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Abstract

Redlining, neighborhood decline, and violence: How discriminatory government
policies created violent American inner cities.
By
Richard A. Powell
Advisor: Dr. Jeremy Porter

Background – The practice of redlining involved the US government categorizing
certain communities, often those inhabited by people of color, as too risky for private
investment. Because of the resulting disinvestment, many of those neighborhoods
deteriorated throughout the latter half of the 20th Century. It also fostered conditions in
redlined neighborhoods, such as high concentrations of poverty, joblessness, and racial
segregation that the criminological theory of Social Disorganization identifies as
correlates of violent crime.
Research Objectives – This study sought to determine whether redlining influenced
levels of social disorganization operationalized as high levels of poverty,
unemployment, family disruption, and racial isolation, and whether that effect on social
disorganization led to higher rates of violent crime in redlined neighborhoods. In
addition, the study sought to determine whether redlining was associated with other
potentially harmful government funding decisions such as the construction of public
housing and highways, and whether those decisions mediated the effect between
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redlining and social disorganization. Finally, the study examined whether there were
any protective factors, such as proximity to employment, community development
spending, high rates of homeownership, waterfront adjacency, or historical
neighborhood designation that helped to protect some redlined neighborhoods from
said harmful effects.
Methods – This analysis used the city of Chicago as a case study. A custom spatiotemporal dataset was created by aggregating data from a variety of sources in unique
ways, and included measures of redline status, homicide rates, social disorganization
indicators, other government funding decisions, and protective factors. This dataset
allowed for empirical tests of the following relationships: 1) The direct relationship
between redlining and social disorganization, harmful government funding decisions,
protective factors, and homicide rate. 2) The mediating/moderating effect of harmful
government funding decisions and each protective factor on the relationship between
redlining and social disorganization. 3) The mediating effect of social disorganization,
potentially harmful government decisions, and protective factors on the relationship
between redlining and homicide rate.
Results – The study found that redlined neighborhoods indeed saw elevated social
disorganization scores. And, while the relationship diminished over the decades,
redlined neighborhoods continued to see higher indices of social disorganization as
recently as 2010. Redlined neighborhoods were also significantly more likely to have
v

public housing and highways constructed in their borders, and the existence of public
housing at least partially mediated redlining’s positive effect on social disorganization.
Several of the protective factors analyzed also influenced the effect of redlining on
social disorganization. For instance, the effect strengthened as commute time increased.
In addition, high levels of homeownership, waterfront adjacency, and landmark status
were all negatively correlated with social disorganization. Finally, redlining was
positively related to increased homicide rates across the study period. And, this
relationship was almost completely mediated by redlining’s effect on social
disorganization.
Conclusions – This study provides evidence that differential rates of urban homicide
may be a result of discriminatory government policies designed to benefit certain
segments of the population at the cost of disadvantaging others. And, while many of
these policies were enacted decades ago, their harmful effects can still be seen today.
The policy implications of these findings are that violence reduction strategies should
focus less on traditional punitive criminal justice measures, and more on helping
strengthen communities that have been disadvantaged from decades of government
sponsored discrimination.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Redlining, a phenomenon by which government policies systematically starved
certain, often Black, communities of investments and other services and left them to
deteriorate, was common in many of America’s inner cities during the 1930s. Indeed,
the roots of many social problems found in certain neighborhoods today such as
poverty, segregation, and crime can be traced back to this practice.
The term redlining originated with the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC),
a government organization tasked with assessing neighborhood lending risk as part of a
New Deal initiative to make homeownership more attainable, which created colored
maps of neighborhoods based on their perceived credit risk. The maps assigned credit
risk grades to each neighborhood ranging from A (best) through D (hazardous) 1. The
grades A through D were also associated on the maps with the colors green (A), blue
(B), yellow (C), and red (D). Neighborhoods given the worst rating, often for the simple
fact that they housed minority communities (which were colored red, hence the term
redlining); were all but ensured to be cut off from investments, both public and private,
for decades as a result. This lack of investment often led these neighborhoods into a
spiral of neglect and disrepair that has lasted for decades and may have even acted as a
harbinger for other discriminatory policies that further hurt their residents.

1

In addition, B rated neighborhoods were labeled “desirable” while C-rated neighborhoods were labelled
“declining”

1

Problem Statement
Social Disorganization Theory incorporates a wide body of criminological
literature that links variance in crime rates to variance in characteristics of place.
Originally, this theory posited that places with higher levels of social disorder such as
poverty, residential mobility, racial heterogeneity, and joblessness will have higher
levels of crime. Due to changes in urban environments in the Twentieth Century, more
recent interpretations of social disorganization have focused less on racial heterogeneity
and residential mobility, and more on concentrated disadvantage, family disruption,
and social isolation (R. Sampson, 1987; R. J. Sampson & Wilson, 1995). And, while
research on social disorganization theory has created an empirical link between
community indicators of disadvantage and crime, it generally takes for granted the
reason why these conditions have tended to concentrate in certain communities.
However, recent evidence in areas outside of criminology suggest that social
disorganization is not simply a result of a natural process of neighborhood change, as
suggested by those who benefited from it (Pritchett, 2003), but indeed was caused by
discriminatory government policies and practices, including redlining and its
subsequent consequences that disadvantaged poor communities of color while
benefiting wealthier white communities (Gordon, 2008; J. R. Logan, 2016; Rothstein,
2017).

2

The purpose of this study is to determine whether redlining influenced those
measures commonly associated with increased levels of crime in the social
disorganization literature, and whether this relationship could explain variance in levels
of violent crime across neighborhoods. As I plan to show in my review of the literature,
studies indicate that redlining may have created neighborhood conditions generally
associated with social disorganization in criminological literature in many of America’s
inner-city neighborhoods. In addition, I test whether neighborhoods affected by
heightened levels of social disorganization and concentrated disadvantage may also
see increases in violent crime rates. I also tested whether, because redlining promoted
the segregation of Blacks into redlined neighborhoods, those neighborhoods became
more likely to be subjected to other discriminatory government policies. Specifically, I
tested whether the construction of segregated public housing and neighborhood
demolition for the construction of highways further promoted social disorganization
and therefore increased violent crime. Finally, I tested whether certain protective factors
- including travel distance to the city center, government redevelopment spending,
homeownership rates, and the existence of natural and manmade amenities - allowed
some redlined neighborhoods to avoid seeing increases in social disorganization and
crime associated with the practice.

3

Research Questions
This study sought to answer the following research questions:
1. What effect has the discriminatory practice of redlining had on area measures of
social disorganization?
While ecological theories of neighborhood decline treat it as a natural process of
neighborhood evolution (Hoover & Vernon, 1962; Krysan & Bader, 2009; Schwirian,
1983; Sweeney, 1974), another set of theories suggest that neighborhood decline
occurred, in many instances, as a direct result of discriminatory government policies
designed to promote racial segregation and advantage white households over Black
households (Gordon, 2008; J. R. Logan, 2016; Rothstein, 2017). I propose that redlining is
one particularly egregious example of this type of policy. Therefore, I hypothesize that
neighborhoods subjected to it, specifically those given D ratings by the HOLC, as a
result of the negative effects of receiving the rating will have higher levels of social
disorganization including: higher unemployment, higher poverty rates, lower
homeownership rates, higher levels of racial segregation, and more single parent
families following this designation 2 compared to neighborhoods that were not given D
ratings.

2

Note, these are the indicators of social disorganization used by Chamberlain and Hipp (2015) in their analysis of
social disorganization.
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In addition, studies show that, for a variety of reasons, disadvantage tends to
persist in certain communities (Graves, 2003; Lang & Nakamura, 1992; R. J. Sampson &
Sharkey, 2008; Sharkey, 2008). Therefore, I hypothesize that the neighborhoods
subjected to redlining will generally remain socially disadvantaged, even decades after
the practice of redlining was officially abolished. However, other evidence shows this
effect may diminish somewhat over time (Krimmel, 2018), therefore I expect that this
link may be strongest in the decades directly following redlining.
2. Has the effect of redlining on social disorganization been partially mediated by
government funding decisions in certain areas that fuel disinvestment?
City governments often targeted minority neighborhoods as the locations for
projects such as public housing and highway construction that rip apart the fabric of
communities under the guise of slum clearance (Bayor, 1988; Connerly, 2002; Harcourt,
2009; Julian & Daniel, 1989; Rothstein, 2017). I hypothesize that HOLC’s residential
security maps may have acted as a roadmap for both purposes by helping governments
easily identify minority neighborhoods and by providing evidence of neighborhood
disrepair. Therefore, I expect that such projects will be much more likely to have been
built in neighborhoods that were given a D rating by the HOLC. In addition, I
hypothesize that because these funding decisions lead to a disruption of the fabric of
neighborhoods, they will partially mediate the effect between redlining and social
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disorganization. Specifically, I expect that neighborhoods subjected to such funding
decisions will see a worsening of social disorganization indicators as a result.
3. Are there protective factors that moderate the effect of redlining on social
disorganization by protecting areas against its harmful effects?
Studies show that a neighborhood’s characteristics, such as the presence of
durable goods including bridges and railways, and the neighborhood’s natural
amenities (S. Lee & Lin, 2013; Lin, 2015; Puga & Duranton, 2014), can impact a
community’s economic wellbeing over time. In the current study, I refer to these as
protective factors, those that potentially lessen the harmful effects of redlining. While
there are countless factors that could fall into these two categories, I will examine five: a
neighborhood’s commute time to the central business district where many high-paying
jobs are located, the amount of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) spent in each
neighborhood which will act as a proxy for positive neighborhood investment,

the

homeownership rate in each neighborhood, whether a neighborhood is waterfront
adjacent, and whether it contains a landmark district – a designation given to
historically significant Chicago neighborhoods.
Given the literature on the effects of housing quality and access to natural
amenities and durable goods, I hypothesize that short commute times, high
homeownership rates, larger amounts of TIF funding spent, bordering a body of water,
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and containing a landmark district will act as protective factors that lessen the effect of
redlining on social disorganization while long commute times, low homeownership
rates, and low TIF spending will have the opposite effect.
4. What effect has redlining had on area homicide rates, and is this relationship
mediated by redlining’s effect on area social disorganization? How is this effect
mediated or moderated by government funding decisions and protective factors?
There is no shortage of studies empirically linking social disorganization
indicators to heightened levels of crime (Carroll & Jackson, 1983; Crutchfield et al., 1982;
Hipp, 2007; Pratt & Cullen, 2005). Therefore, I hypothesize that neighborhood HOLC
grade will be related to violent crime levels. Specifically, neighborhoods deemed riskier
by the HOLC will, on average, have higher rates of crime than those neighborhoods
that were determined to be less risky. However, I propose that, given the theoretical
link between redlining and social disorganization, that this relationship will be
mediated by redlining’s effect on levels of neighborhood disadvantage. Figure 1
below summarizes my hypothesized theory of change. In the diagram, blue arrows
represent positive relationships while red arrows represent negative relationships.

7

Figure 1- Proposed Relationships between Variables

Current Study
I used Chicago as a case study to test for the relationships theorized above. This
is because Chicago is a large American city with diverse neighborhoods that has historic
problems with violent crime concentrated in certain City neighborhoods. Second, there
exist rich datasets for Chicago in the areas of crime, government investments, and
historical resident demographics. And finally, Chicago is a good example of a city that
has seen vast urban renewal projects throughout the last century, making it an ideal
case study of the effects of discriminatory government practices on violent crime rates.
To answer these questions posited in this project, I have collected data on
homicide rates, social disorganization, government funded projects, and protective
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factors as outlined above for the city of Chicago. First, to answer questions 1,2, and 4, I
performed a spatial temporal analysis testing the effect of redlining, other potential
deleterious government funding decisions, and protective factors on levels of
neighborhood disadvantage to examine the effect of these variables on social
disorganization over space and time. In addition, for research question 2, I tested
whether redlining affected government funding decisions, specifically the decisions
regarding where to build highways and public housing developments. To answer
question 3, I ran analyses testing whether protective factors affected levels of social
disorganization and whether the overall effect of redlining was mediated or moderated
by these protective factors. Finally, to answer research question number 4, I tested the
effect of these variables on levels of neighborhood homicide while, at the same time,
examining the mediating effect of social disorganization and the mediating and
moderating effects of government funding decisions and protective factors on this
relationship.
In sum, this study answers the question “are there structural factors (i.e.
redlining) that lead to persistent disadvantage, and therefore crime, which tends to
concentrate in certain places over time?” Specifically, I expect this research will help fill
the knowledge gap left by social disorganization theory of how and why specific
neighborhoods become socially disorganized. In addition, I hope that this research will
help move the focus of blame from the communities who suffer from these conditions
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and onto the power structures, especially national, state, and local governments,
responsible for creating and perpetuating said conditions.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
Background – Redlining and Housing Segregation
The term redlining refers to the denial of services to certain spatially defined
communities based on their racial, ethnic, or income composition (Bartelt, 2010). The
practice officially began with the creation of HOLC in 1933. Following the Great
Depression, home mortgages were prohibitively expensive, and often required
extremely large down payments and short repayment schedules. As a result, many
Americans were unable to afford homes, and those that could were subjected to high
rates of foreclosure (Rothstein, 2017). The HOLC, one of many New Deal programs
founded to help heal the country from the effects of the Great Depression, was designed
to create the first government-backed mortgage system (Mitchell & Franco, 2018). The
specific goals of the HOLC were to: protect homeowners from foreclosure, relieve them
from the burden of excessive interest and principal payments, and declare a national
policy of protecting homeownership (Jackson, 1980). The program did this by
purchasing mortgages that were in default and providing better terms to struggling
families (Mitchell & Franco, 2018). Between 1933 and 1935 alone, the program provided
over $3 billion in funding for over 1 million mortgages (Jackson, 1980).
In 1935 the HOLC’s parent organization, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) created a program that used HOLC staff in partnership with local realtors and
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lenders to appraise the real estate risk for neighborhoods in 239 cities across the United
States (Hillier, 2003). The result was the creation of a rating system that designated
neighborhoods letter grades from A – in demand residential locations through D –
undesirable neighborhoods that have already declined beyond repair (Jackson, 1980).
The designation of D rated neighborhoods as red on the physical maps led to the
coining of the term redlining. Using these designations, the HOLC created residential
security maps. Along with neighborhood designations, these residential security maps
also included justifications for each neighborhood’s rating, which often included crude
descriptions of the neighborhood, its housing stock, and the residents that lived there
(Greer, 2013).
There is some debate as to whether the residential security maps explicitly used a
neighborhood’s racial makeup in assigning its designation. Greer (2013), for instance,
notes that HOLC analysts considered a wide range of factors including race. And while
race was an important predictive factor, the strongest correlate of risk grade was a
neighborhood’s quality and upkeep of homes. Conversely, Rothstein (2017) notes that
neighborhoods received a D rating if they had any African American residents, even if
the neighborhood was solidly middle class and contained only single-family homes,
indicating that actual HOLC rating criteria often strayed from its stated criteria. In
addition, the ratings generally favored newer, more affluent suburbs, while giving
lower ratings to more densely populated urban neighborhoods, which were more likely
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to be inhabited by Black families, even in neighborhoods where homes were in good
condition (Jackson, 1980).
While the HOLC actually did most of its lending in C and D rated
neighborhoods, their residential security maps unfortunately had severe consequences
on other lending institutions. Indeed, evidence suggests that the FHLBB widely
distributed articles to member banks warning them about the negative effects that
certain neighborhood demographics, such as the presence of people of color (which at
the time included groups such as Russians, Greeks, Polish, Armenians, Jews, Slavs,
Italians, Mexican Americans, and Japanese among others), could have on mortgage
finance and urged them to use standard scientific risk appraisals (Woods, 2012). And
this information appears to have had an effect, as a questionnaire circulated in the late
1930s by the FHLBB that asked banks about their lending practices revealed that private
banks often only made home loans in neighborhoods designated A or B on the
residential security maps (Jackson, 1980). As a result, these residential security maps,
along with their support by the FHLBB, fundamentally altered nationwide lending
practices in a way that disadvantaged communities of color, and those that were
socioeconomically disadvantaged while advantaging those who were white and
economically advantaged. The exact effect these ratings had on mortgage lending
practices is difficult to quantify, and studies show that it varies across cities and
neighborhoods depending on local context (Crossney & Bartelt, 2005).
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Direct, government sponsored housing segregation started with the passing of
the National Housing Act of 1934, a New Deal initiative designed to “encourage
improvement in housing standards and conditions, to provide a system of mutual
mortgage insurance, and for other purposes” (United States Congress, 1934). This act
established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) which insured bank mortgages
that allowed lenders to make loans that were backed by the federal government,
making lending far less risky. This substantially increased the number of Americans
who could buy a home. It is estimated that by the end of 1972, the FHA helped nearly
11 million families buy houses and an additional 22 million improve their properties
(Jackson, 1980). However, the FHA created its own underwriting manual, which relied
heavily on the HOLC residential security maps (Woods, 2012) for appraising properties
to ensure loans were at a low risk for default, and these guidelines included a whitesonly requirement, stating that properties would be too risky to insure if they were in
racially mixed neighborhoods. It also favored mortgages in white areas that were
protected from infringement by people of color through natural or artificial boundaries
(Rothstein, 2017). This, in effect, meant that the government was directly involved in
lending practices that promoted racial segregation. In addition, the manual favored
mortgages in suburban areas with newer homes on larger lots. This was true even for
home improvement loans even though inner-city neighborhoods had a larger number
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of older homes in need of repair (Jackson, 1980). As a result, inner-city Black
neighborhoods were left to deteriorate as white families fled to the suburbs.
In 1968, President Lynden Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title VIII
of the act, often referred to as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which prohibited
discrimination concerning the sale, rental, or financing of housing based on race,
religion, national origin, and sex and initially included enforcement mechanisms for
handling breaches of the law (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), n.d.). Unfortunately, to make the bill more palatable to liberal Republicans,
Senator Everett Dickerson of Illinois amended it in such a way that weakened HUD’s
enforcement capabilities, thereby weakening the bill’s ability to meet its goal of housing
desegregation (Massey, 2015). And, unlike other forms of desegregation such as voting
rights for minorities and integration of transportation, reversing the damage done by
decades of segregation has proven extremely difficult because addressing said damage
would require large scale interventions designed to improve the economic status of
minorities following years of employment discrimination and address inequalities in
wealth accumulation due to housing discrimination. It would also require addressing
the disparate impact of policies such as mortgage interest deductions and the building
of highways to white suburbs while neglecting inner-city public transportation; and the
effect that these policies have had on disadvantaged groups (Rothstein, 2017).
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Despite the strides in racial equality that have been made since the HOLC
initially created their residential security maps, redlining has had a devastating, and
long-lasting impact on Black and Latinx inner-city neighborhoods. In The Color of Money
author Bill Deadman paints a picture of how redlining leads to neighborhood decline:
As a consequence of redlining, neighborhoods that local banks
deemed unfit for investment were left underdeveloped or in disrepair.
Attempts to improve these neighborhoods with even relatively small-scale
business ventures were commonly obstructed by financial institutions that
continued to label the underwriting as too risky or simply rejected them
outright. When existing businesses collapsed, new ones were not allowed
to replace them, often leaving entire blocks empty and crumbling.
Consequently African Americans in those neighborhoods were frequently
limited in their access to banking, healthcare, retail merchandise, and even
groceries. (1988)

Many of the neighborhoods affected by redlining have still not recovered to this
day. For instance, studies show that neighborhoods that were redlined have seen less
development, are more segregated, have lower home prices, see more subprime
mortgages, and have higher rates of foreclosure (Aaronson, Hartley, & Mazmuder,
2017; Appel & Nickerson, 2016; Faber, 2017; Rutan & Glass, 2018).

Theoretical Background – Social Disorganization
Social Disorganization is a criminological theory conceived by Clifford Shaw
and Henry McKay who found that high rates of delinquency were not evenly
distributed across cities but were concentrated in areas with high levels of poverty,
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ethnic heterogeneity, and population turnover. They concluded that these areas had
higher rates of delinquency because conventional institutions of social control such as
family, school, and churches were weakened, and therefore unable to regulate
delinquent behavior in socially disorganized areas (Shaw & McKay, 1942). In Shaw and
McKay’s view, these forms of social control existed in established, stable neighborhoods
where residents shared a common vision for their community and sufficient resources
to provide said control. However, in newly and rapidly formed neighborhoods, they
hypothesized these regulating forces were lacking or non-existent. This hypothesis was
partially supported by a review of the home addresses of male truants in Chicago in the
1920s. These maps showed such individuals were concentrated in “zones of transition”
outside of the center city that were characterized by proximity to industrial areas, high
population turnover, and large immigrant populations.
Empirical tests of the tenants of Social Disorganization have supported Shaw and
McKay’s findings (Carroll & Jackson, 1983; Crutchfield et al., 1982; Hipp, 2007; Pratt &
Cullen, 2005). For instance, Miethe et al. (1991) used pooled cross-sectional data from
584 U.S. cities across three decades, finding that indicators of social disorganization
including ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and unemployment all strongly
influenced crime rates. In addition, Groves and Sampson (1989) analyzed sparse
friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational
participation as measures of social disorganization and found them to have a significant
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effect on crime in English cities. Stark (1987) sought to determine why crime persists in
certain places, concluding that ecological factors such as density, poverty, transience,
and dilapidation lead to the following responses: moral cynicism among residents;
increased opportunities for crime and deviance, increased motivation to deviate, and
diminished social control which increase the volume of deviance by attracting deviant
and crime-prone people and criminal activities to a neighborhood; driving out the least
deviant, and thereby further reducing social control.
Re-conceptualizing Social Disorganization
However, since the time of Shaw and McKay, who studied crime during a time
of urban expansion in the United States, the prevailing wisdom around the causes of
social disorganization has shifted. Instead, following deindustrialization in American
Cities during the 1960s and 1970s, neighborhood disorder began to be associated with
urban decline and its negative effect on urban economies instead of urban expansion
(Wilson, 1987). This also shifted how the idea of social disorganization was
operationalized in a modern context, focusing on concentrated disadvantage rather
than disorganization caused by rapid neighborhood transformation. In Towards a Theory
of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality (1995), Sampson and Wilson attempt to explain the
difference in crime rates between Black and white communities, positing that
“macrosocial patterns of residential inequality by race gave rise to the social isolation
and ecological concentration of the truly disadvantaged, which in turn led to structural
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barriers and behavioral adaptations that undermined social organization and hence the
control of crime and violence” (R. J. Sampson et al., 2018). In addition, Sampson (1987)
added family disruption as an important factor in measuring social disorganization,
finding that Black male joblessness stemming from these economic shifts led to an
increase in female-headed households, which were strongly associated with increased
levels of violent crime. Other recent studies have questioned whether the traditional
idea that an influx of new residents, especially immigrants, lead to increased levels of
crime. For instance, Lee and Martinez (2002) studied immigrant communities in Miami,
FL, finding that immigration was not associated with increased levels of crime, but,
instead tended to lead to neighborhood revitalization, calling into the question the link
between residential mobility and crime. In addition, while Shaw and McKay identified
inner city neighborhoods, especially those directly adjacent to downtown, as having the
highest levels of social disorganization, more contemporary evidence shows this is no
longer the case due to a variety of forces such as gentrification and the suburbanization
of poverty (Ellen & O’Regan, 2008; McKinnish et al., 2010). Indeed, a spatial analysis
comparing the income and race of individuals living in the central areas of cities to
those living in neighborhoods further out and in the suburbs found both sets of
neighborhoods to be racially and economically diverse (Schuetz et al., 2017).
There is a wealth of empirical evidence supporting this reconceptualization of
social disorganization. For instance, a meta-analysis on predictors of violent crime

19

found that studies found consistently strong evidence for the association between the
following contextual factors and high levels of crime: racial heterogeneity (as measured
by a high proportion of Black residents), unemployment, poverty, and family
disruption. In addition, the study only found a moderate association between
residential mobility and crime (Pratt & Cullen, 2005). Another meta-analysis found that
“one consistent pattern emerges from race-specific studies irrespective of the outcomes,
predictors, and units under consideration: Structural disadvantage contributes
significantly to violence for both Blacks and whites” (R. D. Peterson & Krivo, 2005).
Going forward, this study will focus on this, more modern, interpretation of social
disorganization as opposed to the original version posited by Shaw and McKay.
The Geography and Racialization of Social Disorganization
Literature on social disorganization notes that it is generally found in segregated
and socially isolated inner-city Black communities. Shaw and McKay note, for instance,
that one cannot directly compare rates of delinquency between Black and white youth,
since it is impossible to reproduce the circumstances found in Black communities in
white communities: “Even if it were possible to parallel the low economic status and the
inadequacy of institutions in the white community, it would not be possible to
reproduce the effects of segregation and the barriers to upward mobility” (1949).
According to W.J. Wilson (1987), this is a result of structural economic changes that
occurred in the 1960s, mainly deindustrialization, which led to extremely high rates of
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Black male joblessness which subsequently led to an increase in female headed
households. This issue was exacerbated by the extreme concentration of poverty and
social isolation from mainstream society in Black communities. In addition, middle class
families, which acted as a buffer from neighborhood deterioration, began to leave the
city for the suburbs en masse. As a result, Blacks suffered much higher rates of
concentrated poverty and family disruption than whites. Indeed, Sampson and Wilson
(1995) found that Blacks were not only two to four times more likely to live in such
conditions, but that there was not one city in the United States with a population
greater than 100,000 where Blacks lived in ecological equality with whites in terms of
these conditions. And, despite large-scale social changes that have occurred since
Sampson and Wilson published those findings, a recent reassessment of their findings
revealed that they generally continue to hold true today (R. D. Peterson & Krivo, 2005;
R. J. Sampson et al., 2018)

.

However, this explanation takes for granted how and why certain communities
became disadvantaged in the first place, often treating these conditions as a given. For
instance, social disorganization theory does not explain why Black communities
suffered higher levels of unemployment and concentrated poverty than predominantly
white communities. From a radical criminological perspective, simply taking the
emergence and distribution of urban poverty as given is inadequate. Instead, this
perspective proposes that understanding why crime is distributed in a certain way
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means understanding how poverty is produced and distributed within a society (Lynch
& Boggess, 2016). Importantly, the same can be said for race and geography. According
to Carter (2009), traditional research of the geography of race that treats subjects as data
points while failing to account for how categories such as race are socially constructed
and how “complex human and institutional relationships” produce such categories can
lead to misleading conclusions. For instance, the author provides examples of studies of
crime that use labels such as “percentage Black” instead of racial homogeneity, which
hides the impact of segregation, and instead correlates crime with the presence of
people of color in a community. Other examples include studies using Black population
as a predictor of crime instead of looking at neighborhood poverty, access to
employment, and dropout rates; essentially assuming that neighborhood racial makeup
could act as a proxy for such factors.
In addition, social disorganization theory proposes that socially disadvantaged
neighborhoods suffer from increased levels of crime because of an inability of their
residents to exert control on their communities through involvement in economic
activity and civic affairs. However, studies have shown that residents of poor
neighborhoods are often actively engaged in their communities (Sanchez-Jankowski,
2008).
A body of literature does exist that examines how neighborhoods become
disadvantaged, why disadvantage tends to persist in certain communities, and how
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disadvantage leads to heightened levels of crime. These studies will be explored in the
next sections of this report.

Causes of Social Disorganization in Urban Communities
There are two competing types of theories that seek to explain why certain
neighborhoods became socially disorganized. The first set of theories, generally referred
to as ecological theories, posit that it occurred because of a natural process involving
shifts in housing preference. For instance, the filtering model describes neighborhood
change as a function of landlord decisions. Specifically, as housing stock begins to age,
upkeep becomes increasingly expensive, and property becomes less valuable as
landlords invest less capital into it. As a result, homes become vacated as tenants who
move into more desirable housing stock are replaced by tenants of lower socioeconomic
status (Sweeney, 1974). The invasion/succession model uses concepts taken from plant
and animal ecology, proposing that as individuals who are socially and racially
different from the current residents of a community (generally poor Black individuals)
move in, conflict arises. And, if a resolution to the conflict is not reached, one group will
withdraw. If the group withdrawing is the original community members, then the new
group will succeed them (Schwirian, 1983). Finally, the neighborhood lifecycle theory
proposes that a neighborhood naturally goes through a life cycle that includes five
stages, which often occur as a result of invasion and succession: development,
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transition, down-grading, thinning out, and renewal (Hoover & Vernon, 1962). Other
theories in this vein include the idea that there exist racialized community gaps where
racial groups have more knowledge of and decide to live in communities where people
of their racial group already live, which in turn leads to concentrations of poor Black
individuals in certain areas (Krysan & Bader, 2009).
Unlike ecological theories, the second set of theories proposes that neighborhood
decline occurred as a direct result of racially motivated government actions including
racially biased lending, the construction of segregated public housing, and the
destruction of Black inner-city neighborhoods through highway construction. In
Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City, Colin Gordon (2008) notes
that the key to urban decline in most American cities lies in their political history, or “in
the ways in which state, local, and federal policies effectively distribute people,
resources, and wealth across the postwar metropolis.” For instance, Logan (2016) notes
that “the very clear hierarchy of better and worse neighborhoods in American urban
areas is not a surprise result from the invisible hand of the market; it is the intended
outcome.” This is because, in addition to residential choices of individuals,
neighborhood change occurs as a result of discriminatory practices that are politically
motivated to serve the interests of wealthy constituents, while concentrating poor and
minority constituents into small geographic areas (J. R. Logan, 2016). And it was not just
one government policy that led to residential segregation, but “scores of racially explicit
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laws, regulations, and government practices combined to create a nationwide system of
urban ghettos surrounded by white suburbs” (Rothstein, 2017, p. XII).
One of the main methods the government used to create segregated ghettos was
through the development of public housing. This is because many of America’s public
housing authorities were created as a mechanism to ensure residential segregation
through the development of segregated public housing developments (Julian & Daniel,
1989). This often involved replacing integrated neighborhoods with segregated public
housing developments. Indeed, the Public Works Administration (PWA), a New Deal
agency designed to alleviate the national housing shortage following the Great
Depression, often designated integrated urban neighborhoods as either “white” or
“Black” neighborhoods and proceeded to make these designations a reality by
developing segregated public housing developments within them. For example, in the
1930’s the City of St. Louis, MO designated parts of the mixed-race, multi-ethnic
community of DeSoto-Carr as slums so that they could be demolished to make way for
two segregated public housing developments; one for white residents, the other for
Black residents (Heathcott, 2011). In addition, in 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), with the support of HUD, had unconstitutionally
selected sites for segregated public housing to maintain the city’s segregated landscape.
In response, the U.S. Solicitor General defended HUD stating: “There will be an
enormous practical impact on innocent communities who have to bear the burden of
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public housing, who will have to host a plaintiff class from Chicago, which they
wronged in no way” (Rothstein, 2017, p. 35).
The development of segregated public housing also led to neighborhood
disorder by producing neighborhood turnover that resulted in instability as families
were forced to relocate (Bursik, 1989). In addition, by the end of the 1950s, strict income
limits were put in place so that only the poorest families could live in public housing.
These regulations forced most white and middle-class Black families out of public
housing. This, along with a lack of political will, led decreased maintenance budgets,
thereby causing most public housing stock to fall into extreme levels of disrepair
(Rothstein, 2017). This deterioration, combined with the fact that local public housing
authorities frequently concentrated developments in a small number of neighborhoods,
resulted in the development of poor, segregated urban ghettos (Schill & Wachter, 1995).
As an example, Mieslin and Daley (1988) detail how the City of New York purchased
thousands of buildings which they converted to public housing, only to let them
deteriorate beyond repair, leading to the decline of entire NYC neighborhoods.
While city governments were concentrating the poor in inner-city
neighborhoods, they were also contributing to the decay of these communities using
“planned shrinkage” policies. In an attempt to prompt people to move out of
neighborhoods to clear the way for redevelopment, governments cut off critical
municipal services that were crucial to maintaining those neighborhoods (Bettencourt &
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West, 2010). In New York City, for instance, this included a reduction in firefighting
services which led to the unwarranted destruction of housing stock, and population loss
in many City neighborhoods (Wallace & Wallace, 1990). Governments further promoted
neighborhood decay by financing the construction of segregated suburban
developments and subsidizing white families to buy homes in these new
neighborhoods while, at the same time, refusing to insure the construction of integrated
developments (Rothstein, 2014). This “white flight” led to a decrease in the tax base for
many inner-city neighborhoods and further fueled their decline. Many city
governments further induced deterioration of Black inner-city communities by
systematically over assessing property values in those neighborhoods, thereby
increasing the tax burden of people living in them. This meant that homeowners in
those neighborhoods had less disposable income available to maintain their properties
and were often forced to take in borders as a result, which altered the characteristics of
many communities from being primarily composed of single-family dwellings to being
composed mainly of multi-family dwellings (Rothstein, 2017).
Government policies not directly related to housing also played a significant role
in neighborhood decline. For instance, the passing of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1956 led to the construction of a vast system of freeways (Glass, 2012). And while this
meant that people could travel from place to place more quickly by car, it also led to
much shorter commuting times from suburban neighborhoods to center cities, making
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suburban living much more attractive to white families with economic means. As a
result, between 1950 and 1990, neighborhoods in America’s inner-cities lost seventeen
percent of their population while metropolitan areas as a whole saw a population
growth of seventy-two percent (Baum-Snow, 2007). Governments also frequently used
highway construction as a method for destroying Black communities in the name of
slum clearance in order to benefit white suburban commuters (Rothstein, 2017). For
example, in Birmingham, AL, highways were built through Black neighborhoods as a
means of maintaining racial boundaries that were established in the city in the 1920s. In
addition to enforcing segregation, the construction of said highways also had a
deleterious effect on Birmingham’s Black neighborhoods through population loss
caused by forced relocation and by threatening the viability of businesses in those
neighborhoods by cutting them off from the rest of the city (Connerly, 2002). Similarly
in Atlanta, highways were designed to act as walls separating Black and white
neighborhoods in the city, thereby concentrating Blacks into small, impoverished
pockets (Bayor, 1988). A national analysis on the overall effect of highway construction
on urban neighborhoods (Nall & O’Keeffe, 2018) found that neighborhoods with
interstate highways built through them before 1970 saw a fifteen percent decrease in
population and housing stock, and that the affected neighborhoods were
disproportionately those that were subjected to redlining. Today, many of those
highways built through poor and Black communities are now crumbling, and many
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cities across the country are looking to tear them down in an attempt to reverse the
damage they have done to inner-city communities (McFarland, 2021).
One of the major methods that governments used to enact said programs in the
decades following WWII was the use of eminent domain. However, the Public Use
Clause, which stated that eminent domain could only be used where it provided
specific benefits to the general public, complicated its use by governments. To sidestep
this issue, urban renewal advocates began using the term “blight”, which they
suggested was a disease that threatened the health of American cities. “A vague,
amorphous term, blight was a rhetorical device that enabled renewal advocates to
reorganize property ownership by declaring certain real estate dangerous to the future
of the city.” This rhetorical tactic was successful, in 1954 in the case of Berman vs.
Parker, the Supreme Court approved the use of eminent domain as a justification for
slum clearance and urban revitalization (Pritchett, 2003). This decision was later upheld
in the case of Kelso vs. City of New London which allowed governments to seize
private land and transfer it to private developers if said development would provide
public benefit (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). Interestingly, the
combined use of the term blight along with eminent domain allowed governments and
private interests to reshape inner city neighborhoods through the guise of ecological
change. Indeed, studies have shown that the use of eminent domain disproportionately
targets poor communities of color (Carpenter & Ross, 2009). Such revitalization efforts
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lead to displacement of those living in poverty, and often led to long-term negative
economic, social, and psychological outcomes; and those displaced residents often
found themselves living in neighborhoods with equivalent or worse conditions than the
ones they left because of “blight” (Broussard, 2000). Indeed, such urban renewal
projects produced such high levels of alienation and collective stress that public health
expert Mindy Fullilove referred to it as root shock (Fullilove et al., 2016). In addition,
forced relocation leads to residential instability and is associated with increased forced
and unforced residential mobility among low-income renters. This is unfortunate as
residential stability leads to improved social relationships and community wellbeing
and improved educational outcomes (Desmond et al., 2015).
Importantly, these discriminatory policies were not explicitly designed to
disadvantage Blacks, but instead, to provide an advantage for whites. For instance,
many of the urban renewal projects whose initial goal was to improve affordable
housing ended up going towards private projects that protected central city business
and property investments, which benefited white business owners along with the
careers of white politicians (J. Logan, 2007). They did this by: shifting urban economies
from focusing on factory production to the service industry, subsidizing the
development of office centers on previously residential land, creating buffers between
new affluent shopping centers and poor communities, and helping cities compete for
corporate investments by constructing luxury housing and other cultural amenities.
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In the 1960s, FHA officials worked with blockbusters in financing white flight
into the suburbs and then aided predatory realtors in arranging the sale of substandard
housing at inflated prices to desperate minority families. The resulting sales and
subsequent foreclosures brought the white lenders great profits. When housing prices
later increased during the 1970s, white homeowners who were able to take advantage
of the discriminatory financing policies saw increases in equity as a result of increasing
home prices, while most Black families who were excluded from said benefits faced
even higher costs of entry into the housing market (Lipsitz, 2018). Indeed, in 1968, the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which was founded by the
President of the United States Dwight Eisenhower to determine the cause of civil unrest
in American cities, produced the Kerner Report which found that “white society is
deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions
maintain it, and white society condones it” (United States National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, 1988).

Persistence of Social Disorganization in Certain Communities
By the 1970s, nearly all the previously mentioned discriminatory government
practices were abolished. However, social disorganization still plagues many of the
neighborhoods subjected to them. To understand why, it is important to examine why
disorder persists in certain communities. One theory of why conditions change very
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little in certain neighborhoods is the idea path dependence which emphasizes “the
importance of historical patterns of economic development and institutional capacitybuilding for understanding the developmental trajectory and capacities of
contemporary city regions” (Sorensen, 2015). In other words, change in neighborhoods
is affected by those neighborhoods’ histories. In policy literature, path dependence
centers on the idea of marginal returns which states that the further one travels down a
specific path, the greater the marginal returns of staying on that path, and the greater
the cost of changing paths (Pierson, 2000). A good example of this is Brooks and Lutz’s
(1989) examination of development patterns in San Francisco neighborhoods that had
street cars around the turn of the 20th century. They found that neighborhoods that had
street cars then had greater density today than neighborhoods that did not. The authors
conclude that this is a result of dense historical zoning patterns ossifying around
neighborhoods with street cars and agglomeration, or the clustering of private activity
around street cars because of increasing returns due to the higher density in those
neighborhoods. In addition to the effect of agglomeration on neighborhood path
dependence, Lin (2015) also identifies sunk factors, or the idea that certain
neighborhoods will continue to attract economic activity because they already contain
durable capital such as bridges, roads, railways, and high-end housing, as a major
factor.
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Social and economic factors can also lead to path dependence. Sharkey (2008), for
example, examined the phenomenon of intergenerational contextual mobility, or the
degree to which inequalities in neighborhood environments persist across generations.
He found that there was remarkable continuity in neighborhood economic status from
one generation to the next resulting from a lack of economic mobility for individuals
living in America’s poorest communities. The permanency of conditions across
neighborhoods could also be due, in part, to personal choice. Sampson and Sharkey
(2008) found, for example, that residential stratification in Chicago was reproduced by
choices made by individuals of different ethnic groups moving to and from
communities. They found that individual preferences and structural constraints led to a
self-reinforcing cycle of inequality in which little exchange occurred between poor and
wealthy neighborhoods, or between white neighborhoods and communities of color.
Path dependence may also mean that neighborhoods subjected to redlining
could still be feeling its effects today. One potential reason for this is that housing is an
extremely durable good, and therefore decisions that affect neighborhood development
will have long-lasting effects on zoning, residential density, and quality of housing
stock (Puga & Duranton, 2014). In addition, a neighborhood’s former redlined status
may affect current day lending practices in that neighborhood since lenders use
information on previous loans to determine the current-day value of homes in an area.
In neighborhoods where few loans have been issued, for instance because of redlining,
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there exists more uncertainty, leading lenders to require larger down payments and
deterring future homeownership in the area (Lang & Nakamura, 1992). The same can be
said for other forms of lending, as traditional lenders such as banks tend to avoid
making loans in poor and minority neighborhoods which are instead often targeted by
predatory payday lenders who charge extremely high interest rates. This often leads to
a cycle of neglect that causes already poor neighborhoods to further deteriorate (Graves,
2003).
There exists plenty of evidence of differences in lending between neighborhoods
based on sociodemographic factors. Yinger (1997), for instance, found that, nearly three
decades after the passing of the Fair Housing Act, rampant discrimination still existed
in the treatment of minority homebuyers when compared to the treatment of
comparable white homebuyers. Indeed, brokers showed minority buyers far fewer
homes and were far more likely to turn down their applications. In addition, he found
that this discrimination costed Black and Latinx homebuyers billions of dollars each
year. Similarly, Immergluck (2002) found that after controlling for industrial mix, firm
size, neighborhood income and population, firm population, and average credit score,
businesses in Black neighborhoods saw lower lending rates than businesses in white
neighborhoods. As a result, Black-owned businesses were more likely to receive smaller
loans, have to rely on consumer credit, and discontinue operations over time (Bates,
1997). Massey et. al analyzed excerpts from fair lending lawsuits, finding evidence of
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systematic racism in mortgage lending practices, which included outright deception of
members of communities of color to coerce them into taking out high-cost, high-risk
mortgages. The authors conclude that “the cumulative disadvantage in wealth
experienced by African Americans today is no mere coincidence, but the outcome of
systemic racism deeply embedded within the social structure of America's mortgage
lending industry” (2016).
Shocks, or events that have a significant impact on neighborhood structures, can
also have long lasting effects on communities. This is true for both natural and manmade disasters. In San Francisco, for instance, Siodla (2015) found that neighborhoods
that lost a substantial number of buildings to a fire in 1906 had higher residential
density in 2011 than neighborhoods that were not burned in the fire since developers
constructed housing that was denser than what previously existed in razed
neighborhoods. The authors concluded that the substantial redevelopment of durable
buildings can have long-lasting effects on urban land-use patterns over time. Note, this
durability argument indicates that the construction of durable, quality housing means
that initial neighborhood housing quality may act as a protective factor against social
disorganization, since quality housing may be better able to withstand against
deterioration. Similarly, Redding and Strum (2016) found that patterns of bombing
damage suffered during World War II correlated with current day home prices and
patterns of socioeconomic residential sorting. And, while neighborhoods that suffered
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from deterioration caused by discriminatory government policies may not seem directly
comparable to those that suffered damage from fires or bombings, one must consider
the fact that neighborhoods affected by urban decay experienced a significant loss in
housing stock as a result of disrepair. Therefore, one could argue that redlining
constituted a shock to the neighborhoods subjected to it. Shocks can also affect the
actions of individuals living in certain communities in ways that make it more difficult
for them to recover. An example can be found in German counties that suffered from
high levels of Jewish persecution over the span of many generations. In those areas,
D’Acunto (2015) found that residents had less access to financial services, were less
likely to hold stocks, had fewer mortgages, and put less savings into bank accounts.
The stigma associated with poor urban communities also makes it more difficult
for such neighborhoods to recover from the economic disadvantage they suffered due
to discrimination. This is especially true in the United States, where the stigma
associated with the Black “ghetto” is particularly strong. The term ghetto itself has often
been used incorrectly to refer to any area with high levels of poverty. In addition, the
idea of a single stereotypical ghetto does not exist, as areas of concentrated Black
poverty do not all look alike (Small, 2008). Instead, opponents of this conceptualization
argue that it is more important to focus on the idea of “ghettoization” which should be
understood as involving the processes of “segregation, racial
stigmatization/domination, economic disadvantage, and state action carried out
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through policy” (Chaddha & Wilson, 2008). In comparing the perception of Black
ghettos in the United States to those in France, Wacquant notes that residents of such
neighborhoods in the United States “suffer from conjugated stigmatization: they cumulate
the negative symbolic capital attached to color and consignment to a specific, reserved
and inferior territory itself devalued for being both the repository of the lowest class
elements of society and a racial reservation” (1993, p. 374). This can inhibit a
neighborhood’s ability to recover from social disorganization in a variety of ways. For
instance, it can result in discursive redlining which is what happens when people talk
about a neighborhood only in negative terms, specifically discussing it as a dangerous
place that must be avoided at all costs. The effect of discursive redlining is that the
negative labels people put on such neighborhoods become part of that neighborhood’s
spatial identity, which can deter individuals from being willing to make personal and
economic investments in such areas. This, in turn, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy
which reproduces inequality (Jones & Jackson, 2011). In addition, Besbris et al (2015)
found that individuals were less likely to make economic transactions in disadvantaged
neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods, indicating that neighborhood perceptions
can have tangible economic effects on people living in them.
In a study of one Latinx community in Boston, Small (2002) found that social
disorganization was not entirely related to structural factors but was highly contingent
on how residents perceived their neighborhood. This was exhibited when a cohort who
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considered the neighborhood a “nice place to live” was replaced by a younger cohort
who considered it “the projects.” As a result, the new cohort participated less in social
organization activities, which subsequently led to neighborhood decline (Small, 2002).
For communities persistently suffering from disadvantage, it may be difficult for
residents to view their neighborhoods positively and therefore participate in social
organization. Wacquant and Wilson (1989) also note that individuals living in extremely
distressed neighborhoods have been almost completely excluded from the current
economy and lack the financial and social capital needed for upward social mobility. As
a result, people in those neighborhoods have little means to change them, or to move to
more affluent neighborhoods. Finally, absent significant shocks such as white flight and
large-scale urban renewal, neighborhood change takes time. In fact, Rosenthal (2008)
studied neighborhood cycles of decline and renewal in Philadelphia, finding that the
average cycle takes approximately 100 years to complete.
Perhaps, at least in part, because social disorganization and disadvantage persist
in the same communities over time, so too does crime. For example, one study
examining gun violence in Boston from 1980 to 2008 found that it tended to be
concentrated in the same small number of street segments, or micro-places, over that
time period (Braga et al., 2010). Weisburd et. al. (2004) came to similar conclusions in
their study of changes in street crime over time in Seattle. These findings follow
Weisburd’s Law of Crime Concentration, which states: “for a defined measure of crime
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at a specific microgeographic unit, the concentration of crime will fall within a narrow
bandwidth of percentages for a defined cumulative proportion of crime” (Weisburd,
2015). And, as evidenced from the literature reviewed here, Weisburd suggests this law
may be the result of unusual levels of social stability in microgeographic crime hot
spots.
Factors that Protect Against Social Disorganization
There are also factors that may help alleviate the effect of social disorganization.
One example which was mentioned earlier is the existence of high-quality housing
stock in a neighborhood. In this study, these are referred to as protective factors. One
example of a protective factor is the abundance of natural amenities. Specifically,
persistent natural amenities such as coastlines, rivers, and lakes can anchor
neighborhoods as higher income over time. In fact, downtown neighborhoods in coastal
cities were found to be less susceptible to suburbanization of high-income residents in
the mid-twentieth century. In addition, naturally heterogenous cities exhibited spatial
distributions of income that were much more persistent than other cities (S. Lee & Lin,
2013). Other studies have shown that in cities with downtowns that contain natural
amenities, wealthy people are more likely to live downtown, while in urban areas with
central cities that lack natural amenities, wealth individuals are more likely to live in
suburbs (Brueckner et al., 1999). The existence of open recreational space in urban
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neighborhoods has also been found to be associated with lower levels of neighborhood
poverty (Duncan et al., 2013).
Another factor that may act to protect against neighborhood decline and social
disorganization is access to jobs. For instance, Chetty et. al. (2014) found that
neighborhoods with shorter commuting times had significantly higher rates of upward
mobility. This is likely because one of the negative impacts of segregation is that it may
make it difficult for certain individuals to access jobs and other resources that facilitate
upward mobility. Indeed, one study found that approximately 17-25% of the difference
in unemployment between ethnic groups in the United States can be accounted for by
spatial factors, chief among them being racial differences in commute times (Gobillon et
al., 2014). This may be because communities of color are more likely to have low
incomes, and because proximity to employment is particularly important for low-wage
workers who often have fewer choices of where to live and how to travel to work due
to, for instance, the high cost of maintaining an automobile (Berube, 2015).
Another potential protective factor is high levels of homeownership within a
neighborhood. According to Lindblad (2013), homeownership increases neighborhood
levels of collective efficacy by increasing resident sense of community and reduces
resident perception of neighborhood disorder, thereby reducing actual incidences of
crime and disorder. Indeed, this resulting increase in social capital as a result of
increased homeownership may also produce an “opportunity structure” that puts
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residents in regular contact with individuals with access to resources, which may
increase their likelihood of employment (Manturuk et al., 2010). It may also produce
feelings of commitment to a neighborhood that produce a sense of community (Brown
et al., 2003) that makes residents more active in their neighborhoods and more likely to
remain in their neighborhood if indicators of disadvantage appear due to a desire
attempt to fix those problems out of a sense of community instead of fleeing them (B. A.
Lee et al., 1994).
Studies have also shown that a neighborhood being designated as a historic
landmark district is associated with increased property values (Leichenko et al., 2001).
However, other studies have indicated that the restrictions on homeowners that come
along with historic designations may actually hurt home values, and that the increase in
property values found in other studies may actually be the result of omitted variables
such as the desirability of historic homes in said neighborhoods (Heintzelman & Altieri,
2013). Indeed, a study by the London School of Economics divided the effects on
property values in landmark districts into heritage effects – those related to the specific
character of buildings in said districts, and policy effects – those stemming from
legislation imposed on those areas. They found that higher property values are, at least
partially, driven by the favorable property and location characteristics found inside
historic designation districts, indicating a heritage effect was at play (Ahlfeldt et al.,
2012).
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Government spending specifically aimed at promoting investment in
neighborhoods has also been found to protect against neighborhood disinvestment and
social disorganization. One study of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
program, for instance, found that neighborhood investment through these grants,
which were designed to help cities build viable urban neighborhoods, was associated
with increased mortgage approval rates, higher home purchase loans, and increases in
the number of businesses in communities that received them (Galster et al., 2004). Other
studies have shown that TIF funding, the main funding tool through which the city of
Chicago uses to promote community investment, have found that it has increased
commercial activity in neighborhoods that have received such funding (Merriman et al.,
2011). However, one study showed that after accounting for neighborhood selection
bias, the program produced little or no tangible economic benefit to local residents
(Lester, 2013). Perhaps because the distribution of TIF funds have been found to be
more likely to go to prosperous white neighborhoods than poorer neighborhoods with
a higher proportion of residents of color (Knight, 2015).

The Effect of Social Disorganization on Neighboring Communities
Social disorganization may increase crime rates both in the focal neighborhood
and in nearby neighborhoods. One theory for this “spillover” effect is that violent
crimes, such as homicide, are interpersonal crimes that are based on social interactions
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across networks and are therefore subjected to a process of diffusion (Morenoff et al.,
2001). In such instances, the same social networks that promote social organization and
collective efficacy may also provide social capital to individuals who offend, resulting
in a negotiated coexistence which potentially diminishes the regulatory effectiveness of
collective efficacy (Browning et al., 2004). In addition, these networks may mean that
youths in adjoining areas are being recruited to participate in criminal activity by
youths in a focal, socially disorganized neighborhood, or that adults in the adjoining
neighborhood simply support illegal activities that they consider needed to protect their
life and property from “dangerous” residents from a nearby socially disorganized
neighborhood (Heitgerd & Bursik, 1987).
Regardless of how social disadvantage affects violent crime rates in nearby
neighborhoods, studies support the existence of this spillover effect. Chamberlain and
Hipp (2015), for instance, examined how nearby neighborhoods effected crime in the
focal neighborhood across seventy-nine cities, finding that violent crime was affected by
both disadvantage in the proximate neighborhood, and in nearby neighborhoods. In
addition, Griffiths and Chavez (2004) examined the spatial nature of gun homicides in
Chicago and found that neighborhoods with high levels of gun homicides were
generally surrounded by neighborhoods with a moderate number of gun homicides,
and generally did not share borders with low-homicide communities. The authors note
that this could, in part, be due to defensive diffusion where individuals begin using
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guns because of the high levels of gun violence in nearby neighborhoods. Similarly,
Morenoff et. al (2001) found that a neighborhood’s spatial proximity was strongly
related to increased homicide rates in the focal neighborhood after controlling for
neighborhood characteristics, indicating a spatial dependence in homicide rates across
neighborhoods. Mears and Bhati (2006) studied the effect that disadvantage in
neighboring communities had on the focal neighborhood, finding that higher levels of
economic disadvantage in surrounding neighborhoods led to increased crime in the
focal neighborhood. In addition, they found that property crime increased in areas
where high and low disadvantage areas were spatially proximate, however this was not
the case for violent crime. Similarly, Peterson and Krivo (2009) found that a one
standard deviation increase in the level of disadvantage in a bordering neighborhood
increased violent crime in the focal neighborhood by ten percent, whereas a one
standard deviation increase in the percentage of white residents in a bordering
neighborhood was associated with an 18% decrease in violent crime in the focal
neighborhood. This is likely because neighborhoods with a high proportion of white
residents generally score higher on indicators of advantage. Unfortunately, the authors
did not report on the spatial lag associated in violent crime associated with a bordering
neighborhood’s Black population.
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Linking Redlining to Current-Day Neighborhood Characteristics
Because redlining was often a major trigger in bringing about social
disorganization in many inner-city neighborhoods, and because social disorganization
tended to persist once it took root, it follows that current-day neighborhood
characteristics could be correlated with whether a neighborhood was subjected to
redlining prior to WWII. And indeed, contemporary studies have shown that redlining
has had a lasting effect on indicators of neighborhood disorganization and crime.
Rutan and Glass (2018), for instance, examined normalized census data from
1970 and 2000 and compared them to data from the 1940 census, finding that
contemporary concentrations of poverty, vacancy, and racial segregation align with
historically redlined areas. To determine this, the authors spatially matched digitized
versions of the original HOLC maps to 1970 and 2000 census tracts; this allowed them
to assign demographic characteristics to each HOLC graded neighborhood.
Importantly, the authors normalized the data across decades by converting them to zscores since their purpose was not to measure the overall change in outcomes across
neighborhoods, but to compare demographics in terms of the citywide distribution to
assess the presence or absence of positional change.
Appel and Nickerson (Appel & Nickerson, 2016) also examined the long-term
effects of redlining using regression discontinuity analysis to see if there was a
noticeable change in housing prices and homeownership rates when crossing the
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borders between neighborhoods with different HOLC grades. They found that there
was a significant increase in both outcomes using data from 1990 when crossing from a
neighborhood that was redlined and one that was not. In addition, data from 1940
showed smooth transitions between neighborhoods that were and were not redlined,
indicating that the disparity did not exist pre-redlining, and therefore must have
developed after the neighborhoods were redlined. In addition, the authors found that
even when removing neighborhoods that were separated by physical barriers such as
highways and rivers which act as a barrier that may cause neighborhood characteristics
to diverge over time, the findings still held.
Krimmel (2018) used similar methods to examine whether redlining influenced
new development in neighborhoods. To determine this, he used a difference-indifference analysis to compare the geographic outcomes of geographically proximate
census tracts that differed in terms of redlining status and that were separated by
HOLC neighborhood borders over time. The study found that neighborhoods that were
not subjected to redlining saw a 16% increase in housing supply compared to
neighborhoods that were, while redlined neighborhoods saw a 22% differential in
population decline compared to neighborhoods that were not. The author also found no
evidence of significant divergence in homeownership or racial segregation differentials
across redlined and non-redlined neighborhoods over time. In fact, since 1940 they
found a moderate convergence in homeownership rates and racial segregation across
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the borders of redlined and non-redlined neighborhoods since 1970, when the practice
was banned, indicating that some of the effects of redlining may have begun to reverse
over time.
Faber (2017) examined the effect of neighborhood redlining on current-day
mortgage application outcomes using data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
and foreclosure rates from the RealtyTrac database. The analysis found that during the
housing boom in 2006, mortgage applicants were 69% more likely to be denied a loan
and 257% more likely to receive a subprime loan if they were in a neighborhood given a
D rating as compared to those given an A rating. They were also more likely to be
denied a loan or receive a subprime loan than those in B and C rated neighborhoods. In
addition, following the recession, they found that foreclosures were much more
common in D rated neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. Unfortunately, as
admitted by the author, this analysis was only descriptive, and was therefore unable to
directly test causality between redlining and negative home loan and foreclosure
outcomes.
White et al (2018) examined the relationship between HOLC grade and currentday census tract-level quality of life indicators such as health, income, educational
attainment, and employment status of residents using spatial analysis and the
development of Bayesian Belief Networks. Their analysis found that individuals living
neighborhoods with A and B grades had much higher probabilities of having a better
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quality of life than individuals in neighborhoods rated C and D, the latter of which
were spread relatively evenly throughout the quality-of-life scales. The authors
conclude that redlining does appear to have had a negative effect on current-day
quality of life indicators.
Unlike other studies examining the effect of redlining on current-day
neighborhood conditions, Aaronson et al (2017) note that a major challenge in testing
this relationship is accounting for the fact that HOLC maps likely reflect major
neighborhood differences that existed at the time they were made. Because of this, it
could be that disparities in the post-HOLC period may reflect practices that would have
occurred over time without the existence of the maps. That is, the factors that caused
neighborhoods to receive certain HOLC grades prior to WWII may have also affected
which neighborhood became socially disorganized over the past several decades. To
account for this, the authors used several empirical approaches. First, they created
counterfactual boundaries that were similar to boundaries created by HOLC and
matched them to HOLC neighborhood boundaries using propensity score matching.
They also examined only boundaries that were deemed unlikely to have been made into
neighborhood borders and were therefore likely drawn for idiosyncratic reasons and
not due to a change in resident credit worthiness. Finally, they exploited HOLCs
decision to create maps only for cities with more than 40,000 residents by using smaller
cities as comparison locations. Even after controlling for these effects, their analyses
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found persistent causal effects of HOLC maps on both racial composition and housing
development in urban neighborhoods. Specifically, they found that the maps could
explain fifteen to thirty percent of the difference between C and D rated neighborhoods
in terms of African American homeownership and forty percent of the difference in
home values. The maps also accounted for much of the difference that existed between
B and C rated neighborhoods.
An et al. (2019) came to similar conclusions as the previously mentioned studies,
namely that HOLC grades affected contemporary housing market outcomes at the
neighborhood level. However, they concluded that the mechanism through which this
occurred was the fact that HOLC grades were found to be a significant predictor of the
location of multifamily housing. In addition, they found that higher concentrations of
multifamily housing were correlated with higher capitalization rates (indicating higher
investment risk) and negatively correlated with rents and home values. This is because
multifamily housing is generally associated with lower home values, higher risk, lower
incomes, and lower owner occupancy rates. They suggest that in redlined
neighborhoods where residents were unable to access mortgages, multifamily
apartments were built instead, and that those structures continued to stand long after
policies that banned housing discrimination were put in place. The authors concluded
that the durability of the effects of redlining can be attributed to the policy’s effect on
the built environment.
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While there is plenty of research linking redlined neighborhoods to current-day
social disorganization, and social disorganization to crime, there have been few studies
to date linking redlining directly to increased levels of modern-day crime. One
exception is a recent study by Jacoby et al (2018) that examined the concentration of
firearm assaults in 2013 and 2014 across HOLC neighborhood designations in
Philadelphia, PA while controlling for sociodemographic factors. The study found that
firearm assaults were highest in historically redlined neighborhoods. However, the
findings did not support a relationship between overall violent crime and redlining
after controlling for neighborhood sociodemographic factors. While this study has
many similarities to the present study, there are some key differences. First off, the
present study examined the change over time across HOLC graded neighborhoods,
while Jacoby et al’s study only examines current-day conditions. In addition, the
present study examined the effect of redlining indirectly on current-day crime rates
through the influence that redlining had on neighborhood social disorganization.
Finally, the present study examined how redlining affected other potentially
detrimental policies such as highway construction and the effect that those have had on
neighborhood social disorganization and crime.
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The Link Between Disorganization and Crime – Structural Theories
To understand why neighborhoods subjected to redlining may see increased
crime levels, it is important to identify the mechanisms through which social
disorganization and economic disadvantage lead to crime. The following sections of this
report examine two sets of theories that seek to explain this relationship.
One theory is that this process was not a result of deprivation itself, but of the
economic inequality it caused. Blau and Blau (1982), for instance, tested the hypothesis
that Southern location, poverty, and economic inequality lead to increased rates of
violent crime. They found that all three had first-order effects, but that once economic
inequality was controlled for, neither absolute poverty nor being in the South remained
significant predictors. The authors hypothesize that the link between inequality and
violence stems from inequality causing feelings of alienation, despair, and pent-up
aggression which tended to find expression through violent conflicts. Similarly, an
examination of Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data by Rosenfeld (1986) found that crime
rates were more strongly associated with inequality than poverty. Balkwell (1990) found
that it wasn’t simply inequality that increased rates of crime, but specifically ethnic
inequality, or systematic disparities between ethnic groups as measured by the average
of ethnicity-specific share of income weighted against their respective population
proportions. Specifically, he found that ethnic inequality was a strong predictor of
homicide rate. Inequality may also have differing effects among races. Shilhadeh and
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Steffensmeier (1994), for instance, found that inequality had strong effects on violent
crime rates among whites, but a much weaker effect among Blacks.
Another theory is that disadvantage leads to crime through its effect on
segregation and racial/socioeconomic isolation. Shihadeh and Flynn (1996), for instance,
examined the link between Black social isolation and rates of Black homicide using an
index of spatial isolation. They found that unevenness in the spatial distribution of
Blacks and whites had a positive relationship with Black homicide, and that Black
isolation was a major influence on Black violence. However, after controlling for the
isolation factor, the effect of spatial unevenness became insignificant, indicating that
isolation was the driving factor in increased Black violent crime, likely due to the
separation it causes from mainstream institutions that is required for upward social
mobility. Peterson and Krivo (1993) came to similar conclusions, finding the effects of
segregation on Black homicide rates were much stronger than the effect of social
deprivation. Shilhadeh and Ousey (1996) propose that the finding that cities with higher
degrees of suburbanization have higher rates of serious crime can be explained by the
fact that suburbanization is one of the major processes that isolated poor Blacks in the
inner city. Potter (1991) found that racial segregation of Blacks had a strong effect on the
Black-white life expectancy differential caused mainly by the differential in the number
of individuals whose cause of death was homicide. Massey proposes that racial
isolation affects violent crime rates by concentrating poverty, stating that as poverty
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concentrates – “so will the density of joblessness, crime, family dissolution, drug abuse,
alcoholism, disease, and violence” (Massey, 1996, p. 407). Unfortunately, this means that
in areas of concentrated poverty, one not only has to worry about themselves and their
own lack of income, but also must deal with the effects of living in environments where
all of their neighbors also are poor.
Peterson and Krivo (1999) tested the effect of racial isolation on homicide
separately for Black and white communities. They found that such segregation
concentrated poverty in Black but not white neighborhoods, and that this concentration
led to a heightened prevalence of social problems, including violent crime. They note
that segregation affects Blacks and whites differently because prejudice and housing
discrimination lead to differential treatment in Black neighborhoods which causes
disorganization and diminished social control, however segregation in white
neighborhoods acts to shield those communities against those forces. And increased
violent crime due to racial isolation may not only be an urban issue. Logan and Messner
(1987) examined the effects of racial residential segregation in suburban neighborhoods,
finding that suburban neighborhoods where Blacks were more racially segregated had,
on average, higher rates of violent crime.
A third theory is that disadvantage increases violent crime mainly through its
effect on family structure and family instability, specifically through increasing the
prevalence of female-headed households in a community. The prevalence of female53

headed households in impoverished communities is likely the result of Black males in
such communities being disconnected from mainstream society through forces such as
a lack of employment opportunities and criminal justice system involvement which
make it harder for mothers in the community to find stable marriage partners (Solomon,
2018; Wilson, 1978). Much of this effect can be explained by three factors: family
disruption has been shown to increase juvenile delinquency, marriage disruption may
decrease formal social controls, and that family disruption may affect informal social
controls since dual parent families have more capacity to provide supervision and
guardianship to the community (R. Sampson, 1987). For instance, a study by Sampson
(1985) that used National Crime Survey data to test the effects of neighborhood
characteristics on crime victimization, found that the rate of female-headed households
had a strong positive effect on personal victimization rates while other factors that are
generally hypothesized to have an effect such as income inequality, racial composition,
residential mobility, and structural density had little or no effect. Similarly, Messner
and Sampson (1991) found while studying the effect of sex distributions on crime rates
that having a high ratio of females to males had a significant positive effect on crime
rates, and that the effect was likely significant due to its influence on family disruption,
as it is an indicator of a large number of female-headed households. Another study
which examined the effects of income inequality within Black communities on violent
crime found that it had a strong positive effect on Black violence, but that the effect was
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indirect since it was mediated by its effect on family disruption as operationalized
through the rate of female-headed households (Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994).
Disadvantage may also affect crime through its influence on employment.
Unemployment is theorized to have two counterbalancing effects on crime, the first is a
positive effect on criminal motivation through its influence on strain and social control,
and a negative effect on available targets by decreasing the time individuals are away
from home for employment and leisure activities (Cantor & Land, 1985). Other studies
link rising unemployment, especially resulting from low-skill jobs disappearing to
deindustrialization, to deprivation, which has a positive effect on homicide rates
(Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996). Phillips and Land (2012) studied this effect in 400 of the
largest US counties, finding a positive relationship between unemployment rates and
crime rates. However, they found the effect to be stronger for property crimes than for
violent crimes. This is likely because unemployment’s positive effect on crime is mainly
a result of its effect on motivation, and unemployment increases motivation to commit
property crime for material gain. Arvanites and Defina (2006) came to a similar
conclusion by linking an economic upturn in the 1990s to reductions in all four index
property crimes and robbery. Devine et al. (1988) also created a model attempting to
explain the effect of unemployment and inflation on crime rates, finding that their
model explained crime rates well, but that it increased in predictive power as it moved
from predicting more violent to less violent crimes. Carmichael and Ward (2001) looked
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at the effects of adult and youth male employment separately, finding that both were
related to overall crime rates. However, they noted that the effect of youth
unemployment on crime rates was stronger than it was for adults, but that adult
unemployment was the only factor significantly related to robbery rates. Finally, Allan
and Steffensmeier (1989) examined the effect of unemployment and the availability of
quality employment on youth and young adult arrest rates, finding full-time
employment to be associated with low arrest rates, and unemployment and low quality
(inadequate pay and/or hours) to be associated with high arrest rates.

The Link Between Disorganization and Crime – Cultural Theories
Other theories seek to explain how disadvantage leads to crime by examining
cultural traits of high-crime neighborhoods. The subcultural theory, for instance, asserts
that certain segments of society have adopted particularly violent subcultures. In such
subcultures, individuals who are alienated from mainstream society take on a set of
values and attitudes that are at odds with mainstream society. Specifically, individuals
who adhere to this subculture often act violently and are expected to conform to a
“machismo” lifestyle that emphasizes things like leading an exciting life, achieving
status, and protecting honor (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967). Messner (1983) tested the
subcultural theory by analyzing whether metropolitan statistical areas’ murder rates
were affected by indicators of social disorganization and being located in the South. The
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study found that being located in the South (an area of the country identified as having
a particularly violent subculture, perhaps due to its history of slavery) and having a
large Black population both had significant effects on homicide rates after controlling
for sociodemographic variables. Critics of subcultural theory, however, note that most
residents of high-crime communities share conventional values, and that rather than
condoning crime, members of such communities actually suffer from a degree of
fatalism or moral cynicism as a result of their circumstances (Kornhauser, 1978). Other
critics, such as Ball-Rokeach (1973), found little correlation between violent attitudes
and violent behavior among Americans, thereby providing evidence against the
subcultural theory. Another study found that individuals who held values that were
favorable towards violence were more likely to be persistent offenders, but that they
were no more likely than other offenders to commit violent crimes (Mcgloin et al., 2011).
Similar to the subcultural theory of violence is Elijah Anderson’s Code of the
Street. In Code of the Street, Anderson describes how, for individuals living in extreme
poverty:
The inclination to violence springs from the circumstances of life among the
ghetto poor – the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, limited basic public
services .., the stigma of race, the fallout from rampant drug use and drug
trafficking, and the resulting alienation and absence and hope for the
future. (1999, p. 32)
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According to Anderson, individuals living in such communities often feel they
must take justice into their own hands because of a feeling of alienation and complete
lack of faith in mainstream society, including the criminal justice system. As Anderson
puts it “The code of the street is actually a cultural adaption to a profound lack of faith
in the police and the judicial system – and in others who would champion one’s
security” (Anderson, 1999, p. 34). This, combined with the proliferation of drug dealing
and easy access to guns has resulted in extreme levels of violence in many poor, innercity neighborhoods (Anderson, 1999).
Other theories suggest that the bonds between young men in disadvantaged
neighborhoods who lack opportunities for mainstream respect use violence to prove
their manhood and gain the respect of those in their peer group. According to
Messerschmidt “crime by men is a form of social practice invoked as a resource, when
other resources are unavailable, for accomplishing masculinity” (1993). Majors and
Bilson (1993) further assert that this macho attitude or “putting on a cool pose” helps
young Black males in disadvantaged communities obscure their anger and
disappointment caused by the barriers in place that stop them from fulfilling their roles
as traditional breadwinners. In such situations, status is gained both by surviving
dangerous conflicts and being tough enough to take another person’s life if the need
arises (McCall, 1995).
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Another cultural theory is that the proliferation of guns on the streets of cities has
led to an “ecology of danger” in which young people take on behavioral norms that call
for violence, and the idea that since guns are so prevalent, that violence will often be
lethal. In such a culture, guns have become a symbol of respect, power, and manhood
(Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998). As with Anderson’s Code of the Streets, young people who
take on this macho attitude are much more prone to violence, and since they are often
carrying guns, this violence is highly likely to turn lethal. In addition, in an in-depth
survey of young Black men in New York City, a majority said that the perceived risk of
victimization that would result from not carrying a gun outweighed any risks of
criminal justice sanctions (Brunson & Wade, 2019).
While each of these theories posit that the culture of individuals living in
disadvantaged neighborhoods increases their propensity to commit crime, they also
imply that these cultures and attitudes are developed in the context of, and as a result of
the structural realities of living in a disadvantaged neighborhood. Similar patterns can
be seen in other fields such as education, where Black students, on average, do not
perform a well academically as their white counterparts. However, some have argued
that this is a rational reaction for Black students who generally see a severely limited
return from traditional education (Ogbu, 1978). Similarly, these young people look to
their immediate surroundings for information on future opportunities, specifically by
observing the current economical and occupational status of those around them, often
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finding that those individuals who have turned to crime are doing better economically
than those participating in the traditional economy (Bruce et al., 1998). Indeed, Kubrin
and Weitzer (2003) argue that unidimensional approaches are fundamentally limited in
that they fail to account for the intersection between cultural and structural dimensions.
As an example, they looked at retaliatory killings in St. Louis, MO, finding that the
combined effects of structural disadvantage, neighborhood cultural responses to that
disadvantage, and problematic policing mean that retaliatory killings become a way of
exerting control without needing to rely on the police. Indeed, solving problems that
would generally be handled by law enforcement in less disadvantaged neighborhoods
may be a rational choice as studies have shown that neighborhood context influences
police behavior. For example, Smith (1986) found that police officers offered more
assistance to residents and initiated more contact with suspicious persons in more
racially heterogenous neighborhoods. Their study also found that officers were less
likely to file incident reports in higher crime neighborhoods.

Criminal Justice Response to Urban Crime
While a large body of research on the causes of urban crime points to segregation
and concentrated disadvantage, much of the policy response has involved surveillance
and punishment, especially in Black communities. By the end of the 19th Century,
slavery was abolished, and the US entered the era of Reconstruction. At this point,
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many states began to use the criminal justice system as a way to hold onto white
supremacy. For instance, while the 13th amendment banned slavery, it allowed for
involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime. To take advantage of this, states began
to put in place “Black Codes” that punished minor infractions such as vagrancy and
loitering, offenses whites were never punished for, to allow for the economic
exploitation of Black labor through the prison system (Stevenson, 2017). Eventually,
Black Codes were replaced by Jim Crow laws that legally subjugated Blacks. Such laws
were enforced by law enforcement, and when broken, often resulted in extremely harsh
police brutality, and even lynching (Jett, 2021).
By the mid-1960s, the Jim Crow era ended following the passing of the Civil
Rights and Voting Rights acts in 1964 and 1965, respectively. However, by the time the
Kerner Commission Report was published in 1968, the authors of that report found that
poor community/police relations to be a major driver of the violence and civil unrest
occurring in major cities that year. More specifically, the report stated that:
The police are not merely a "spark" factor. To some Negroes police have
come to symbolize white power, white racism and white repression. And
the fact is that many police do reflect and express these white attitudes. The
atmosphere of hostility and cynicism is reinforced by a widespread belief
among Negroes in the existence of police brutality and in a "double
standard" of justice and protection--one for Negroes and one for whites.
(United States National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1988)
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The era directly following the Civil Rights Movement was also the time that,
according to Elizabeth Hinton (2016), the US Government shifted from fighting a “War
on Poverty” to a “War on Crime”. During the Civil Rights Movement, what white
conservatives and liberals alike perceived as collective violence in Black communities,
along with rising national crime rates, caused them to lose sympathy for anti-poverty
policies, which they began to see as ineffective. This led politicians to take a “law and
order” stance on crime that contained thinly veiled racial overtones and painted Black
Americans, especially young men and Civil Rights protestors, as dangerous criminals
the white community needed saving from. As a result, the prevailing wisdom became
that crime was not a result of disparities that needed to be addressed through social
policies, but a criminal justice issue that required surveillance and punishment (Mauer,
2017).
The War on Crime started with the passing of the Safe Streets Act in 1968 which
called for the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).
Between 1968 and its disbanding in 1981, the LEAA spent nearly $25 billion in today’s
dollars on crime control projects throughout the country. This money rapidly expanded
America’s criminal justice system over the course of those decades and focused on
increasing government control of low-income urban communities (Hinton, 2016). The
1970s saw the Nixon Administration further dismantle social policies in favor of crime
control policies. Many advisers within the Nixon Administration, chief among them
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Edward Banfield, proposed that the government would never be able to solve the
problem of concentrated urban poverty, and should therefore stop trying (Kosar, 2020).
During this period, police agencies in major cities began to expand the use of foot patrol
in low-income neighborhoods, placing emphasis on increasing arrest volumes and
confronting, not only individuals that had actually committed crimes, but individuals
who they suspect may have committed a crime, to maintain order. This also ushered in
an era where police agencies used decoy operations which led to a rash in police
shootings and sting operations that entrapped and punished low-level street pushers
(Hinton, 2016).
In addition to the “War on Crime”, the 1960s also saw the beginning of the “War
on Drugs”. In 1968, the Nixon campaign identified two enemies – the anti-war left and
Blacks and decided the best way to disenfranchise them was to heavily criminalize
marijuana and heroin, drugs used by anti-war protestors and Black Americans,
respectively. In 1971, Nixon officially announced the War on Drugs, an initiative which
funneled money into drug control agencies and put in place strict mandatory
sentencing policies for drug crimes (A Brief History of the Drug War, 2020). President
Ronald Reagan escalated the War on Drugs by further funding drug enforcement
programs that disproportionately targeted Black communities. These policies were
continued by both the Bush and Regan administrations. During this period, the United
States also saw a steep rise in its incarceration rate (Nunn, 2002). Indeed, in their book
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The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander (2012) likens mass incarceration through the war
on drugs to Jim Crow in that both sought to disenfranchise Black Americans by
labelling them criminals and stripping them of their rights, thereby continuing the racial
hierarchy that began with slavery.
The 1980s saw the implementation of broken windows policing, a model
introduced by Wilson and Kelling (1982), which hypothesized that neighborhood
disorder, including visible signs of antisocial behavior, lead to more serious crime. The
theory further suggests that actively policing minor crimes including loitering, public
drinking, and fare evasion, will help foster an atmosphere of order that will prevent
crime from flourishing. This form of policing was embraced in many large US cities in
the 1980s, leading to zero tolerance policing of petty crimes and therefore a steep rise in
arrests of individuals in poor Black communities (Klinenberg, 2018). A notable offshoot
of broken windows policing was New York City’s stop and frisk practice where law
enforcement would stop and interrogate individuals they perceived as suspicious; a
practice has since been ruled unconstitutional. Evaluations of these practices have failed
to identify benefits in terms of crime reduction (Braga et al., 2015; Harcourt, 2009).
Indeed, studies have found that such police interventions make residents feel less safe
(Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008) and leads to resident distrust in law enforcement (Kamalu &
Onyeozili, 2018).
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The effects of discriminatory policing can be seen in Black communities today,
with recent high-profile examples of police shootings of Black and brown people in
American cities in recent years too numerous to name. Recent polls suggest that Black
Americans are far less likely than individuals of other races to feel like they have been
treated fairly by law enforcement, many even claiming that they were more worried
about police brutality than local crimes in their neighborhood (Coleman, 2020). This is
especially likely to affect redlined communities, as studies show a high level of
correlation between racial segregation and the number of police killings of Black people
in a community (Gaynor et al., 2021).
This tenuous relationship may even be a key cause of gun violence in certain
communities as distrust leads residents to stop reporting incidents to police and acting
as active witnesses, and, in the absence of an effective system of justice, individuals
begin to take the law into their own hands (Giffords Law Center, 2020). Other studies
have shown that the dehumanization resulting from over-policing in Black
communities increases crime in those communities by dehumanizing residents and
alienating them from mainstream society and hampering future economic prospects
(Owusu-Bempah, 2017). As mentioned, these policies have also boosted the national
incarceration rate. Since 1970, the incarcerated population in the United States has
increased by 700% to 2.3 million people in jail or prison on any given day (American
Civil Liberties Union, n.d.). And, in 2018, the Black incarceration rate was over five
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times that of whites (Carson, 2020). As with over policing, research suggests that mass
incarceration may be counter-productive if the end goal is crime reduction. For instance,
studies have found that imprisonment negatively affects income (Western et al., 2015)
and likelihood of marriage (Lopoo & Western, 2005), which is important since the
theoretical framework used in this study suggest that poverty and single parent
households are both important causal mechanisms of crime. Further research shows a
direct correlation between the number of people returning to a community following
incarceration and community crime levels, suggesting a potentially criminogenic effect
of incarceration (Vieraitis et al., 2007). These studies indicate that the current method of
dealing with urban poverty, through punishment and surveillance, in addition to being
discriminatory, may not only be ineffective in solving the problem, it may actually
exacerbate it.

Gaps in the Literature
This project seeks to test whether redlining, through its effect on social
disorganization caused certain neighborhoods to see chronically higher rates of violent
crime, and whether there were other government funding decisions or protective
factors that affected this relationship. More specifically, with this project I plan to fill a
major gap in the extant literature on how and why crime concentrates in certain
geographic areas, and why it tends to have an inordinate effect on communities of
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color. This will be accomplished using an analysis that examines the effect of redlining
on social disorganization and homicide rate in the city of Chicago over space and time. I
expect that it will explain why inner-city Black communities tend to suffer from greater
levels of disadvantage, or social disorganization, than other communities. As
mentioned, social disorganization literature has provided an empirical link between
neighborhood disadvantage and crime, however, it fails to identify how and why
certain communities become socially disorganized in the first place, and why those
neighborhoods tend to be predominately Black neighborhoods. This may also explain
why previously undesirable groups, including individuals of Italian and Jewish
descent, who were targeted by redlining have since been able to have been less affected
by redlining over time. Given the research linking discriminatory government policies
designed to segregate Blacks into poor ghettos and economic inequality, I propose that
such policies also increase levels of crime through their effect on neighborhood
conditions generally associated with social disorganization.
In addition, the current literature on redlining links the practice directly to social
disorganization but fails to explicitly connect it to varying levels of crime, a link that
likely exists given the plethora of literature linking social disorganization and crime.
However, this study seeks not only to explicitly test the relationship between redlining
and crime, but also examine the factors that mediate and moderate this relationship.
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Finally, this study will add to the extant literature by examining the effects that
certain protective factors may have in alleviating the negative influence that redlining
and social disorganization has had on certain inner-city communities.
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Chapter 3 - Methods
The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the discriminatory
practice of redlining affected homicide rates through its direct influence on social
disorganization, and that this relationship was affected by certain other government
funding decisions and protective factors. Specifically, the current study seeks to answer
the following questions using Chicago as a case study:
1. What effect has the discriminatory practice of redlining had on area measures of
social disorganization?
2. Has the effect of redlining on social disorganization been mediated by
government funding decisions in certain areas that fuel disinvestment?
3. Are there protective factors that moderate the effect of redlining on social
disorganization by protecting areas against its harmful effects?
4. What effect has redlining had on area homicide rates, and is this relationship
mediated by redlining’s effect on area social disorganization? How is this effect
mediated or moderated by government funding decisions and protective factors?

Site Selection
Chicago was chosen as the case study site for this analysis for a variety of
reasons. First and foremost, it was chosen because, as will be seen in this chapter, the
City makes available a variety of datasets that allow for the types of analyses needed to
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answer the above questions. However, there are other reasons that Chicago is an
excellent case study for the examination of the effects of redlining on violent crime. For
instance, Chicago is a large, very densely populated city. In fact, for most of the 20th
century, Chicago was the United States’ second largest city behind New York City. This
is advantageous for a quantitative analysis because it allows for a large number of
neighborhoods to be included in the analyses, therefore increasing their statistical
power.
In addition, Chicago was a site of many of the major issues being studied in this
analysis. For instance, Chicago has consistently ranked in the top quarter of all US cities
in terms of economic segregation and in the top ten percent in terms of Black white
racial segregation (Acs et al., 2017). And, like in many other cities in the early part of the
20th century, the City was not segregated by mistake, but through the use of policies that
directly promoted segregation (Hirsch, 1998; R. J. Sampson, 2013). In addition, Chicago
had the second most public housing units of any United States city, trailing only New
York (The Furman Center, 2011), which is important, as public housing was one of the
major government funding programs analyzed in this study. During the same time that
public housing was being constructed, the City also began tearing down Black
neighborhoods to build highways that allowed better access to suburbs. Indeed,
according to a biography of then mayor Richard Daley, the Dan Ryan expressway was
purposefully re-routed to reinforce the border the Mayor’s home neighborhood and a
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predominately Black neighborhood to its east (McClendon, 2005). And finally, Chicago
is a city that has had historically high crime rates. These rates began to rise rapidly
during the late 1960s following increased civil unrest, economic decline, and gang
violence (Bentle et al., 2020). This trend continued through the 1990s before declining,
however, the city has seen a recent spike in homicides.

Data
The data used in this study seek to operationalize the following measures:
redlining, social disorganization, potentially harmful place-based government funding
decisions, levels of violent crime, and potential protective factors. These data cover the
years 1940 through 2019 3, which covers the time period directly following redlining’s
implementation, which occurred in the 1930s. In addition, data on social
disorganization were calculated starting in 1920 to allow for analyses testing whether
social disorganization levels changed in redlined areas relative to non-redlined areas
after redlining was implemented. In addition, sociodemographic data were used to
include as control variables when running quasi-experimental analyses. Before
describing how the variables were constructed, it is important to explain how the key
unit of analysis for this project, the census super tract, was constructed and
standardized over each decennial census.

3

Note, not all of these factors were available for each decade. For specifics on which data points were available for
each decade, see table A1 in appendix A.
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Harmonizing Census Data Over Time – Data for this study were aggregated to
the census tract level for analytical purposes. However, census tracts changed from
decade to decade, so census data had to be standardized across decades. Census data
were all acquired from the Social Explorer website (Social Explorer, n.d.). Social Explorer
standardized data from the 1970 census through the 2000 census to 2010 census tract
boundaries using a technique called weighted interpolation to estimate the population
of 2010 census tracts using data from previous decades, as employed by John Logan et
al (2014) from the Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences initiative at Brown
University. Unfortunately, these methods used census block data for some decades and
land use data for others, which were not available for the decennial census prior to
1970. Instead, I manually created super tracts using the QGIS software by aggregating
existing census tracts from each of the decennial censuses from 1940 through 1960 and
the 2010 census (since the census data from 1970-2000 were already interpolated to 2010
census tracts). Between each census, tracts were split and combined, and the super
tracts were formed so that tracts from each decade could be aggregated to fit within a
super tract. For more information on super tracts see Downey (2006) and Noble et al
(2011). Figure 2 below shows a map of all 677 super tracts created for Chicago. In
addition, Figure 3 provides an example of how the super tracts were created. The map
on the left shows a set of tracts from the 1940 census and the center panel shows the
same area with the 2010 tracts. Finally, the figure shows how those different tracts were
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encompassed into one super tract in the far-right panel. Note, the borders did change
slightly. Specifically, the 2010 borders are much straighter than the 1940 borders.
However, the super tract envelopes the tracts from both sets of censuses with only a
small amount of error.

Figure 2 - Map of Chicago Super Tracts (N = 677)

Figure 3 - Example of 1940 tracts (left) 2010 tracts (middle) and super tracts (right)
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The data that will be used to operationalize each variable include:
Homicide Rate – Given that the current study seeks to extend and modify social
disorganization theory, which provides a theory for variations in crime levels (Shaw &
McKay, 1949), homicide rate within each super tract acted as the outcome variable of
interest in this study. The study focused on homicide rates, as opposed to other types of
violent crime and property crime rates for two reasons. First, and most importantly,
data on homicide counts were available at the census tract level, which made the data
ideal for the current analysis from a measurement level perspective, as those data were
easy to convert to super tracts. Second, violent crime, and especially homicide, is less
likely to be influenced by changes in law and police practices than other types of crime
and is more likely to affect the quality of life of individuals living in areas where it is
prevalent.
Data on homicides in Chicago from 1965 through 1995 were taken from the
dataset Homicides in Chicago, 1965-1995 (Block et al., 1995) which contains the date, time,
and location of each homicide in Chicago during that time. For the public data set,
homicides were aggregated to the census tract level for data privacy purposes. I then
aggregated to the super tract using a cross reference table that matched tracts to super
tracts. Data on homicides from 2000 through 2019 were taken from the City of Chicago’s
Online Data Portal. This dataset contains the time and location of each homicide in
Chicago from 2000 through 2019 with geographic coordinates which were used to
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spatially join each homicide to a census super tract. Unfortunately, data on homicides
from 1996 through 1999 with sufficient geographic information were not publicly
available for use in this study. The resulting dataset contained the number of homicides
by super tract and by decade. To account for certain decades (i.e. the 1960s and 2000s)
each having only 5 years of available data, the decade homicide totals for those two
decades were doubled. The decade homicide counts were then converted into annual
rates per 100k residents by dividing the number of homicides in each super tract and
decade by the number of years of homicide data available for that decade, and by using
population data from the decennial census (which will be described in more detail
below) and standardized by converting the rates into Z scores by decade. The census
super tract-decade combination was used as the basis of all analyses. There were a total
of 677 super tracts, across six decades, leading to a sample size of 4,062 observations.
The average annual homicide rate varied greatly by super tract and decade from as few
as 0 per 100k residents to as many as 916 per 100k residents. Descriptive statistics on
homicide incidences and rates can be found below in Table 1.
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Table 1 - Decade Total Homicides and Homicide Rate Descriptive Statistics by Super
Tract 1965-2019
Statistic
N
Annual
4,057
Homicides
Annual Homicide 4,057 4
Rate per 100k

Mean St. Dev.
10.24
14.32

Min
0

Pctl(25)
2

Pctl(75)
14

Max
206

22.95

0.00

3.50

32.30

1,666.67

40.83

Figure 4 shows the distribution of super tract-level homicide rates by decade. As
the figure shows, the distribution of homicide rates varied across decades. During the
1960s, homicide rates were relatively low. However, rates increased in terms of both
overall rate and variance during the 1970s before dropping in the 2010s. In addition,
across decades there appear to be many outliers which have homicide rates several
standard deviations above the decade mean.
Figure 4 – Distribution of Homicide Rates per 100K by Super Tract and Decade 19652019

4

The homicide rate for a small number of tracts was not calculable because their populations were 0 in certain
decades. This happened specifically in Garfield Park because of the construction of Midway Airport and in Grand
Boulevard because of the demolition of Robert Taylor Homes and the construction of a park in their place.

76

The mean homicide rate by decade can also be seen below in Table 2.
Table 2 – Mean Super Tract Homicide Rate per 100k residents by Decade 1965-2019
Decade
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

Mean Homicide Rate
15.91
27.22
29.97
21.31
20.38
23.88

Redlining – This variable was included as the main explanatory variable in the
study. The literature shows that neighborhoods subjected to redlining generally
suffered from the types of conditions associated with social disorganization as a result
(Appel & Nickerson, 2016; Faber, 2017; Krimmel, 2018; Rutan & Glass, 2018; White et al.,
2018). This feature was calculated using a geographic data file containing polygons for
each HOLC neighborhood in Chicago along with that neighborhood’s risk rating (A, B,
C, or D), as the HOLC maps are generally used as indicators of which neighborhoods
were redlined (Greer, 2013; Hillier, 2003; Jackson, 1980). This dataset was created by the
Mapping Inequality Project at the University of Richmond and shows the ratings given
to neighborhoods by the HOLC between 1935 and 1940 (R. K. Nelson et al., 2018). As
previously noted, neighborhoods were considered redlined if they were given a “D”
rating by the HOLC. Therefore, anytime this study refers to super tracts as redlined in
analyses, it is referring to those tracts that were assigned a HOLC rating of D. A map of
Chicago neighborhood ratings can be found in Figure 5. In addition, many
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neighborhoods directly outside the City limits were also assessed and included in
HOLC’s residential security map. However, only neighborhoods that fell fully within
Chicago’s boundary were included in this analysis.

Figure 5 - Map of Chicago’s HOLC Neighborhood Grades

Data on the distribution of HOLC neighborhood grades across all Chicago
HOLC neighborhoods can be found in Table 3.
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Table 3 - Distribution of Redlining Scores across HOLC Neighborhoods 1935-1940
Grade
A
B
C
D

Count of
Neighborhoods
5
43
146
70

% of All
Neighborhoods
1.9%
16.3%
55.3%
26.5%

Next, these redlining grades were translated to the census super tract
level. This was done by spatially matching the super tract geographic file onto
the HOLC neighborhood file. Specifically, super tracts were converted to
centroids which were overlaid onto the HOLC neighborhood polygon file. Super
tracts were then assigned the HOLC letter grade of the neighborhood in which
its centroid fell. The distribution of letter grades by super tract can be seen in
Table 4. Note, the unrated super tracts are included in the table as “no match”,
these super tracts did not overlap with HOLC neighborhoods. Areas not graded
by the HOLC included commercial and industrial areas, undeveloped land,
waterways, and landmarks (Appel & Nickerson, 2016).
Table 4 - Distribution of Redlining Scores across Super Tracts
Grade
A
B
C
D
No Match

Count of Tracts % of All Tracts % of Valid Tracts
7
1.0%
1.2%
47
7.0%
8.3%
312
48.0%
56.6%
206
28.8%
33.9%
105
15.2%
--
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Social Disorganization – this study relied on the empirical findings of social
disorganization theorists who identify neighborhood disadvantage as strong predictors
of variance in neighborhood crime rates (Carroll & Jackson, 1983; Crutchfield et al.,
1982; Hipp, 2007; Pratt & Cullen, 2005). As previously noted, a more modern version of
social disorganization focuses on indicators of concentrated disadvantage: including
poverty, joblessness, and family disruption that took place, most often in racially
segregated communities of color during the time of deindustrialization starting in the
1960s (R. J. Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 1987). Therefore, this study focused on
these measures when operationalizing social disorganization.
Social disorganization indicators were calculated using decennial census data for
each decade from 1920 to 20105 and aggregated to the super tract level. Data going back
to 1920 were included to allow for comparisons of social disorganization scores before
and after redlining occurred in the 1930s. This dataset provided data on social
disorganization including demographic data (to calculate racial isolation), income,
family composition, and employment. The following factors were included as indicators
of social disorganization: the percentage of the population living below the poverty
level, percentage of households headed by an unmarried female, the percentage of

Not all factors that went into this score were present for all decades, especially earlier decades. See appendix 1 for
information on census data that were available for each decade.

5
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individuals sixteen and older who were unemployed, and the spatial racial isolation
index for each super tract.
Importantly, the spatial isolation index, which measures the degree to which
minority populations are only exposed to individuals of their own race, was calculated
for each census super tract for each decade using demographic data from the decennial
censuses. This measure was included as social disorganization research indicates that
one way disadvantage leads to crime is through racial social isolation (R. D. Peterson &
Krivo, 1999; Potter, 1991; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996; Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996). Since
HOLC neighborhoods were too small in many cases to contain enough census super
tracts to calculate this score, isolation was calculated at the community area level (N =
77) and the community-level isolation score was assigned to each super tract whose
centroid fell within it. The distribution of spatial isolation index scores by decade can be
found in Figure 6 below. It was calculated using the following formula:
n

�[(xi /X)(xi /t i )]
i=1

Where n is the total number of super tracts in each community area, x is the tract level
Black population, X is the community area level Black population, and t is the total tract
population. Note, as indicated in Figure 6, scores appear to have increased during the
1950s and again during the 1970s and stayed high before beginning to decrease in 2010.
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Figure 6 - Spatial Isolation Index Scores from Census Descriptive Statistics –
Community Area Level

This can be further seen in Table 5 which shows the mean social isolation score
by decade.
Table 5 - Mean Community Area Social Isolation Score by Decade 1920-2010
Decade
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

Mean Spatial Isolation Index Score
0.0942
0.1855
0.1615
0.2187
0.2140
0.4228
0.4924
0.4993
0.4920
0.4568

A social disorganization score was also calculated using the standardized
versions of each of the four disorganization factors, which were summed and averaged.
Since the factors available to calculate the social disorganization score changed each
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decade, separate Chronbach’s alpha statistics were calculated for each decade from 1920
through 2010. These can be found in Table 6. Clearly, the association between these
items within this scale strengthened beginning after the 1940’s, which coincides with
the beginning of redlining, and continued to strengthen over time.
Table 6 - Cronbach’s Alpha for Social Disorganization Index Score by Decade 19202010
Decade
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

Mean Spatial Isolation Index
Score
0.395
0.221
0.659
0.706
0.709
0.867
0.851
0.915
0.912
0.904

A correlation matrix for these measures can be found below in Table 7.
Table 7 - Correlation Matrix for Variables Included in Social Disorganization Scale
Isolation
Isolation
Female Headed
Poverty
Unemployment

1
0.6840597
0.5247843
0.5600329

Female Headed

1
0.7937041
0.7495106

Poverty

1
0.7482913

Unemployment

1

Summary statistics for each of these measures can also be found below in Table
8. Note that the number of records for each variable vary since not all variables were
available across all years.
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Table 8 - Decade Average Social Disorganization Indicators from Census Descriptive
Statistics – Census Super Tract Level 1920-2010
Statistic
Percent Female
Headed
Percent Unemployed
Percent below Poverty
Isolation Index

N
3,379

Mean
0.27

St. Dev.
0.18

Min
0.00

Pctl(25)
0.13

Pctl(75)
0.37

Max
1.00

6,823
3,377
6,827

0.10
0.19
0.32

0.08
0.16
0.38

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.04
0.07
0.004

0.13
0.28
0.74

0.92
0.94
0.99

The distribution of social disorganization scores across all decades included in
the study can be found below in Figure 7 6.
Figure 7 - Distribution of Social Disorganization Scores from Census Descriptive
Statistics – Super Tract Level 1920-2010

Note, data on poverty rates were not available until the 1960 census and data on female headed household rates
were not available until the 1970 census

6
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Government Funding Decisions – Another major hypothesis of this study is that
redlining affected where local governments decided to construct public housing
developments and highways, which may have promoted neighborhood disadvantage
and therefore increased crime levels.
Two specific government programs were analyzed. First, the construction of
public housing was examined as studies have shown that it was often used to isolate
poor and minority neighborhoods from other, more affluent, parts of the city
(Heathcott, 2011; Julian & Daniel, 1989; Rothstein, 2014, 2017). Public housing
construction was operationalized using a GIS file with the location and year of
construction of each public housing development in Chicago. Similarly, highway
construction was also included as a potentially harmful government program as it was
also often used to isolate poor Black communities (Bayor, 1988; Connerly, 2002;
Rothstein, 2017). It was operationalized using a GIS file with the locations of highways,
along with the year of construction. Since this analysis tested how these harmful
government decisions affected the relationship between redlining and social
disorganization, and redlining occurred in the 1930s, data on these factors were
collected from 1940 onward. This also coincides with the beginning of construction of
public housing and highways in Chicago.
Public housing developments and highways were matched to the super tract
level using the same methodology. First, the objects in both files were assigned a
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construction year which was then converted to a construction decade. For highways, a
60-meter 7 buffer was added to convert the line features into polygons with a width of
120 meters since highways are not one-dimensional lines. Next, the geographic files
were overlaid onto the super tracts to determine which super tracts overlapped with
highways or public housing. This resulted in the following measures: two dichotomous
flag variables indicating whether 1) a highway was built within the super tract during
the decade and 2) a public housing development was built in the super tract during the
decade. These indicators were used to test whether the disruption caused by the actual
construction of these projects had any harmful effect in each super tract. Figure 8
below shows the locations of Chicago’s highways and public housing developments.

7

This is simply an estimate, since Chicago’s highways vary significantly in terms of width. However, according to
the Indian Roads Congress https://archive.org/details/govlawircy2013sp87/page/24, a six-lane highway should
measure about 35 meters in width.
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Figure 8 - Map of Chicago’s Highways and Public Housing Developments

Protective Factors – In addition, I tested whether certain protective factors
moderated the effect of redlining on violent crime. As with harmful government
decisions, protective factors were included to see whether they affected the relationship
between redlining and social disorganization. And, since redlining occurred in the
1930s, data on protective factors were collected from 1940 onward. Note, the list of
factors that could be counted as potential “protective factors” is endless. Anything
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about a neighborhood that would make individuals more likely to invest in it, despite it
being redlined, could be included. Many of these factors, for instance, a neighborhood
being the location of a historically significant business or having appealing mature tree
lined streets, could be included. However, I chose the factors below because I had
access to data on them that allowed for them to be quantified. The protective factors
that were included, along with how they were calculated are as follows:
1.) The commute time using public transportation to Chicago’s central business
district. This was included as a potential protective factor because I propose that an
area’s access to high-paying jobs in the City’s central business district may act to protect
it against social disorganization. One reason this variable was included as a protective
factor is because, to some degree, it represents the existence of durable goods,
specifically mass transit stations, which the literature does identify as a potential
protective factor (Lin, 2015). In addition, short commute times were shown to contribute
to upward mobility which would help protect against indicators of social
disorganization (Chetty et al., 2014). Commute times were calculated from each super
tract centroid to the center of Chicago’s Loop using the Google Maps API. I am
assuming that relative commute times have changed little across super tracts given the
age of Chicago’s public transportation system.
2.) The amount of tax increment financing (TIF) funds spent in each super tract.
This form of financing was used as a vehicle for the city to divert tax dollars to funding
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neighborhood investment. In this study, TIF funding is being used as a proxy for
government investment in neighborhoods, as one reason identified for neighborhood
disrepair was a lack of government investment (Meislin & Daley, 1988; Rothstein, 2017).
A data file with information on TIF funding came from Chicago’s Department of
Planning and Development website (City of Chicago TIF Data, n.d.). The file contained
the amount of TIF funds spent on each project, the year they were spent, and their
geographic coordinates. Since funds for the first TIF project were approved in 1986, the
first decade TIF funding appear is 1980. To calculate the level of TIF funding spent at
the super tract level, TIF project locations were overlaid onto the super tract geographic
file, and the dollar value was summed for each tract at the decade level. This resulted in
two variables, the amount of TIF funding spent in each decade, and the cumulative
amount of TIF funding spent on or before that decade. In addition, standardized
versions of these variables were created at the decade level.
3.) The percentage of housing units in a super tract that were owner-occupied.
Homeownership rates were taken from the decennial census and were included as
protective factors since studies show that homeownership rates often help alleviate
neighborhood disadvantage (Lindblad et al., 2013).
4.) Whether a super tract is waterfront adjacent. Specifically, whether a super
tract shares a border with Lake Michigan. This was included as studies have shown that
natural amenities such as waterfront adjacency can affect quality of life indicators (S.
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Lee & Lin, 2013). Overall, 5.5% (N=37) of super tracts were designated as waterfront
adjacent.
5.) Whether a super tract contains an area designated by the city of Chicago as a
Landmark District. These areas have been designated by the City as having some
historical significance and are therefore protected against redevelopment. These were
included as an indicator of both the existence of quality durable housing stock and of
the existence of other non-natural neighborhood amenities. A shapefile with the
geographies of Landmark Districts was overlaid with super tracts geometries, and those
super tracts that contained any portion of a Landmark District were designated as
landmark super tracts. Note, neighborhoods were generally given this designation in
more recent years, however, it is not the actual designation that is of interest here, but
what that designation says about the historical significance of a given neighborhood.
Overall, 14.2% (N=96) of super tracts contained landmark districts.
Table 9 contains the summary statistics for the three quantitative measures listed
above: commute time, homeownership rate, and TIF spending.
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Table 9 - Decade Average Protective Factors by Super Tract 1940-2010 – Summary Stats
Statistic
Commute time (
minutes)
TIF Funds Spent
(in millions of
dollars)
Homeownership
Rate

N

Mean St. Dev.

5,288 38.52

Min

Pctl(25)

Pctl(75)

Max

12.31

7.62

30.10

46.52

90.37

677

5.49

32.52

0.00

0.00

1.00

635.72

5,407

0.38

0.23

0.00

0.21

0.53

1.00

Analysis Plan
Using the data described above, I plan to answer each of my four research questions by
performing the following analyses:
1.) What effect has the discriminatory practice of redlining had on area measures of social

disorganization?
The first step in answering this question involved plotting tract level social
disorganization scores over time from 1920 through 2010 by HOLC grade to test
whether social disorganization scores increased in redlined tracts relative to other tracts
in the decades following redlining. Since the HOLC assigned neighborhood’s grades
based on existing neighborhood conditions, neighborhoods in super tracts assigned a D
rating would be expected to have higher social disorganization scores prior to the
creation of residential security maps. However, if redlining did have an impact on
social disorganization levels in those areas, the social disorganization scores in D rated
super tracts should increase relative to super tracts assigned an A, B, or C rating. To test
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whether this change existed and was statistically significant, a difference-in-difference
analysis was also conducted. This analysis involved constructing an OLS regression
model with data from 1930 and 1940 (the decades directly before and after redlining
took place respectively) which predicted social disorganization using redlined status, an
indicator of whether the measure was taken before or after redlining, and an interaction
term between redlining status and the pre-post redlining indicator. A positive,
significant relationship for the interaction variable was taken as an indication of an
increase in social disorganization in redlined super tracts relative to other super tracts
and was therefore also taken as evidence of an effect of redlining on social
disorganization.
Since the remaining analyses were looking at the effect of redlining on social
disorganization, data from 1940 onward, after redlining occurred, were used. Bivariate
tests of association were performed between HOLC grade and each of the factors that
went into the social disorganization score: poverty rate, female headed household rate,
unemployment rate, and racial isolation index. Given the non-normal distribution of the
outcome variable, these analyses involved performing permutation tests 8 of
independence for each independent/dependent variable combination

. In addition,

the relationship between redlining and social disorganization was examined visually by

8

These will act as non-parametric alternatives to ANOVA tests. They involve resampling the data in order to
estimate the sampling distribution which can then be used to estimate confidence intervals.
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mapping tract-level social disorganization scores throughout each decade along with
super tract redline status to see whether there was any spatial temporal relationship
between redlining and social disorganization.
To test for spatial clustering, local spatial autocorrelation (LISA) cluster maps were
created to test whether high or low levels of social disorganization clustered in certain
super tracts each decade. To perform this analysis, a spatial lag variable was created for
each super tract and decade which represented the mean social disorganization rate of
tracts bordering the focal tract. Specifically, the lag variable was created using a file that
contained a list of neighboring super tracts for each focal tract using queen contiguity,
meaning that any super tract that shared a common edge or vertex with the focal tract
was included as a neighboring tract. The social disorganization lag term for the focal
tract was then taken by calculating the mean of that super tract’s neighbor’s social
disorganization scores. Note, all super tracts had at least one neighbor, and therefore a
lag term was calculated for all super tracts in the analysis. Super tracts were assigned to
LISA clusters based on the social disorganization score of the focal tract and the lag
variable, calculated from social disorganization scores in neighboring tracts, for that
tract. So, for instance, tracts were designated as high-high if they had standardized
social disorganization scores above zero, and lag statistics above zero. Tracts with social
disorganization scores and lag statistics below zero were assigned low-low, and so on.
However, when mapping these clusters, only those that had a significant level of
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autocorrelation were assigned to each of their respective categories. The level of
association was determined by calculating a local Moran’s I, a measure of spatial
autocorrelation for each tract in each decade. These LISA clusters were then plotted by
decade, which allowed for visual inspection of the locations of high and low clusters of
social disorganization through the decades. High social disorganization tracts clustering
in redlined areas following the 1930s when redlining occurred would indicate a
potential positive relationship between redlining and social disorganization.
In addition, the global Moran’s I, a measure of the overall level of spatial clustering
in a sample, was calculated for each decade. Significant levels of spatial autocorrelation,
indicated by significant global Moran’s I statistics, indicated the need to control for
spatial autocorrelation in subsequent analyses. This would mean including the lag term
calculated earlier as a control in any spatial models constructed using these data.
Finally, a regression model predicting standardized social disorganization scores by
decade using each of the independent variables mentioned earlier was constructed. Of
particular interest in this model was the effect that redlining (operationalized using the
HOLC grade designation) had on social disorganization, and how this relationship
changed over time. To test this relationship, a mixed-effects model with random effects
for the relationship of redlining status on social disorganization that was allowed to
vary by decade was created. As the literature on redlining shows, its insidious effects
tended to occur through processes and decisions that were made in the years and
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decades following HOLC’s designations. Since redlining occurred in the 1930s and data
on social disorganization are available starting in the 1940s, I expected to see an
immediate positive effect between redlining and social disorganization that increased in
the decades immediately following redlining and decreasing gradually over time after
that.
2.) Has the effect of redlining on social disorganization been mediated by government
funding decisions in certain areas that fuel disinvestment?
Since research question 2 sought to determine whether harmful government
decisions affected the relationship between redlining and social disorganization,
analyses in this section used data from 1940 onwards. To determine whether redlining
influenced harmful government funding decisions – specifically the construction of
public housing and highways – tests were conducted to determine whether redlined
super tracts were more likely to be subjected to such decisions using chi-square
analyses. Specifically, I tested whether the proportion of super tracts in neighborhoods
rated D by the HOLC that had a highway or public housing built in them significantly
exceeded the expected proportion given the citywide distribution. In addition, public
housing developments and highways were plotted along with redlined super tracts and
visually inspected for overlap.
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Next, tests of whether super tracts where highways and public housing were built
had higher indices of social disorganization were performed using permutation tests
with an outcome variable of mean super tract level social disorganization score. The
first set of tests simply examined whether the presence of a highway or public housing
in each tract during a given decade influenced the mean social disorganization score in
that super tract. The next set of tests examined whether having one of these constructed
during a given decade affected social disorganization for that decade. Finally, two
variables were created for each decade/super tract combination – one was a calculation
of the difference in standardized social disorganization score in the focal decade
compared to the decade before and one that compared the difference between the
current decade and the decade after. The purpose of this analysis was to see if the
relative social disorganization score changed compared to the previous decade
(indicating an immediate effect) or if it changed the relative score the following decade
(indicating a lagged effect). To allow for visual inspection, decade-level maps were
created that plotted super tract-level social disorganization score along with the
locations of public housing developments that existed during each decade. Similar
maps were created plotting the LISA clusters described earlier along with the locations
of public housing and highways by decade. These maps provided visual evidence of
whether high social disorganization tracts clustered in areas where public housing and
highways were constructed.
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From there, a series of regression models were created to test whether public
housing and highway construction respectively mediated the effect of redlining on
social disorganization. In general, a causal mediation analysis seeks to estimate whether
an outcome (in this case, social disorganization levels) is directly affected by an
exposure variable (in this case, redlining status), or whether some portion of the
exposure variable’s effect is operates through a mediator (in this case, harmful
government funding decisions). Without the inclusion of a mediator, this relationship
would look like Figure 9.
Figure 9 - Illustration of Direct Relationship

However, with the inclusion of a mediator, the relationship might look more like
Figure 10. In this model, some of the total effect of the exposure variable on the outcome
variable, or the total effect, instead goes through the exposure variable’s effect on the
mediator, and the mediator’s effect on the outcome. This represents the indirect, or
mediated, effect on the outcome. The remaining effect of the exposure variable in this
new model is called the direct effect. This type of relationship is visualized in Figure 10.
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Figure 10 - Illustration of Mediated Relationship

According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the traditional method of testing for
mediation involves the following steps:
1. Regressing the outcome variable on the exposure variable to obtain the total
effect. The exposure variable should have a significant relationship with the
outcome variable
2. Regressing the exposure variable on the mediator. Again, the exposure variable
should have a significant relationship with the mediator.
3. Regressing the outcome variable on the exposure and mediator variables. In this
model, a significant relationship between the mediator and the outcome variable,
and a non-significant relationship between the exposure and outcome variable
would signify full mediation. A diminished, but still positive relationship
between the exposure and outcome would signify partial mediation.

98

Therefore, to test whether harmful government funding programs mediated the
effect of redlining on social disorganization, a series of three regression models was
created for each type of funding decision (public housing and highway construction).
The first was a mixed-effect binary logistic regression model predicting whether the
mediator (public housing or a highway) was built in a super tract using redlining status
while controlling for population density, social disorganization lag, and the random
effects of decade. The second was a mixed-effects OLS model that used the same
predictors to predict super tract-level social disorganization score. The final model used
the same set of predictors as the second model, but also controlled for the mediator. If
redlining had a significant association with the outcome variables in models 1 and 2,
and the mediator variable (highway or public housing) had a significant relationship
with social disorganization score in model 3, and the redline variable in that model was
reduced to insignificance, that would indicate that the candidate mediation variable
indeed fully mediated the effect between redlining and social disorganization. If
instead, the effect of redlining in model 3 was reduced but remained significant, that
would indicate partial mediation. Finally, if mediation was found, the significance of
the relationship was tested using the R “mediate” package which breaks down the
effects into the average causal mediation effect (the proportion of the effect on the
outcome that was mediated by the mediator variable), the average direct effect (the
remaining effect of the exposure variable on the outcome) and the total effect, their sum.

99

This package also produces a 95 percent confidence interval for these effects, allowing
significance levels to be measured.
3.) Are there protective factors that moderate the effect of redlining on social disorganization
by protecting areas against its harmful effects?
Analyses used to answer question 3 also used data from 1940 onwards. The analyses
used to answer this question were remarkably similar to those used to answer research
question 2. For instance, the relationship between social disorganization and each set of
potential protective factors was examined using permutation tests for categorical factors
and correlation tests for numerical factors. For certain protective factors that involved
durable neighborhood conditions – such as commute time, landmark status, and
waterfront adjacency – the analyses also included exploring whether this relationship
changed over time. It was hypothesized the relationship between each of these durable
protective factors and social disorganization, along with the level at which they
mediated the effect of redlining on social disorganization changed over time.
Specifically, it was expected that they would have increasingly negative relationships
with social disorganization in more recent decades. Indeed, this may even have meant
that in some instances the direction of the relationship could have changed in more
recent decades. To check for such relationships, social disorganization scores were
separated by the existence or absence of each protective factor and plotted by decade.
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The next step involved examining the relationship between each protective factor
variable and super tract-level social disorganization by placing them in a mixed-effects
OLS regression model predicting social disorganization and controlling for population
density, social disorganization lag, and the random effects of decade. For the more
permanent factors discussed above, interaction terms for said protective factor and the
decade of measurement were also included in the model. The expectation being that
these interaction terms would be negative if the factors did, indeed, decrease the effect
of social disorganization over time.
For variables that had a significant effect on social disorganization in this previous
analysis and that could theoretically be affected by redlining (such as homeownership
rate), mediation analyses were conducted. Otherwise, moderation analyses were
performed to see whether the relationship between redlining and social disorganization
changed as the protective factor changed. This was performed by creating regression
models predicting social disorganization score using redlining status, the protective
factor, an interaction term between redlining and the social disorganization variable
and controlling for population density and social disorganization lag. A significant
interaction term, and an improvement in model fit with the inclusion of the interaction
term were used as indicators of moderation. Figure 11 Illustrates this relationship.
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Figure 11 - Example of Statistical Moderation

4.) What effect has redlining had on area homicide rates, and is this relationship mediated by
redlining’s effect on area social disorganization? How is this effect mediated or moderated
by government funding decisions and protective factors?
Since homicide data were not available until 1965, this analyses in the section used
data from the 1960 census onward. Answering the first part of this question -whether
redlining affected homicide rates - first involved performing bivariate tests of the
relationship between redlining and homicide rates by examining the differential in the
mean annual homicide rates standardized by decade across super tracts by HOLC
grade using a permutation test. Given the data linking redlining to social
disorganization and social disorganization to violent crime, it was expected that super
tracts in D-rated neighborhoods would have significantly higher mean homicide rates
than other tracts. This relationship was further examined by plotting the mean tract102

level social disorganization score by decade separated by redline status. A further
visual inspection was done by plotting redlined super tracts along with both super
tract-level choropleth maps of homicide rates where homicide rates are represented by
the intensity of a geography’s shading, and LISA cluster maps showing clusters of high
and low homicide rate tracts by decade. Decade-level global Moran’s I statistics were
also calculated and plotted to check for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in
homicide rates to determine whether controlling for spatial lag was necessary. In
addition, the relationship between social disorganization score and average homicide
rate was examined using a mixed effects model predicting homicide rate using social
disorganization score and controlling for population density and (if necessary) a lag
variable for homicide rates in neighboring tracts. The model also included coefficients
for the relationship between redlining and homicide rate that were allowed to vary by
decade and were then plotted to see if the relationship changed over time.
Answering the second question – whether the effect of redlining on homicide rate
was mediated by social disorganization – first involved performing a simple correlation
analysis to see if homicide rates and social disorganization scores were significantly and
positively correlated and examining the significance of the Pearson’s correlation
statistic. In addition, choropleth plots of tract-level social disorganization scores were
mapped next to tract level homicide rates by decade to allow for the visual inspection of
similarities and differences in concentrations of the two variables. Then, two mixed-
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effects negative binomial regressions were constructed predicting homicide rate using
social disorganization score, population density, and (if appropriate) homicide lag
while controlling for the random effects of decade. The second model also allowed the
coefficients for the effect of social disorganization score on homicide rate to vary by
decade to see if that relationship changed over time. Negative binomial regression
analysis was used since the raw outcome being used was the count of homicides in a
super tract. The negative binomial model was used because the dependent variable of
interest, homicide count per decade per super tract, was a count variable, and because
the variable was over dispersed, meaning its variance exceeded its mean. However, so
that the model could account for population differences in each super tract, tract
population was included in the models as an offset, which functionally converted the
outcome being measured from a count to a rate. Because the population offset was
included to treat the outcome as a rate, I will refer to this outcome as the homicide rate
going forward. Next, a full mediation analysis was performed to see if the relationship
between redlining and homicide rate was mediated, either fully or partially, by social
disorganization score.
Finally, analyses were performed that tested the bivariate relationships between
each government funding and protective factor and homicide rate using the appropriate
test based on the level of measurement of the protective or government funding
variable. Then, for each factor that had a significant relationship with homicide rate and

104

that could have been affected by redlining (homeownership rates, highway
construction, and public housing), a mediation analysis was performed to see whether
that relationship was mediated by social disorganization. For all other variables,
moderation analyses were performed to test for a moderating effect on the relationship
between redlining on homicide rate.
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Chapter 4 - Results
Research Question 1
1.) What effect has the discriminatory practice of redlining had on area measures of social

disorganization?
The first question this project sought to answer was whether a super tract’s redlining
status (super tracts were considered redlined if their centroids fell within
neighborhoods that received a D rating by the HOLC) had any effect on the level of
social disorganization in that super tract. As noted, redlining exacerbated racial
segregation in certain, inner-city neighborhoods, and simultaneously starved those
neighborhoods of the resources they needed to thrive.
Figure 12 below shows the social isolation index by HOLC grade over the decades
from 1920 to 2010. Racial spatial isolation was analyzed separately here since a major
hypothesis of this study is that the government used redlining to spatially isolate
people of color into certain communities and cut those communities off from
investment. The vertical black line represents when redlining was put into effect, as the
HOLC published their residential security maps in 1938. Since these are standardized
scores, the numbers represent the number of standard deviations above or below the
decade mean. Clearly, redlined super tracts, or those given a grade of D by the HOLC,
saw a dramatic increase in social disorganization measures relative to other super tracts
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in the City. While it is likely that at least some of this difference was a result of other
forces that were already in effect, and that these forces may have affected HOLC
ratings, the stark difference between those super tracts that were and were not redlined
is hard to ignore. Specifically, the racial isolation scores in redlined super tracts
increased from .27 to .53 standard deviations above the city mean isolation score. In
addition, the difference between D rated super tracts and other super tracts narrows
over time. This could be because of a dispersion of the effects of redlining over time. Or,
as will later be analyzed, this could be a result of the effect of factors that protect against
the negative effects of redlining.
Figure 12 - Decade Average Super Tract Standardized Racial Isolation Scores by HOLC
Grade 1920-2010
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Figure 13, which shows the mean social disorganization score by HOLC grade
and decade tells a similar story. While super tracts given D grades by the HOLC had
slightly higher indices of social disorganization prior to the publication of the
residential security maps, that difference jumped drastically following their publication,
and stayed significantly higher than other Chicago super tracts throughout the life of
the study. For instance, in 1930, redlined super tracts had a mean social disorganization
score that was .49 standard deviations above those super tracts given a C rating. By
1940, the difference was just over a full standard deviation. This indicates that redlining
may have had a lasting effect on area social disorganization. And, as hypothesized, the
difference in social disorganization scores in redlined super tracts and non-redlined
super tracts decreased as time moved further away from when redlining was put into
effect by the publication of the residential security maps. However, even in 2010,
redlined super tracts still had significantly higher indices of social disorganization than
even those super tracts rated as C by the HOLC in the 1930s.
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Figure 13 - Decade Average Super Tract Social Disorganization Scores by HOLC Grade
1920-2010

To test whether the effect of redlining on social disorganization identified above
was significant, a difference in difference test was performed. The results of that that
test can be seen in Table 10 below. The table shows the results of a regression model
that regresses super tract level social disorganization scores on whether a tract was
redlined, whether the decade fell before or after redlining occurred (operationalized
using the variable post-redlining), and the interaction between those two variables for
data from the 1930 census (right before redlining) and the 1940 census (right after
redlining). The table indicates that both of the first-order variables in the model were
significant. And, importantly, it also shows that the interaction between whether a tract
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was redlined and whether the data were from before or after redlining happened was
significant, indicating that redlining did have a significant effect on social
disorganization indicators in tracts that were subjected to it. Specifically, since the effect
of redlining status and the interaction between redlining status and the timing variable
are additive, being a redlined track post-redlining increased the predicted social
disorganization score by nearly a full standard deviation.
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Table 10 - Difference-in-Difference Analysis: GLM Regression Model Predicting Social
Disorganization Score for Data from 1930 & 1940
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization
Score
Redlined

0.456***
(0.047)

Post Redlining

-0.126**
(0.042)

Redline*Post Redlining

0.471***
(0.074)

(Intercept)

-0.160***
(0.028)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

1597
0.183
0.181
0.685 (df = 1593)
118.798*** (df = 3; 1593)
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Table 11 shows the mean standardized score for each indicator included in the
social disorganization score by super tract and HOLC grade for decades following
redlining. For each indicator, those super tracts rated D by the HOLC had significantly
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higher mean rates than those rated A through C. In addition, those rated A had
significantly lower mean rates for each indicator than those rated B through D. In all
cases, the difference in mean scores across HOLC grades was found to be statistically
significant using permutation tests.
Table 11 - Mean Standardized Super Tract Social Disorganization by HOLC Grade
1940-2010
HOLC
Grade

*Below
Poverty

A
B
C
D

-1.009
-0.668
-0.22
0.564

*Female
Headed
Households
-0.949
-0.403
-0.157
0.418

*Unemployment
-0.964
-0.602
-0.247
0.517

*Isolation

-0.838
-0.152
-0.234
0.395

*Significance from permutation test of independence = p <= .001

To further explore the relationship between a super tract’s redlined status and its
level of social disorganization across time, Figure 14 shows the locations of Chicago
super tracts that were subjected to redlining, and the distribution of standardized social
disorganization across Chicago’s super tracts in 1920, 1940, 1970, and 2010 respectively.
For the maps in Figure 14, each color in the color ramp shows which of seven social
disorganization score quantiles each super tract falls into from light (the lightest color
representing the lowest, or first quantile) to dark (the darkest color representing the
highest, or seventh quantile).
In the upper left quadrant of that figure, representing social disorganization
scores from the 1920 census, which occurred a full decade prior to redlining, there do
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not appear to be any strong spatial patterns, as quantiles with high and low levels of
social disorganization are spread throughout the map. However, in the maps for 1940
and 1970, the high-social disorganization tracts begin to concentrate in certain areas of
the city. Specifically, in those tracts falling to the South and West of the Loop, which is
Chicago’s downtown district. The Loop includes the larger tracts in the north central
part of Chicago’s far eastern border which abuts Lake Michigan. A similar pattern can
be seen in the top map in Figure 14, which indicates that many of those same super
tracts were also subjected to redlining during the late 1930s. This provides more
evidence that social disorganization began to cluster in redlined areas following the
publication of HOLC’s residential security maps. Also, as hypothesized, in 2010, which
was over seven decades after redlining occurred, the pattern of social disorganization
scores appears to have begun moving away from the pattern established during
redlining, as highly socially disorganized super tracts began to concentrate further to
the west and south of the City, in areas further away from the Loop. As discussed later
in the discussion section, there are many potential explanations for this, including the
suburbanization of poverty, and the gentrification of older denser neighborhoods that
has occurred across the country.
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Figure 14 - Locations of Redlined Super Tracts and Social Disorganization by Decade
for 1920, 1940, 1970, and 2010

Figure 15 provides additional evidence of a clustering effect on social
disorganization following the implementation of redlining. This figure shows the LISA
clusters for the same decades shown above in Figure 14. Dark red clusters indicate
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tracts with high social disorganization scores that are surrounded by other tracts with
high social disorganization scores. Dark blue tracts indicate tracts with low social
disorganization scores surrounded by other tracts with low social disorganization
scores. Light blue tracts indicate low-high tracts, and high-low tracts would be
represented by light red shading, however, that combination did not appear during
these decades. All other tracts had no significant correlation between the focal tract’s
social disorganization score and the social disorganization score of neighboring tracts.
Clearly, there was extraordinarily little clustering in 1920, while in subsequent decades
clustering was evident. These maps also show that clustering patterns changed over
time, as clusters of high social disorganization moved the center of the city, where a
majority of redlining took place, in 1940, to more outlying areas in the western and
southern portions of the City. Importantly, this shift may partly explain the decrease in
the effect of redlining on social disorganization through the decades as seen in Figures
13 and 14.
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Figure 15 - Social Disorganization LISA clusters by Decade for 1920, 1940, 1970, and
2010

Figure 16 plots the global Moran’s I statistic for social disorganization score by
decade. This statistic measures the level of spatial autocorrelation among super tracts.
Therefore, a higher Moran’s I statistic is indicative of super tracts social disorganization
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scores being highly correlated with neighboring super tracts. The figure shows that the
level of autocorrelation rose significantly between 1920 and 1940, which provides
further evidence of social disorganization beginning to cluster following the
implementation of redlining. This also indicates that future analyses should control for
spatial autocorrelation.
Figure 16 - Local Moran’s I Statistic for Social Disorganization by Decade 1920-2010

Finally, to control for potential bias caused by spatial dependency between
neighboring super tracts on both the treatment and outcome variable, a mixed-effects
spatial regression model was run which included spatial lag terms to account for social
disorganization levels and the redline statuses of neighboring super tracts. In addition
to spatial lag, this model also controlled for population density and for the random
effects of decade. The resulting fixed effects from that spatial regression model can be
found below in Table 12. The table indicates that, even after controlling for spatial lag,
redlining still had a significant positive effect on social disorganization levels. The
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negative insignificant interaction term between redline status and decade indicates that
the relationship between redlining status and social disorganization score decreased,
but insignificantly as the decades increased.
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Table 12 - Mixed-Effects OLS Regression Prediction Social Disorganization 1940-2010
with Lag Terms for Redlining Status and Social Disorganization Controlling for
Decade Random Effects
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
Redlined

0.097***
(0.028)

Population Density

0.022***
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.025***
(0.008)

Redlined Lag

-0.094***
(0.025)

Decade

0.004
(0.003)

Redlined*Decade

-0.006
(0.005)

(Intercept)

-0.019
(0.014)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

5405
-2402.336
4822.672
4882.028
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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A second, mixed-effects model was created that regressed the standardized
social disorganization score on redlining status and included random slope term for the
effect of redlining on social disorganization by decade. Figure 17 shows these random
effects plotted by decade along with their 95% confidence intervals. As expected, the
strength of the relationship between redlining status and social disorganization
decreased each decade following 1940. However, after 1990, this trend seems to have
reversed somewhat. This reversal is likely the result of several factors including the
dispersion of social disorganization from central city areas to outlying areas as seen in
Figures 14 and 15, and the effect of protective factors over time.
Figure 17 - Random Effects by Decade from Mixed-Effects Regression Predicting Social
Disorganization by Decade 1940-2010
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Together, the findings from these analyses indicate that redlining and social
disorganization were strongly related in Chicago. In addition, they indicate that
changes in social disorganization followed the institution of redlining temporally,
providing evidence that redlining may have led to increased levels of social
disorganization. Finally, they indicate that, as predicted, the relationship between
redlining and social disorganization was strongest shortly after redlining occurred, and
that these effects diminished slowly over time.

Research Question 2
Has the effect of redlining on social disorganization been mediated by government funding
decisions that fuel disinvestment in certain areas?
Next, this study sought to determine whether, and to what extent, the relationship
between redlining and social disorganization was mediated by harmful government
funding decisions. It focused specifically on two types of government funding
decisions: the construction of highways and public housing developments. As
previously discussed, governments often target disadvantaged communities and
communities with large Black and immigrant populations when deciding where to fund
projects that are often found to further segregation and fuel decline and disinvestment.
Answering this question first involved determining whether the construction of
public housing and highways was more likely to have occurred in redlined areas. The
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next step involved determining whether the construction of these projects correlated
with increased levels of social disorganization, and whether these factors fell into the
correct sequence, that is, that increased levels of social disorganization followed the
construction of public housing developments or highways. And finally, a mediation
analysis was performed to see whether the effect of redlining on social disorganization
was mediated by these funding decisions.
Public Housing Table 13 shows the proportion of all super tracts broken out by redlining status and
whether they overlapped with a public housing development. This table indicates that
redlined tracts were far more likely to contain public housing developments than nonredlined tracts. In fact, of the forty-two tracts that overlapped with public housing
developments, only four were not designated as redlined. In addition, the significant
chi-square test indicates that such a difference in proportions would be highly unlikely
by chance alone.
Table 13 - Proportion of Super Tracts with Public Housing by Redlining Status
Public Housing Built
Redlined
Super Tract
Yes
No

Yes

%

No

%

38
4

90.48%
9.52%

168
362

31.70%
68.30%

Note: χ2 = 55.822, p<=.001
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This pattern can be seen visually in Figure 18, which plots public housing
developments and redlined super tracts together. This figure illustrates that, with very
few exceptions, public housing developments were located within redlined super tracts,
and those that were not tended to be located just outside redlined tracts. And, since
much of the public housing in Chicago was constructed between 1940 and 1960, after
the HOLC graded the City’s neighborhoods, it is plausible that governments used
neighborhoods’ redlined status to target where to construct public housing.
Figure 18 - Map of Chicago’s Redlined Super Tracts and Public Housing Developments

The findings from Table 13 and Figure 18 both indicate that the City of Chicago
was far more likely to build public housing developments in redlined tracts (90.5%) as
compared to non-redline tracts (9.5%), a difference that would be very unlikely to occur
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by chance. This provides evidence that the government may have used the HOLC’s
residential security maps when determining where to build public housing
developments. It could also indicate that government used the same criteria in
determining where to build public housing as the HOLC used in determining which
neighborhoods to give a D rating to.
After establishing a relationship between redlining and the construction of public
housing, the next step involved testing the relationship between the existence of public
housing and levels of super tract social disorganization. Table 14 shows the mean super
tract level standardized social disorganizations score by the presence of public housing
and redline status. The mean score for tracts with public housing was significantly
higher than the mean score for tracts without public housing. Since the mean scores are
a weighted average of Z-scores, the resulting social disorganization score acts similarly
to a Z-score, meaning that the social disorganization score for tracts with public housing
is over 1.4 standard deviations above the mean score for tracts without public housing.
And, within tracts grouped by redline status, super tracts with public housing had
much higher levels of social disorganization than tracts without. Interestingly, nonredlined tracts with public housing had higher social disorganization levels than
redlined tracts with no public housing.
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Table 14 - Mean Super Tract Level Social Disorganization Score by Presence of Public
Housing and Redline Status 1940-2010
Public
Housing

Redlined

Not Redlined

Total

Yes
No

1.456
0.441

1.167
-0.213

1.383
-0.017

P-Value <.001***

Table 15 shows the effect of the construction of public housing on census tract
social disorganization scores in two ways. First, it looks at the mean change in social
disorganization by super tract for tracts that did and did not have public housing built
in the focal decade. The purpose of this comparison is to see whether super tracts that
had public housing built in a given decade saw a change in social disorganization score
that differed from the change seen in tracts that did not have public housing built that
decade. More specifically, this analysis sought to determine whether the actual
construction of public housing, which often involved the demolition of existing
neighborhoods and displacement of their residents, had any immediate effect on social
disorganization. As the table indicates, super tracts appear to see a decrease in their
social disorganization score during the decade that public housing was built. There are
a variety of reasons that one might see this seemingly counterintuitive outcome. For
instance, during the construction of a public housing development, the population in a
given tract may decrease as individuals in the community are displaced while
construction is ongoing. It could also be that the construction of new housing could
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have a temporary positive effect on neighborhoods that were already blighted when
construction began. Or, following the theory of social disorganization, it could be that
newly constructed housing that has not yet begun to deteriorate temporarily depressed
indicators of neighborhood distress, temporarily decreasing what is typically thought of
as social disorganization. The second analysis looks at the mean change in social
disorganization score by whether public housing was built in a given tract during the
prior decade. As expected, those tracts with public housing built the previous decade
saw a significantly higher change in social disorganization score from the previous
decade as compared to tracts that did not. This indicates that there may be a lagged
effect in public housing’s effect on social disorganization. Alternatively, based on the
finding that social disorganization decreases the decade a public housing development
is built, this difference could just be indicative of tracts regressing to their mean social
disorganization rate after seeing an unusually large drop.
Table 15 - Mean Change in Super Tract Level Social Disorganization Score from
Previous Decade by Construction of Public Housing Current and Previous Decade 19402010
Public
Housing Built
Current
Yes
No
P-Value

Mean Change in
SD from Previous
Decade
-0.371
0.007
<.001***

Public
Housing
Built Prior
Yes
No

Mean Change in SD
from Previous
Decade
0.122
0
0.022**
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The relationship between social disorganization and public housing construction
can also be found below in Figure 19. As the figure indicates, those tracts that had
public housing built within their boundaries at some point had, on average, much
higher social disorganization scores than other tracts. And, while this difference
appears to have decreased over time, tracts with public housing continued to have
much higher social disorganization scores than other tracts as recently as 2010.
However, from this figure the relationship does not appear to be causal, as tracts that
had public housing built within them appear to have had significantly higher rates of
social disorganization than tracts that never saw public housing construction before
such developments began to be built in Chicago starting in the early 1940s.
Figure 19 - Mean Social Disorganization Sore by Whether Highway Ever Built Through
Tract and Decade with Markers for Public Housing Construction Interval in Chicago
1940-2010
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Next, to further examine whether there was a causal relationship between the
presence of public housing and elevated social disorganization scores, a difference-indifference analysis was conducted. This analysis used data from 1940, before public
housing began to be constructed in Chicago and 1970, after the construction of public
housing was completed across the City. Table 16 shows the results of this analysis
which involved constructing a mixed-effects OLS regression model that controlled for
population density and for decade random effects. The variable of interest is the
interaction term between the presence of public housing “Public Housing” and whether
the decade associated with the observation was before or after the construction of
public housing was completed. This value is negative, but insignificant. This indicates
that the difference in the change in social disorganization between 1940 and 1970 tracts
with and without public housing is not large enough that one can dismiss it as the
result of chance with sufficient confidence. This also indicates that, while there is clearly
a relationship between public housing and social disorganization, the relationship may
not be causal, as the sequential ordering does not support causation.
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Table 16 - Difference-in-Difference Analysis: Mixed-Effects Regression Model
Predicting Social Disorganization Score for Data from 1940 & 1970
Dependent variable:
SD Score
Public Housing

1.721***
(0.138)

Post Public Housing

-0.008
(0.054)

Population Density

-0.103***
(0.020)

Public Housing * Post
Public Housing

-0.277
(0.172)

(Intercept)

-0.119**
(0.038)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

1327
-1464.934
2943.867
2980.202
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

This information can be seen visually in Figures 20 and 21 which plot social
disorganization scores and LISA spatial clusters respectively by super tract for 1930
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through 1970 and for 2010. These maps clearly confirm that public housing and high
levels of social disorganization are highly spatially correlated. However, it also appears
to indicate that public housing was generally constructed in areas that already had high
levels of social disorganization, which does not support the hypothesis that public
housing leads to increased levels of social disorganization. For instance, in the map
below, the dark brown super tracts are those that were in the highest of seven quantiles
in terms of social disorganization for that decade. The blue public housing
developments began showing up in 1940 in super tracts that were in this highest
quantile of social disorganization the previous decade. This holds true, with very few
exceptions, for each subsequent decade. Interestingly, the maps also indicate that super
tracts with public housing built in the 1940s through the 1960s continued to have some
of the highest levels of social disorganization in the City as late as 2010.
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Figure 20 - Map of Chicago’s Public Housing Developments and Social Disorganization Scores with Public Housing Locations
by Decade

Public Housing

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

2010

Public Housing
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Figure 21 - Map of Chicago’s Public Housing Developments and Social Disorganization LISA Clusters with
Public Housing Locations by Decade

So far, it has been established that redlining preceded the construction of public
housing developments in Chicago, and that there is a strong relationship between
whether a super tract was redlined, and whether public housing was built within that
super tract. In addition, it was shown that there was a strong relationship between the
development of public housing and increased indices of social disorganization,
however, the timing did not indicate causality. The next set of analyses determined to
what extent the effect of redlining on social disorganization identified earlier in this
study was mediated by the existence of public housing. First, to determine the direct
effect of redlining on public housing construction, a mixed effects logistic regression
was run predicting whether public housing was built in a given tract using redlining
status and controlling for population density and a lag term which indicates the average
social disorganization scores of all tracts surrounding the focal tract. This was included
since, as indicated in Figure 16, the Moran’s I statistic - a measure of spatial
autocorrelation – was highly significant for social disorganization in each decade
studied. Therefore, each regression using social disorganization score as a dependent
variable controlled for this term going forward. Of interest in this analysis is the
coefficient for the effect of redlining on the construction of public housing, which in this
case was highly significant. Specifically, the odds of a tract containing public housing if
it was subjected to redlining were nearly three times the odds for a tract that was not.
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Table 17 - Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Model Controlling for Random
Effects of Decade Showing Odds Ratio of Public Housing Construction for Mediation
Analysis 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Public Housing Built
Redlined

2.844*
(1.137)

Population Density

1.079
(1.038)

Social Disorg. Lag

3.249**
(1.082)

(Intercept)

0.029
(1.175)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

5405
-1124.499
2258.997
2291.973
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Table 18 shows the results of two regression models predicting super tract social
disorganization score first using the following predictors: redline status, decade,
population density, and a social disorganization lag term; and the second using the
same set of predictors with the addition of the existence of public housing. Mediation

134

was measured by the effect that the addition of the public housing variable had on the
relationship between redlining and social disorganization. In this instance, including
the public housing variable caused the redlining variable to go from significant to nonsignificant at the p <= .05 level. This indicates full mediation, meaning the effects of
redlining on social disorganization appear to act through redlining’s effect on public
housing.
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Table 18 - Mixed-Effects Regression Models Controlling for Random Effects of Decade
Predicting Social Disorganization with and without Public Housing Variable to test
for Mediation 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.027*
(0.012)

Public Housing

0.002
(0.012)
0.356***
(0.020)

Population Density

0.020***
(0.005)

0.017**
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.015***
(0.008)

0.984***
(0.008)

(Intercept)

-0.014*
(0.006)

-0.032***
(0.006)

5405
-2398.841
4809.681
4849.252

5405
-2255.271
4524.542
4570.708

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

The analysis from Tables 17 and 18 is summarized below in Figure 22. As the
figure shows, redlining increases the odds of public housing being built by almost
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threefold, while the existence of public housing in a tract increases social
disorganization in said tract by nearly 0.4 standard deviations. And, when controlling
for public housing, redlining has almost no direct effect on social disorganization.
Figure 22 - Summary of Results of Public Housing’s Mediation of the Effect of
Redlining on Social Disorganization

Finally, an additional analysis was performed using the mediation package in R
to test whether the causal mediation identified above was significant. The results of this
analysis can be found below in Table 19. This table shows the average causal mediation
effect (ACME), the average direct effect (ADE), and the total effect. The total effect is
equal to the sum of the ACME and the ADE and represents the total effect redlining has
on social disorganization in the models. The ACME is the effect of redlining on social
disorganization that is mediated through the existence of public housing. In this case,
the significant estimate for the ACME indicates that the effect of redlining on social
disorganization is mediated by the existence of public housing. The ADE is simply the
direct effect of redlining on social disorganization that is not mediated by the existence
of public housing. And finally, the proportion mediated is simply the ACME as a
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proportion of the total effect. In this case, fifty-five percent of the effect of redlining on
social disorganization appears to be mediated by the existence of public housing.
Table 19 - Test of Whether Public Housing Mediates Effect of Redlining on Social
Disorganization
Value

Estimate

ACME
ADE
Total Effect
Proportion Mediated

Note:

Upper 95% CI

0.010**
0.002
0.012
0.551

Lower 95% CI

0.002
-0.022
-0.014

0.020
0.020
0.030

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Highways Table 20 shows the proportion of all super tracts broken out by redlining status
and whether they overlap highways, which were constructed through the 1950s and
1960s. While the table shows that redlined super tracts were more likely to have
highways constructed through them, sixteen percent of redlined super tracts saw
highway construction as compared to eleven percent of those that were not categorized
as redlined. This difference was not significant.
Table 20 - Proportion of Super Tracts with Highways Built by Redlining Status
Highway Built
Redline
Neighborhood

Yes
No

Yes

%

No

32
45.07%
174
39
54.93%
362
Note: χ2 = 2.455, p>.05

%

32.46%
67.54%
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This relationship is again visualized in Figure 23, which plots the locations of
highways in Chicago along with the locations of redlined super tracts. While it does
appear that highways tended to go through redlined super tracts, they also go through
non-redlined tracts, especially in those areas further out from the center city. This
makes sense, since highways were built to move people to and from the inner-city, and
therefore must flow through neighborhoods outside of the inner urban core, where
most of the redlining occurred in Chicago. Importantly, what this map does not show is
the level of development that already existed in each of these tracts when the highways
were built through them in the middle of the 20th Century, which may have played an
important factor in the level of disruption caused by highway construction.
Figure 23 - Map of Chicago’s Redlined Super
Tracts and Highways
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Because redlining does not appear to correlate strongly with the construction of
highways, which would be required for highway construction to mediate the effect of
redlining on social disorganization, we can already dismiss it as a mediator in this
analysis. However, it is still of interest for this project to see what effect highway
construction had on social disorganization, as the literature provides evidence that it
often led to increased levels of segregation and that it negatively impacted the
communities it was built through. Table 21 shows the mean social disorganization score
for Chicago neighborhoods with and without highways built through them by redline
status. Interestingly, the table indicates that neighborhoods with highways built
through them had lower mean social disorganization scores than those without
regardless of redline status. And the category with the highest level of social
disorganization was those super tracts with no highways that were redlined.
Table 21 - Mean Super Tract Level Social Disorganization Score by Presence of
Highway and Redline Status 1940-2010
Highway Redlined
Yes
No

0.025
0.470

P-Value

<.001***

Not
Redlined
-0.258
-0.208

Total
-0.195
-0.001

Figure 24 shows a plot of mean tract-level social disorganization scores by
decade and whether the tract ever had a segment of highway constructed within its
boundaries. This figure also contains markers for when highway construction began
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and ended in Chicago. Tracts without highways built through them started out with
much higher levels of social disorganization but saw a steep decrease in social
disorganization score before increasing again after 1990. Tracts with no highways built
through them, on the other hand saw steady, but slowly rising, levels of social
disorganization throughout the study period. The drop in social disorganization score
in tracts with highways may be an indicator of “slum” clearance, and the relocation of
poor households, which was common practice during the decades that highways were
being constructed in Chicago.
Figure 24 - Mean Social Disorganization Sore by Whether Highway Ever Built Through
Tract and Decade with Markers for Highway Construction Interval in Chicago 19402010
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As with the public housing analysis, the immediate effect of highway
construction, specifically the change in social disorganization score from the decade
before the highway was constructed to the decade the highway was constructed and the
change from the decade the highway was constructed to the decade after the highway
was constructed were analyzed. The results of this analysis can be seen below in Table
22. This table indicates that tracts saw a slight decrease in social disorganization score
the decade a highway was built, while other tracts saw no discernable change. And the
difference in change between groups was not found to be significant. The table also
indicates that tracts that had highways built did see a significant decrease in social
disorganization the decade after the highway was built. Again, this finding seems to go
against the hypothesis that highway construction led to heightened levels of social
disorganization. A potential explanation for this, as mentioned before, is that highways
tended to go through both established inner-city neighborhoods and neighborhoods
further outside of the City that were, at the time, likely more suburban in nature. Super
tracts in these more suburban neighborhoods likely had more undeveloped land, and
therefore may have experienced less of the destruction that comes with highway
construction. In addition, these outer neighborhoods may have also seen some benefits
of highway construction which likely made those neighborhoods more accessible to
downtown Chicago and the high paying jobs located there. As a proxy for this, further
multilevel analyses of the effects of highway construction on neighborhood social
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disorganization will also include a covariate for population density. In addition, this
does not show how highway construction affected families living in those areas before a
highway was constructed, as those families were likely displaced to other areas of the
city.
Table 22 - Mean Change in Super tract Level Social Disorganization Score from
Previous Decade by Construction of Highway Current and Previous Decade 1940-2010
Highway
Built
Current
Yes
No
P-Value

Mean Change in
SD from Previous
Decade
-0.155
0.004
0.204

Highway
Built Prior
Yes
No

Mean Change in
SD from
Previous Decade
-0.264
0.003
.001***

Table 23 shows the results of a multivariate model regressing social
disorganization score over decade, redline status, whether a highway was present,
population density, a term for the interaction between population density and whether
a highway was present, and a spatial lag term for social disorganization. The purpose of
this regression was to see whether controlling for population density and the
interaction between highway construction and population density discussed earlier had
any influence on the effect of highway construction and social disorganization. The
hypothesis being that highway construction may have a stronger effect on social
disorganization in denser, more urban neighborhoods than in less dense neighborhoods
further from the City’s urban core. However, the model shows that the presence of a
highway has no significant effect on social disorganization, while the interaction
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between highway construction and population density has a negative effect. This
indicates that highway construction had more of a lessening effect on social
disorganization in denser neighborhoods, going against the hypothesis that highway
construction would increase social disorganization in denser neighborhoods.
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Table 23 - Mixed-Effects Regression Model Predicting Social Disorganization that
Includes Highway Construction and Population Density Controlling for Random
Effects of Decade 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
Redlined

1.721***
(0.138)

Highway

-0.008
(0.054)

Population Density

-0.103***
(0.020)

Social Disorg. Lag

-0.277
(0.172)

Highway*Pop Density

-0.119**
(0.038)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

1327
-1464.934
2943.867
2980.202
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Figure 25 shows the relationship between social disorganization and highway
construction graphically. Each of the six frames in the figure shows a map of Chicago
with super tracts shaded by the tract social disorganization score broken out into seven
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quantiles, from lightest for the lowest social disorganization tracts to darkest for the
tracts with the highest levels of social disorganization. In addition, each frame has the
locations of highways that were present at the time of that decade’s decennial census.
These maps seem to indicate that there is a correlation between the locations of
highways and rates of social disorganization. However, the relationship does not
appear to be causal. Instead, it appears that super tracts with high levels of social
disorganization were chosen as locations for the construction of highways. It also
appears that many of those locations continued to have high levels of social
disorganization as recently as 2010. However, many of the locations where highways
were constructed that are closer to Chicago’s Loop, especially those areas to its West
and South, appear to have become less socially disorganized as of 2010 compared to
other super tracts in the City. This figure also shows that highways tend to go through
less socially disorganized tracts as they get further from The Loop. Again, this is likely
because highways were built to move people from the City’s urban core to the outskirts,
which would necessitate they go through outer neighborhoods.
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Government Funding Decisions Summary:
Table 24 below summarizes the relationships between each of the government
funding decisions analyzed, including their direct effect after controlling for covariates,
and their effects as mediators of the relationship between redlining and social
disorganization. The construction of public housing, and the immediate effect of public
housing being built on the change in social disorganization the following decade, both
had positive effects on social disorganization. In addition, public housing mediated the
relationship between redlining and social disorganization. Highway construction, on
the other hand, had no significant effect on social disorganization, nor did it mediate the
effect between redlining and social disorganization.
Table 24 - Summary of Findings for Government Funding Decisions
Govt Funding
Decision
Public Housing Built
PH Built Previous
Highway Construction

Relationship with SD

+
+
Null

Mediation between RL
and SD

+
Null
Null

And finally, each of the factors examined in this section were put into one regression
model to examine their effect on social disorganization while controlling for the others
as covariates. The results of this analysis can be found in Table 25. Given the previous
analyses in this section, none of the findings from this table are very surprising. Redline
status is reduced to insignificance when including the public housing and social
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disorganization lag variables, while public housing continues to be highly significant
and highway construction continues to have a negative, but non-significant effect.
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Table 25 - Mixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Social Disorganization using
Redline Status and Government Funding Decisions as Covariates with Random Effects
for Decade 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
Redlined

0.003
(0.012)

Public Housing

0.339***
(0.022)

PH Built Prev. Decade

0.110*
(0.052)

Highway

-0.013
(0.016)

Population Density

1.122**
(0.378)

Social Disorg. Lag

0.983***
(0.008)

(Intercept)

-0.044***
(0.007)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

5405
-2253.638
4525.276
4584.632
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Research Question 3
Are there protective factors that moderate the effect of redlining on social
disorganization by protecting areas against its harmful effects?
While the previous section of this analysis examined whether certain government
funding decisions led to increased levels of social disorganization, this section looks at
whether certain protective factors, both natural and those designed by humans,
lessened social disorganization levels in certain areas, and whether their effects on these
areas changed over time. As shown in previous analyses, the relationship between
redlining and social disorganization decreased as more and more time elapsed from the
creation of the HOLC residential security maps. This analysis tests some factors that
may have led to this decrease in said effect. The protective factors examined in this
section include: commute time to The Loop, TIF funding spent in tract, homeownership
rates, waterfront adjacency, and landmark district status.
Commute Time
Commute time was measured as the amount of time in minutes it took to travel
from the center of a given super tract to the center of Chicago’s Loop using public
transportation, calculated using the Google Maps API. The hypothesis being that super
tracts with shorter commute times to high-paying jobs may be less affected by the
factors that lead to social disorganization. A correlation analysis comparing super tract

151

commute times to social disorganization scores produced a correlation coefficient of .266, which was significant at the p <= .001 level. This indicates that, for the entire study
sample which includes data from 1940 to 2010, commute time had a negative
relationship with social disorganization scores. Or, more simply put, super tracts with
longer commute times had, on average, lower levels of social disorganization. This may
seem counterintuitive given that super tracts with longer commute times should, in
theory, have less access to high-paying jobs in Chicago’s downtown.
However, one must also consider the difference in characteristics between those
super tracts on the outskirts of the City that had longer commute times, and those closer
in with shorter commute times. Specifically, the tracts that are closer to the downtown
area are generally older, denser, and more urban super tracts, while those tracts that are
further out are likely to be more suburban and less dense in nature. This relationship
can be seen below in Figure 26 which shows a map of the average population density
across decades for each tract next to a map of the calculated commute time for each
tract. The map indicates an inverse relationship where tracts closer to downtown were
denser and had shorter commute times while tracts further from downtown were less
dense and had longer commute times.
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Figure 26 - Map of Mean Population Density and Commute Time by Public
Transportation for Chicago Tracts 1940-2010

And, as discussed earlier in this study, one of the major contributors of urban
distress was that wealthy, often white, families generally left more densely populated
areas to move to the suburbs, while those inner-city neighborhoods they left were
starved of resources and were subjected to heightened levels of distress as a result.
However, as time moved further away from the days of redlining and white flight, it is
possible that easy access to high-paying jobs may have increasingly lessened social
disorganization levels in neighborhoods as those neighborhoods become more
“desirable”. To test this hypothesis, Figure 27 plots the correlation between commute
time and social disorganization score by decade. This plot clearly shows that, over time,
the relationship between commute time and social disorganization score decreased to
the point where there was practically no correlation in 2010.
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Figure 27 - Pearson Correlation between Super Tract Level Commute Time and Social
Disorganization Score by Decade 1940-2010

Table 26 shows the results of an OLS regression predicting social disorganization
using commute time in minutes, decade, population density, a lag term for social
disorganization, and importantly, a term for the interaction between decade and
commute time. The purpose of the interaction term is to test the hypothesis that the
effect of commute time on social disorganization may have flipped in recent decades as
short commute times may have become more desirable. The analysis shows that, after
controlling for population density and the social disorganization in neighboring tracts,
none of the commute time variables remained significant. Interestingly, there was a
significant positive relationship between population density and decade, which could
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be a result of increasing isolation and poverty in those areas in Chicago’s urban core
following WWII, and the movement of affluent white residents into more suburban
areas with single family homes. As discussed later, the reversal of this trend could be a
result of strong social forces, such as gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty,
that have taken place in recent decades.
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Table 26 - Mixed-Effects Regression Model Predicting Social Disorganization using
Commute Time and Other Covariates with Random Effects for Decade 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
Commute time (minutes)

0.066
(0.059)

Population Density

0.004
(0.012)

Decade

0.002
(0.008)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.029***
(0.008)

Commute Time* Decade

0.003
(0.011)

Population Density*Decade

0.010***
(0.003)

(Intercept)

-0.063
(0.040)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

5365
-2371.796
4761.592
4820.881
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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While commute time does not appear to have a direct effect on social
disorganization, it may still act to moderate the effect of redlining on social
disorganization. Table 27 shows the results of an analysis testing whether commute
time has a moderating effect on this relationship. In this table, model one uses redline
status, commute time in minutes and several other covariates to predict tract-level
social disorganization including a term to control for the lag in neighboring social
disorganization scores to correct for the spatial autocorrelation found earlier in Figure
16. Model two is the same, but with the addition of a term to control for the interaction
between commute time and redline status. Importantly, the addition of the interaction
term between redlining status and commute time is positive and significant, indicating
that redlining’s effects on social disorganization are stronger as commute times
increase. In addition, including the interaction term actually reverses the direction of
the relationship between redlining and social disorganization from positive and
significant to negative and significant. Again, this seems to suggest that redlining’s
positive effects on social disorganization tend to be concentrated in super tracts further
from the City’s center. This, along with a significant likelihood ratio test indicating that
model two explained significantly more of the variance in social disorganization than
model one, indicates that commute time does moderate the effect between redlining
and social disorganization.
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Table 27 - Test for Commute Time’s Moderation on the Relationship between Redlining
and Social Disorganization 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.038**
(0.013)

-0.070
(0.036)

Commute Time

0.089**
(0.028)

0.038
(0.032)

Population Density

0.033***
(0.006)

0.035***
(0.006)

Social Disorg Lag

1.019***
(0.008)

1.017***
(0.008)

Redline*Commute Time

(Intercept)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

0.191**
(0.060)
-0.073***
(0.020)

-0.038
(0.022)

5365
-2363.986
4741.971
4788.085

5365
-2360.808
4737.615
4790.316

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Homeownership
The next protective factor analyzed was homeownership. One effect that
redlining had on neighborhoods was that it made it more difficult to take out loans in
redlined neighborhoods, depressing homeownership (Lang & Nakamura, 1992). And,
homeownership has been found to increase neighborhood levels of collective efficacy,
and therefore potentially reduce levels of crime (Lindblad et al., 2013). Because
homeownership may be directly affected by redlining, there is a chance that it could
mediate the effect of redlining and social disorganization.
Figure 28 shows the standardized owner-occupancy rate by decade and tract
redline status from 1940 through 2010. Over the decades, redlined tracts saw
consistently lower homeownership rates than non-redlined tracts.
Figure 28 – Standardized Super Tract Homeownership Rate by Decade and Redline
Status 1940-2010
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However, the figure fails to account for other potentially important covariates that
may affect homeownership, including population density which could have a strong
relationship with homeownership. Therefore, Table 28 below shows the results of an
OLS regression analysis examining the effects of redlining on homeownership while
controlling for population density and decade. As the regression output shows,
redlining had a significant negative relationship with homeownership rates in these
data.
Table 28 - Mixed-Effects OLS Regression Testing Effect of Redline Status on
Homeownership Rate with Random-Effects for Decade 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Homeownership Rate
Redlined

-0.437***
(0.028)

Population Density

-0.00002***
(0.00000)

(Intercept)

0.364***
(0.022)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

5407
-7268.811
14547.620
14580.600
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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The next test involved examining the relationship between homeownership rates
and social disorganization, the hypothesis being that areas with lower rates of
homeownership will have had higher levels of social disorganization. The Pearson’s
correlation coefficient between the two variables was .02, which was not found to be
significantly different from zero. However, a direct correlation analysis may miss
important covariates that affect the relationship between the two variables. Table 29
shows a mixed-effects regression model predicting social disorganization using
homeownership rate and including covariate terms for standardized population density
and social disorganization lag, in addition to controlling for the random effects of
decade. In this analysis, homeownership rate does appear to have a negative and
significant effect on social disorganization scores, meaning tracts with higher levels of
homeownership generally saw lower levels of social disorganization.
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Table 29 - Mixed-Effects OLS Regression Testing Effect of Homeownership Rate on
Social Disorganization Score with Random-Effects for Decade 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
-0.056***
(0.006)

Homeownership Rate
Population Density

0.008
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

0.996***
(0.008)

(Intercept)

-0.006
(0.005)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

5404
-2349.485
4710.970
4750.540
*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Since redlining has a significant effect on homeownership rates, and
homeownership rates had a significant effect on social disorganization, homeownership
could possibly be a mediator between the effect of redlining and social disorganization.
Table 30 below shows two mixed-effects regression models that predict social
disorganization while controlling for the random effects of decade. Both models
contained terms to control for population density and social disorganization lag from
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neighboring tracts. However, model two also includes the super tract level
standardized homeownership rate as a covariate. These models indicate that
homeownership did have a mediating effect on the effect of redlining on social
disorganization. First, in model 2, the estimated effect for homeownership rate was
negative and significant. Second, the indicators of model fit in model 2 are better than
the model fit for model 1, indicating the addition of homeownership to the model
improved its predictive ability. A likelihood ratio indicated that this difference was
significant. And finally, the estimate for redlining goes from significant in model 1 to
insignificant in model 2 with the addition of the homeownership variable.
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Table 30 - Mixed-Effects Regression Models Controlling for Random Effects of Decade
Predicting Social Disorganization with and without Homeownership Variable to test
for Mediation 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.027*
(0.012)

Home Ownership Rate

0.016
(0.012)
-0.056***
(0.006)

Population Density

0.020***
(0.005)

0.007
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.015***
(0.008)

0.992***
(0.008)

(Intercept)

-0.014*
(0.006)

-0.010
(0.006)

5404
-2398.841
4809.681
4849.252

5404
-2352.126
4718.251
4764.415

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

This relationship can be seen graphically in Figure 29. As the figure shows,
redlining had a positive, but non-statistically significant relationship with social
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disorganization. In addition, redlining had positive indirect effect on social
disorganization through its negative effect on homeownership rates in redlined super
tracts. As the figure shows, homeownership rates decreased social disorganization
levels, so redlining’s negative effect on homeownership rates appears to have been
associated with increased levels of social disorganization in redlined super tracts.
Figure 29 - Summary of Results of Homeownership Rate’s Mediation of the Effect of
Redlining on Social Disorganization

And finally, Table 31 shows the results of an analysis testing whether the
relationship between redlining and social disorganization was mediated by
homeownership rates. The significant ACME value indicates that homeownership does
have a significant mediating effect on this relationship. However, the proportion of the
total effect mediated by homeownership was small, only 7.8%.
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Table 31 - Test of Whether Homeownership Mediates Effect of Redlining on Social
Disorganization
Value

Estimate

ACME
ADE
Total Effect
Proportion Mediated

-0.002
0.016
0.014
0.078

Note:

*

Upper
95% CI

Lower 95%
CI

PValue

-0.003
-0.009
-0.002

0.000
0.040
0.040

0.014*
0.210
0.264

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

TIF Spending
Tax increment financing, or TIF, as previously mentioned, is a vehicle through
which Chicago diverts tax funds to neighborhood reinvestment. TIF dollars were
invested in specific projects throughout the City. For the purposes of this analysis, those
projects were overlaid with super tracts so that investment could be estimated at the
tract level. The two maps below in Figure 30 show the locations of TIF project sites
overlaid on top of redlined tract locations. The map to the right shows the cumulative
amount of TIF spent per tract through 2019. Overall, 33.5% of redline tracts (N = 69) had
some amount of TIF spending within their limits as compared to 29.5% (N = 139) of
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non-redlined tracts. In addition, TIF spending appears to have been concentrated within
the borders of both redlined and non-redlined tracts.
Figure 30 - Map of TIF Sites and Redlined Tracts (right) and Cumulative TIF Dollars
Spent per Tract through 2019 (right)

Redline
TIF Site
-

Funds for the first TIF project were approved in 1986, therefore, TIF data are only
available for the 1980 decade onward. Table 32 below shows the results of several
correlation analyses that view the relationship between social disorganization score and
TIF spending in a variety of ways. It looked at the correlation between current decade
social disorganization and: cumulative TIF spending, current decade spending, and
previous decade spending, and the correlation between the changes in social
disorganization score from the previous decade to the current decade correlated against
the TIF spending in the previous decade. Only the latter analysis was found to be
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significant. However, the positive direction of the correlation was unexpected given
that TIF spending should have, in theory, improved conditions that lead to a decrease in
indicators of social disorganization.
Table 32 - Correlation Tests for Relationship between Super Tract-Level Social
Disorganization and TIF Spending 1980-2010
Variable
SD - Cumulative TIF
SD - TIF Current Decade
SD - TIF Previous Decade

Correlation Coeff
-0.021
-0.005
-0.034

T-Value
-0.940
-0.230
-1.510

0.069

3.118**

Δ SD - TIF Previous Decade

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
However, this simple correlation analysis failed to account for other, potentially
relevant, factors that could affect the relationship between TIF spending and social
disorganization. Table 33 shows the results of a regression model predicting the change
in tract-level social disorganization score from 1980 to 2010 using the cumulative
amount of TIF spent during those decades, controlling for population density and the
lag from the social disorganization scores in neighboring tracts in 2010 and population
density. The table indicates that TIF spending had a positive and significant effect on
the change in social disorganization score. Again, this seems counterintuitive given the
hypothesis that TIF spending would lessen social disorganization.
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Table 33 - OLS Regression Testing Effect of TIF Spending on Change Social
Disorganization Score from 1980-2010
Dependent variable:
Change in SD 1980-2010
TIF Spending

0.050*
(0.020)

Population Density

0.045*
(0.020)

Social Disorg. Lag

-0.221***
(0.024)

(Intercept)

-0.002
(0.019)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

674
0.140
0.136
0.501 (df = 670)
36.459*** (df = 3; 670)
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

One hypothesis as to why those tracts with TIF spending saw higher levels of
social disorganization is that they had higher social disorganization scores before TIF
funds were spent. Figure 31 gives some value to this hypothesis. It shows mean social
disorganization scores in tracts that did and did not have TIF spending by decade. It
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could also be the result of an issue with the unit of analysis. For instance, TIF funds
generally went towards small areas within a super tract, therefore, it may be that a
smaller unit of analysis would be needed to identify the positive effects of TIF spending.
Clearly, those tracts that saw TIF spending had higher social disorganization scores
during all decades analyzed. In addition, when TIF spending began around 1990, the
difference in mean social disorganization score between tracts with and without TIF
spending began to narrow.
Figure 31 - Mean Tract-Level Social Disorganization Score by Decade and TIF Spending
Status 1940-2010

The final analysis involving TIF funding examined whether it had a moderating
effect on the relationship between redlining and social disorganization. The results of
this analysis can be found below in Table 34. It contains the output of two models
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predicting change in social disorganization score from 1980-2010 using redline status,
standardized population density, and TIF spending. The second model also includes
the interaction between redline status and TIF spending, the coefficient for which was
not significant. This, combined with the fact that the inclusion of this interaction term
did not change the R-squared value, indicate that TIF spending does not moderate the
relationship between redlining and social disorganization.
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Table 34 - Test for TIF Spending’s Moderation on the Relationship between Redlining
and Social Disorganization 1980-2010
Dependent variable:
Change in SD 1980-2010
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.169***
(0.044)

0.169***
(0.044)

Population Density

0.070***
(0.021)

0.070***
(0.021)

TIF Spending

0.053*
(0.021)

0.063*
(0.025)

TIF Spending*Redlined

(Intercept)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

-0.029
(0.042)
-0.053*
(0.024)

-0.053*
(0.024)

674
674
0.057
0.057
0.052
0.052
0.525 (df = 670)
0.525 (df = 669)
13.403*** (df = 3;
10.164*** (df = 4; 669)
670)
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Landmark Status
As discussed, landmark district status is given to Chicago neighborhoods with
historical significance by Chicago’s City Council. Landmark status helps preserve the
historic infrastructure in these neighborhoods from redevelopment and qualifies them
for historic rehabilitation incentives. However, for the purposes of this study, landmark
district status was included as a proxy for other intangible neighborhood conditions
that could not be measured using administrative data, including: the quality of existing
neighborhood housing and the existence of other desirable neighborhood
infrastructure. Therefore, the date this designation was granted is unimportant for the
purposes of this analysis, it is the qualities of each community that allowed them to gain
such status that was measured, not the actual landmark status of that neighborhood at
any given time. Figure 32 below shows the locations of Chicago landmark districts in
blue plotted on top of redlined super tracts in red. There does appear to be a significant
amount of overlap, however, this is likely because redlining tended to occur in older,
denser areas near Chicago’s Loop, which tended to contain older, historic
neighborhoods. And, since there is no theoretical or logical link between redlining
status and the designation of a landmark district, this analysis examined the
moderating effect of landmark status on the link between redlining and social
disorganization and did not treat it as a potential mediator.
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Figure 32 - Map of Chicago Redline Tracts and Landmark
Districts

Landmark District
Redlined Tract

An analysis of the pooled social disorganization scores across each decade from
1940 to 2010 showed that super tracts that contained landmark districts had a slightly
lower mean standardized social disorganization score (-0.062) than those that did not
(0.008). This difference was found to be slightly significant using permutation tests of
independence. However, when looking at the difference in social disorganization score
between tracts that did and did not contain landmark districts by decade, a clear pattern
emerged. Figure 33 plots mean decade-level standardized social disorganization scores
for tracts separated by landmark status. In 1940, the mean social disorganization scores
were nearly identical between the two sets of tracts. Between 1940 and 1960, landmark
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tracts saw a steep rise in social disorganization score compared to non-landmark tracts.
However, from 1970 onward, landmark tracts saw a steep decrease in mean social
disorganization score while non-landmark tracts saw a slight but steady increase in that
indicator.
Figure 33 - Mean Tract-Level Social Disorganization Score by Decade and Landmark
District Status 1940-2010

Next, a mixed-effects regression model was created to test the effect of landmark
status on tract-level social disorganization score while controlling for the effects of
population density, lag from social disorganization scores of neighboring tracts, and the
random effect of decade. Table 35 below shows the fixed effects from this model. Note
the model also included coefficients for the random effects of landmark status on social
disorganization score by decade, since Figure 33 above indicated that said effect varied
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drastically and non-linearly across decades. These effects will be discussed later. In this
model, the pooled fixed effect of tract landmark status on social disorganization is
negative and significant, meaning tracts with landmark status generally saw lower
levels of social disorganization while controlling for the other covariates in the model.
Table 35 - Fixed Effects from Mixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Social
Disorganization using Landmark Status 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
Landmark Tract

-0.058*
(0.023)

Population Density

0.023***
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.022***
(0.007)

(Intercept)

0.002
(0.006)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.

5405
-2391.326
4798.651
4851.412

Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Figure 34 shows the random effects of landmark status on social disorganization
score by decade. Surprisingly, given the pattern in social disorganization score
separated by decade and landmark status shown earlier, the coefficient seems to have
increased over time. Clearly, controlling for the effects of population density and the lag
term for social disorganization from neighboring tracts had a strong influence on the
relationship between redlining and tract landmark status. This may be because, as
stated earlier, it is not the actual landmark designation that is important, but the
neighborhood characteristics that made that designation possible. And those conditions
may be present in tracts neighboring the focal tract. It could also be that landmark
status was given to older, denser areas which were hit particularly hard by the declines
seen in the middle part of the 20th century, and that all such areas are beginning to
regress to the mean.
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Figure 34 - Random Effects of Landmark Status on Social Disorganization from Mixed
Effects Model 1940-2010

Table 36 shows the results of an analysis testing whether landmark status
moderates the effect of redlining on social disorganization. In the analysis, the addition
of the interaction term for redlining and landmark status was not significant, and its
addition did not affect the significance of the redlining term. Therefore, this analysis
indicates that landmark status, while a significant predictor of social disorganization,
does not moderate the effect of redlining on social disorganization.
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Table 36 - Test for Landmark Tract Status’s Moderation on the Relationship between
Redlining and Social Disorganization 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.031*
(0.012)

0.033*
(0.013)

Landmark Tract

-0.060***
(0.015)

-0.055**
(0.018)

Population Density

0.021***
(0.005)

0.021***
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.014***
(0.008)

1.013***
(0.008)

Landmark Tract * Redline

-0.015
(0.031)

(Intercept)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

-0.007
(0.007)

-0.007
(0.007)

5405
-2393.770
4801.539
4847.705

5405
-2396.215
4808.429
4861.190

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Waterfront Adjacency
Waterfront adjacency is another measure of an area’s natural amenities, which
can often protect neighborhoods from the harmful effects of urban decline in certain
instances (S. Lee & Lin, 2013). While Chicago has an abundance of rivers, the main body
of water that was used to identify whether a tract was waterfront adjacent was Lake
Michigan, which neighbors Chicago along its Eastern border. Figure 35 shows the
locations of waterfront adjacent tracts in blue in the left-hand frame of the figure, and
redlined super tracts in red in the right-hand frame. There is overlap between
waterfront adjacent tracts and redlined tracts, especially in those tracts that lie directly
south of the Loop.
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Figure 35 - Map of Waterfront Adjacent and Redline Tracts in Chicago

An analysis of pooled social disorganization scores across decades from 1940 to 2010
showed that waterfront adjacent super tracts had lower mean standardized social
disorganization scores (-0.177) than non-waterfront adjacent tracts (0.008). This
difference was significant at the p <= .05 level. Figure 36 shows the mean social
disorganization score by decade separated by waterfront adjacency status. While the
non-waterfront adjacent tracts saw steady rates of social disorganization, the waterfront
adjacent tracts saw much more variable rates, rising in 1960 before falling drastically
through 2010. However, this difference could be because of the small sample size of
waterfront adjacent tracts combined with the fact that the social disorganization scores
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are standardized across decades, which would mean one would expect very little
variability for non-waterfront tracts across decades given that the overall mean of
pooled standardized scores would be expected to be approximately zero.
Figure 36 - Mean Tract-Level Social Disorganization Score by Decade and Waterfront
Adjacency 1940-2010

Next, a mixed effects regression model was created which allowed the effect of
waterfront adjacency on social disorganization to vary across decades. The fixed effects
from this analysis can be found in Table 37. Waterfront adjacency had a significant
negative relationship with social disorganization when controlling for population
density and lag from social disorganization in neighboring tracts. However, the decade
varying random effects of waterfront adjacency on social disorganization were not
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plotted, as they were all so close to zero that doing so would have added no additional
information to the fixed-effects results. So, like landmark status, it appears that when
controlling for population density and social disorganization lag from neighboring
tracts, the variation in the effect of waterfront adjacency on social disorganization over
time seems to have disappeared.
Table 37 - Fixed Effects from Mixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Social
Disorganization using Waterfront Adjacency 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization Score
Waterfront Tract

-0.078***
(0.022)

Population Density

0.023***
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.020***
(0.007)

(Intercept)

-0.002
(0.005)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.

5405
-2394.573
4805.146
4857.907

Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Table 38 shows the results of an analysis testing whether the effect of redlining
on social disorganization was moderated by tract waterfront adjacency using two
mixed-effects regression models that control for the random effects of decade. The table
shows that the term for the relationship between redlining and waterfront adjacency
was not significant, and the coefficient for redlining did not change significantly with
the addition of this term. Therefore, the effect of redlining on social disorganization was
not moderated by tract waterfront adjacency.
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Table 38 - Test for Waterfront Adjacency’s Moderation of the Relationship between
Redlining and Social Disorganization 1940-2010
Dependent variable:
Social Disorganization
Score
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.023
(0.012)

0.022
(0.012)

Waterfront Adjacent

-0.073**
(0.022)

-0.081***
(0.024)

Population Density

0.021***
(0.005)

0.021***
(0.005)

Social Disorg. Lag

1.015***
(0.008)

1.014***
(0.008)

Waterfront Adjacent * Redlined

0.069
(0.071)

(Intercept)

-0.009
(0.007)

-0.008
(0.007)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.

5405
-2396.315
4806.630
4852.796

5405
-2397.569
4811.137
4863.898

Note:

*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Protective Factors Summary
The effect of each protective factor on the social disorganization, and on the
effect of redlining and social disorganization are summarized in Table 39. Each of the
protective factors, except for commute time had a significant direct relationship with
social disorganization. In addition, commute time moderated the effect of redlining on
social disorganization, specifically the effect of redlining on social disorganization
increased as commute times increased. In addition, homeownership partially mediated
the effect of redlining on social disorganization; specifically, the analyses indicated that
redlining depressed homeownership levels, which increased social disorganization.
Table 39 - Summary of Relationships between Protective Factors and Social
Disorganization
Protective Factor

Relationship
with SD

Mediation

Moderation

Commute Time

Null

NA

+

+
-

-

NA

NA

Null

NA

Null

NA

Null

Homeownership
TIF Spending
Landmark Status
Waterfront Adjacency

Finally, each of these factors were combined into a regression model to test their
effect on social disorganization while controlling for each other factor. The results from
this analysis can be found in Table 40. The first model in the table predicted social
disorganization score using each of the protective factors from this section along with
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social disorganization lag from neighboring tracts and population density, it also
controlled for the random effects of decade. The second model contained the same
information in the first model, but also included the government funding decision
factors. In this model, all the protective factors except TIF spending were significantly
related to social disorganization score. In addition, the redlining variable continued to
be significant after controlling for these variables. Interestingly, in the two individual
models controlling for homeownership and waterfront adjacency along with the usual
population density, and social disorganization lag, the redline status term was no
longer significant. However, adding in the remaining protective factor terms flipped the
redline status term back to significance. In the second model that included the
government funding decision factors, all the protective factor terms remained
significant, however, the term for redlining became insignificant with their inclusion.
This is unsurprising given that public housing was found to mediate the effect between
redlining and social disorganization. Taken together, these models show that many of
the government funding decision and protective factors analyzed here play an
important role in determining tract-level social disorganization. It also indicates that the
way they interact with each other affected social disorganization in complex.
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Table 40 - Full Mixed Effects OLS Regression Models Predicting Social
Disorganization with Protective Factors and Government Funding Decisions 1940-2010
Dependent variable:

Redlined

Social Disorganization
Score
(1)
(2)
**
0.036
0.014
(0.013)
(0.012)

Public Housing Built

0.361***
(0.021)

Highway Built

0.016
(0.016)

Commute Time (minutes)

0.004***
(0.001)

0.005***
(0.001)

Homeownership Rate

-0.094***
(0.007)

-0.087***
(0.007)

Landmark Status

-0.056***
(0.015)

-0.050***
(0.015)

Waterfront Adjacent

-0.122***
(0.023)

-0.122***
(0.022)

Cumulative TIF Spent

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Population Density per km2

0.014*

0.011

(0.006)

(0.006)

Social Disorg. Lag

0.989***
(0.008)

0.962***
(0.008)

(Intercept)

-0.167***

-0.198***
188

(0.022)

(0.022)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.

5364
5364
-2290.188 -2146.370
4602.375 4318.739
4674.838 4404.377

Note:

*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Research Question 4
What effect has redlining had on area homicide rates, and is this relationship mediated by
redlining’s effect on area social disorganization? How is this effect mediated or moderated by
government funding decisions and protective factors?
Relationship between redlining and homicide The final set of analyses analyzed the effect that redlining had on homicide rates,
and whether that effect was influenced by the other factors previously discussed in this
study. A simple permutation test of independence of the mean tract-level annual
homicide rate per 100k residents indicated that redlined and non-redlined tract
homicide rates came from two different samples with a degree of significance of p <
.001. Specifically, redlined tracts had much higher homicide rates than non-redlined
tracts.
This relationship can be seen clearly in Figure 37, which plots the mean tract-level
homicide rate by decade and redline status from 1960, the first decade of homicide data
available for this study, through 2010. While the rates fluctuated greatly within the two
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groups over the decades, the redlined tracts had consistently higher homicide rates
across decades. In addition, both groups follow the same general pattern in homicide
rates with a steady increase from 1960 through 1980, followed by a decrease until 2000,
and a spike in 2010.
Figure 37 – Chicago Super Tract Homicide Rate per 100k Residents by Decade and
Redline Status 1960-2010

Figure 38 shows this relationship geographically. Each panel shows the tract-level
homicide rate for each decade from 1960 to 2010, with the borders of redlined tracts
overlaid to show where redlining occurred. During the 1960s and 1970s, the highhomicide rate super tracts seem to have been concentrated closer to the City’s urban
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core in areas that were redlined. However, the concentrations seem to have started
dispersing further away from the City Center starting in the 1990s, and by 2010, the
concentration of high-homicide tracts were clustered much further to the West and
South of the City, further away from where redlining occurred.
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Figure 38 - Maps Showing Tract-Level Homicide Rate per 100k Residents by
Decade
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Figure 39 shows the global Moran’s I statistic for tract-level homicide rate by
decade. Again, this statistic measures the level of spatial autocorrelation, that is, the
level at which homicide rates in a focal tract were correlated with homicide rates in
neighboring tracts. For these data, the Moran’s I statistic was positive and significant for
each decade, indicating the presence of autocorrelation. As a result, the spatial analyses
in this section included a spatial lag term to control for this spatial autocorrelation.
Figure 39 - Global Moran’s I Statistic for Tract Homicide Rate by Decade 1960-2010

Figure 40 plots the homicide rate LISA clusters for each decade. The red super
tracts are those that had a significant high-high correlation between the focal tract and
neighboring tracts. That is, these are tracts that had high homicide rates and were
surrounded by other tracts with high homicide rates. The blue tracts represent low-low
clusters. There were no high-low or low-high tracts in these data. These plots indicate
significant clustering of homicide rates for each decade. This was especially true for
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super tracts with high homicide rates. These clusters of high-high rates followed a
similar spatio-temporal pattern to social disorganization, where high clusters started
close to the areas surrounding Chicago’s Loop, and began to shift towards the West and
South of the City beginning in the 1980s.
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Figure 40 - Homicide Rate LISA clusters by Decade for 1920, 1940, 1970, and 2010

Table 41 shows the fixed effects from two mixed-effects negative binomial
regression models predicting the total number of homicides per decade while
controlling for population density, lag from homicides in neighboring tracts, and
decade-level random effects. The model also contained an offset variable for the log of
tract population to control for the different population sizes of each tract. However,
unlike model 1, model 2 also contains a term that allows the relationship between
redline status and homicide count to vary by decade. In both models, even after
controlling for lag from neighboring tracts and population density, redlining had a
positive effect on homicides that was highly statistically significant. However, the fixed
effect of redlining status was weaker in model 2 which also includes the random effects
of redline status and homicide count by decade.
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Table 41 - Mixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Total
Homicides per Decade Using Redline Status with (2) and without (1) Controlling for
Random Effect of Redline on Homicide Count by Decade 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.224***
(0.011)

0.163***
(0.042)

Population Density

0.048***
(0.004)

0.034*
(0.015)

Homicide Lag

0.724***
(0.005)

1.320***
(0.026)

(Intercept)

-6.313***
(0.147)

-6.446***
(0.160)

4053
-19094.470
38198.930
38230.470

4053
-11759.780
23535.560
23586.020

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Figure 41 plots the decade-level total effects (random effects + fixed effects) of
redline status on homicide count for that decade. For all six decades the relationship
was positive. However, the relationship is much stronger in the 1970s and 1980s. This is
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perhaps because the overall number of homicides in Chicago for those decades was
higher than in other decades.
Figure 41 - Decade-Level Total Effects of Redline Status on Homicide Count 1960-2010

These analyses indicate a strong, positive relationship between redlining and
homicide rate that increased in strength in the decades following redlining before
diminished somewhat over subsequent decades.
Relationship between social disorganization and homicide –

Next, the relationship between social disorganization score and homicide rate
was tested. A simple correlation analysis for the two factors produced a correlation
coefficient of 0.634, which was significant at the p<=.001 level, indicating a strong
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positive relationship between the two variables. This relationship can be seen visually
over time in Figure 42. This figure shows maps of Chicago with tract-level social
disorganization scores on the left and homicide rates per 100k on the right for the
decades 1960, 1990, and 2010. These decades were chosen for display following a visual
inspection of Figure 38, which showed significant changes in homicide rates during
those decades.
These maps indicate a high level of correlation between concentrations of highsocial disorganization tracts and high-homicide rate tracts. As the locations of dark
brown tracts in the left panels (representing tracts with high rates of social
disorganization) move from the Eastern and Central portions of the City to the City’s
Southern and Western tracts, so do the locations of tracts with high levels of homicides.
Indeed, the similarities between each panel on the left showing social disorganization
score concentrations and its neighboring panel on the right showing homicide rate in
each decade, are difficult to ignore. Again, this suggests that there may have been a
strong relationship between concentrations of indicators of social disorganization and
concentrations of homicides.
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Figure 42 - Chicago Decade-Level Social Disorganization Score and Homicide Rates per
100k Residents for 1960, 1990, and 2010
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Table 42 shows the fixed effects from two negative binomial regression models
that predict total tract-level homicides per decade using social disorganization score,
population density, and lag from homicide counts in neighboring tracts while
controlling for the random effects of decade. Both models also contain an offset term to
control for tract population. In addition, the second model also controls for the random
effect of social disorganization by decade. In both models, the fixed effect coefficient of
social disorganization score had a significant positive relationship with homicide count
even after controlling for the other, highly significant, covariates in the model.
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Table 42 - Mixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Total
Homicides per Decade Using Social Disorganization Score with (2) and without (1)
Controlling for Random Effect of SD on Homicide Count by Decade 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Social Disorg. Score

0.659***
(0.023)

0.665***
(0.038)

Population Density

0.006
(0.013)

0.004
(0.013)

Homicide Lag

0.706***
(0.028)

0.704***
(0.030)

(Intercept)

-6.449***
(0.148)

-6.450***
(0.149)

4053
-11379.330
22770.660
22808.500

4053
-11374.170
22764.350
22814.800

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Figure 43 shows the total decade-level effects of social disorganization score on
homicide count per decade. While the total effect fluctuated by decade, in each decade a
unit increase in standardized social disorganization score was associated with at least
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one estimated additional homicide per tract per decade. In certain decades, including
1960 and 2010, the estimated increase was nearly 1.4 homicides. This increase seems
particularly large given that the median number of homicides ranged from one per
decade in the 1960s to about seven in the 1980s.
Figure 43 - Decade-Level Total Effects of Social Disorganization Score on Homicide
Count 1960-2010

Does Social Disorganization Mediate the Effect of Redlining on Homicide Rate?
The next hypothesis tested was whether the significant, positive relationship
between redlining and homicide rates was mediated by social disorganization’s effect
on homicide rate. As previously shown, redlining had a positive relationship with
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social disorganization and homicide rate, and social disorganization score had a
positive relationship with homicide rate. Table 43 shows the results of two mixedeffects negative binomial regression models predicting the number of homicides in a
tract during a decade controlling for population density, homicide lag, and the random
effects of decade. The first model only uses redline status as a predictor, the second
model is the same as the first, but also controls for a tract’s social disorganization score.
The addition of the social disorganization variable made the relationship between
redlining and homicide rate non-significant in model 2, which is a strong indicator of
mediation. In addition, adding the social disorganization variable improved each of the
model fit statistics in Table 43, and a likelihood ratio test of the two models confirmed
that the addition of the social disorganization variable significantly improved the model
fit. Unfortunately, there is no method available for testing the ACME for mediators in
negative binomial models. However, given the evidence stated above, it can safely be
concluded that social disorganization mediated the effect that redlining has on
homicide rate.
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Table 43 - Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models Controlling for
Random Effects of Decade Predicting Decade Homicide Count using Redline Status
with and without Social Disorganization Variable to test for Mediation 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.166***
(0.031)

Social Disorg. Score

0.009
(0.028)
0.658***
(0.023)

Population Density

0.035*
(0.015)

0.005
(0.013)

Homicide Lag

1.320***
(0.026)

0.706***
(0.029)

(Intercept)

-6.447***
(0.162)

-6.451***
(0.148)

4053
-11760.590
23533.170
23571.020

4053
-11379.280
22772.570
22816.720

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Figure 44 combines data from the two regressions in Table 43 and the regression
from the first section of the findings section, Table 12, to show a visual representation of
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the mediation relationship that social disorganization had on the relationship between
redlining and homicide rate. While redlining had a positive and significant relationship
with homicide rate before controlling for social disorganization, including social
disorganization into the analysis diminished redlining’s relationship with homicide rate
to insignificance, indicating a full mediation of said effect. Instead, redlining’s effect
appears to be mediated by its positive significant relationship with social
disorganization, an effect which earlier analyses in the study found to be potentially
causal.
Figure 44 - Summary of Results of Homeownership Rate’s Mediation of the Effect of
Redlining on Social Disorganization

Homicide, Social Disorganization, and Government Funding Decisions Previous analyses indicated that certain government funding decisions examined
in this study, specifically those associated with the construction of public housing, were
significantly related to rates of social disorganization. In addition, the previous analysis
indicated that social disorganization had a positive and significant relationship with
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homicide rates. This may indicate that these government funding decisions influenced
homicide rates. To test this hypothesis, an independence test was performed on the
mean homicide rate per 100k residents for tracts that were and were not affected by
each type of government funding decision. The results of those analyses can be found
below in Table 44. This table shows the mean tract-level homicide rate separated by
whether the tract had public housing built within it, whether that public housing was
built in the previous decade, and whether the tract had a highway built within it. In
each case, the mean homicide rate for the tracts that were subjected to each government
funding decision was significantly higher than for tracts that were not. This was
especially true for the tracts with public housing within them, and with public housing
that was built during the previous decade.
Table 44 - Tract-Level Homicide Rate per 100k by Government Funding Decisions 19602010
Homicide Rate per 100k
Yes
No

Z-Score

Public Housing

43.314

21.189

9.331***

PH Built Prev.

51.599

22.610

9.331***

Highway

27.043

22.251

2.632**

Note:

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Table 45 shows the results of a series of mixed-effects negative binomial
regression models that explore this relationship further. Model 1 predicts homicide rate
using redlining status as a predictor, along with population density and homicide lag as
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covariates. It also controls for the random effects of decade and contains an offset
variable to account for tract population. Model 2 has the same set of predictors but also
includes each of the government funding decision variables as covariates. Finally,
model 3 contains all the same predictors as model 2, with the addition of social
disorganization score as a covariate. The purpose of these three models was to examine
the effect that government funding decisions have on homicide while controlling for
other covariates, and what effect they have on the relationship between redlining and
homicide count. It also sought to identify the effect that the addition of social
disorganization to the model had on these relationships.
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Table 45 - Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models Controlling for
Random Effects of Decade Predicting Decade Homicide Count using Redline Status and
Government Funding Decisions with and without Social Disorganization Variable to
test for Mediation 1960-2010

Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
(3)
Redlined

0.166***
(0.031)

0.180***
(0.011)

Social Disorg. Score

-0.037**
(0.012)
0.611***
(0.007)

Public Housing

0.225***
(0.016)

-0.186***
(0.017)

PH Built Prev. Decade

0.169***
(0.031)

-0.188***
(0.032)

Highway

-0.055***
(0.014)

0.033*
(0.014)

Population Density

0.035*
(0.015)

0.036***
(0.004)

-0.011*
(0.004)

Homicide Lag

1.320***
(0.026)

0.717***
(0.005)

0.461***
(0.008)

(Intercept)

-6.447***
(0.162)

-6.317***
(0.148)

-6.337***
(0.128)
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Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

4053
4053
4053
-11760.590 -18918.180 -15246.370
23533.170 37852.360 30510.740
23571.020 37902.820 30567.510
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

In model 1, redlining had a significant, positive relationship with homicide rate. As
did each of the government funding decision variables in model 2, however, the
direction of the relationship between homicide rate and highway construction was
negative. This is not a surprise given the results of earlier analyses from this study. In
addition, the relationship between redlining and homicide rate remained significant
and positive with the addition of these variables. In fact, the addition of these variables
increased redlining’s coefficient slightly, indicating an absence of a mediation effect.
The addition of those variables to the model also worsened the model fit as compared to
the version of the model with just redline status. Finally, the addition of social
disorganization score to the model completely reversed the effect that both redlining
and each of the government funding decision variables had on homicide rate. This
indicates that, while redlining and government funding decisions such as the
construction of public housing have a positive relationship on homicide rate, these
relationships are fully mediated through their effect on social disorganization.
However, this does not necessarily mean that these variables have a negative
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relationship with homicide rate, since there are important variables missing from this
analysis, including protective factor variables. These relationships will be explored
shortly.
Homicide, Social Disorganization, and Protective Factors
The next set of analyses tested whether the protective factors previously
analyzed moderated (or in the case of homeownership, mediated) the relationship
between redlining and homicide rate. Analyses from earlier in this study showed that
each of the protective factors analyzed - landmark status, waterfront adjacency,
commute time, homeownership rate, and TIF spending – had a relationship with social
disorganization, and that social disorganization had a significant relationship with
homicide rate. Therefore, one might expect each protective factor to have a significant
relations relationship with homicide rate.
Table 46 below shows the results of bivariate analyses testing the relationship
between each protective factor and homicide rate. The factors in the top portion of the
table are dichotomous variables, and therefore imputation tests of means were used to
test this relationship. The variables in the bottom portion of the table are continuous,
and therefore the tests of association are Pearson correlation tests. The analyses in this
table indicate that three protective factors had significant negative bivariate
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relationships with homicide rate, those were: waterfront adjacency, commute time, and
owner occupancy rate.
Table 46 - Tract-Level Bivariate Tests of Relationship with Homicide Rate per 100k for
Protective Factors 1960-2010
Protective Factor
Landmark Tract
Waterfront Tract
Commute Time
Ownership Rate
Cumulative TIF

Note:

Homicide Rate per 100k
Yes
No
20.637
23.327
17.508
23.269
Correlation Coefficient
-10.408***
-18.352***
-0.989

Z-Score
-1.464
-2.070*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*

Table 47 shows the fixed effects from three mixed-effects negative binomial
regression models predicting homicide rate. The first model only includes redline status
and the covariates population density and lag from homicide rates in neighboring super
tracts. It also includes an offset to control for tract population. The second model has the
same predictors as the first, but also contains each of the protective factors analyzed.
Finally, the third has the same predictors as the second, but also includes a predictor for
social disorganization score.
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Table 47 - Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models Controlling for
Random Effects of Decade Predicting Decade Homicide Count using Redline Status and
Protective Factor Variables with and without Social Disorganization Variable to test
for Mediation 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
(3)
Redlined

0.166***
(0.031)

0.120**
(0.038)

Social Disorg. Score

-0.058
(0.033)
0.724***
(0.027)

Landmark Site

-0.176***
(0.049)

-0.085*
(0.043)

Waterfront

-0.169*
(0.072)

-0.127*
(0.062)

Commute Time (mins)

0.002
(0.002)

-0.006***
(0.002)

Cumulative TIF

0.045*
(0.018)

0.028
(0.015)

Homeownership Rate

-0.239***
(0.021)

-0.077***
(0.019)

Population Density

0.035*
(0.015)

-0.035
(0.021)

-0.046*
(0.019)

Homicide Lag

1.320***
(0.026)

1.163***
(0.030)

0.504***
(0.033)

(Intercept)

-6.447***

-6.371***

-6.083***
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Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

(0.162)

(0.187)

(0.179)

4053
-11760.590
23533.170
23571.020

2682
-7791.454
15604.910
15669.750

2682
-7471.627
14967.250
15037.990

*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

As with the previous sets of models, the first model indicates that redlining had a
significant positive relationship with homicide rate. In the second model, four of the
five protective factors added had a significant relationship with homicide rate:
landmark status, waterfront adjacency, homeownership rate, and TIF spending.
Interestingly, TIF spending actually had a significant positive relationship with
homicide in this model. In addition, adding these protective factors to the model did
decrease the strength of the relationship between redlining and homicide rate, but did
not reduce it to the point of insignificance. This indicates that the combined factors
partially mediated the relationship between redlining and homicide rate but did not
mediate it fully. The addition of the social disorganization variable as expected, reduced
the effect of redlining on homicide rate to insignificance. It also left cumulative TIF
spending insignificant. However, after its addition, the other protective factor variables
remained significant. Again, this is further evidence that social disorganization
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mediates redlining’s effect on homicide rate, even after controlling for a variety of
protective factors.
The final analysis using protective factors examined whether certain protective
factors moderated the effect between redlining and social disorganization. These
protective factors included – TIF spending, landmark status, waterfront adjacency, and
commute time. Homeownership rate was not included in these analyses since the
hypothesized relationship between homeownership and the effect of redlining on
homicide rate was one of mediation. The test for moderation for each protective factor
involved placing each into a negative binomial regression model predicting homicide
rate that included redlining and other important covariates, then creating a second
model that included an interaction term between that protective factor and redlining. A
significant interaction term, and an improvement in model fit with the addition of said
term were taken as indicators of a moderating effect.
Table 48 shows the results of a moderation analysis testing for the moderating effect
of cumulative TIF spending on homicide rate. The table shows the fixed effects from
two mixed-effect negative binomial regression models predicting homicide rate using
cumulative TIF spending, redline status, population density, and homicide lag from
neighboring tracts and controlling for the random effects of decade. The second model
in the table also includes a term for the interaction between TIF funding and redline
status. The lack of both significance of the interaction term and improvement in model
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goodness of fit measures indicate that TIF spending did not moderate the effect of
redlining on homicide rate.
Table 48 - Test for TIF Spending’s Moderation on the Relationship between Redlining
and Homicide Rate 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.167***
(0.037)

0.165***
(0.037)

Cumulative TIF

0.028
(0.017)

0.035*
(0.018)

Population Density

0.025
(0.021)

0.027
(0.021)

Homicide Lag

1.269***
(0.029)

1.269***
(0.029)

Redline *Cumulative TIF

-0.064
(0.047)

(Intercept)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

-6.330***
(0.175)

-6.330***
(0.176)

2702
-7933.778
15881.560
15922.870

2702
-7932.942
15881.890
15929.100

*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Table 49 shows the results of a similar moderation analysis testing the
moderating effect of landmark status on the relationship between redlining and
homicide rate. As with TIF spending, the addition of the interaction between landmark
status and redline status is non-significant and fails to improve the model’s fit.
Therefore, this analysis did not find that landmark status moderates the effect of
redlining on homicide rate.
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Table 49 - Test for Landmark Status’s Moderation on the Relationship between
Redlining and Homicide Rate 1960-2010

Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.166***
(0.031)

0.184***
(0.034)

Landmark Site

0.026
(0.040)

0.064
(0.049)

Population Density

0.035*
(0.015)

0.034*
(0.015)

Homicide Lag

1.321***
(0.026)

1.319***
(0.026)

Redline*Landmark Site

(Intercept)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

-0.110
(0.083)
-6.450***
(0.162)

-6.456***
(0.162)

4053
-11760.380
23534.760
23578.900

4053
-11759.500
23535.000
23585.460

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*
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Similarly, as shown in Table 50, the moderation test for waterfront adjacency on the
relationship between redlining and homicide rate failed to identify a moderating effect.
This can be seen by the insignificant interaction term and lack of improve of model fit
with its addition.
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Table 50 - Test for Waterfront Adjacency’s Moderation on the Relationship between
Redlining and Homicide Rate 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.169***
(0.031)

0.169***
(0.032)

Waterfront

0.047
(0.059)

0.048
(0.063)

Population Density

0.035*
(0.015)

0.035*
(0.015)

Homicide Lag

1.321***
(0.026)

1.321***
(0.026)

Redline*Waterfront

-0.010
(0.181)

(Intercept)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

-6.450***
(0.162)

-6.450***
(0.162)

4053
-11760.270
23534.540
23578.690

4053
-11760.270
23536.540
23587.000

*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Finally, Table 51 shows the moderation analysis results for commute time. And,
unlike the previous three protective factors, commute time does appear to moderate the
effect of redlining on homicide rate. This moderating effect is indicated by the
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significant interaction term between commute time and redline status and the slightly
improved goodness of fit statistics for the model with the interaction term as compared
to the model without. Interestingly, the addition of the interaction term reversed the
direction of the relationship between redlining and homicide rate. Note, because of high
multicollinearity between the redlining term and the interaction term (something
common and expected in moderation analyses (McClelland et al., 2017)), it would be
inappropriate to deduce that redlining has a negative effect on homicide rate because of
this finding. However, the positive interaction term indicates that the effect of redlining
on homicide rate increased as commute time increased.
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Table 51 - Test for Commute Time’s Moderation on the Relationship between Redlining
and Homicide Rate
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
Redlined

0.132***
(0.032)

-0.695***
(0.103)

Commute Time (Minutes)

-0.008***
(0.001)

-0.015***
(0.002)

Population Density

0.029
(0.015)

0.044**
(0.015)

Homicide Lag

1.291***
(0.026)

1.275***
(0.026)
0.024***
(0.003)

Redline*Commute Time
(Intercept)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

-6.135***
(0.170)

-5.851***
(0.174)

4023
-11639.610
23293.210
23337.310

4023
-11604.120
23224.240
23274.640

*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

As stated previously, this may not actually be a direct measure of the effect of
commute time on this relationship, but instead, commute time may have acted as a
proxy for some other factor that was highly correlated with commute time. For instance,
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commute time was correlated with adjacency to the inner city, and adjacency to the
inner city affects many neighborhood characteristics that are difficult to quantify. The
addition of a population density term tried to account for this. However, such a term
may lack the ability to account for other important factors that adjacency to inner city
may affect, such as for instance, structural density.
Summary of Homicide Analysis Findings Table 52 summarizes the findings from the analyses performed to answer
research question four. As the table, and the previous set of analyses, indicate redlining had a significant positive relationship with homicide rate. Social
disorganization also had a significant positive relationship with homicide rate, and fully
mediated redlining’s relationship with homicide rate. All the government funding
decisions have significant direct relationships with homicide rate, however the analyses
failed to identify them as having a mediating effect on the relationship between
redlining and homicide rate. And finally, three of the five protective factors had
negative direct bivariate relationships with homicide rate. However, in combination no
mediation was detected on the relationship between redlining and homicide rate, and
only commute time was found to moderate that relationship.
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Table 52 - Summary of Relationships between Factors Analyzed and Homicide Rate
Relationship
with Homicide

Mediation of
RL/Homicide

Moderation
of RL
Homicide

NA

NA

+

NA

Null

NA

Null

NA

Null

NA

NA

+

Homeownership

+
+
+
+
-

Null

NA

TIF Spending

Null

NA

Null

Landmark Status

-

NA

Null

Waterfront Adjacency

Null

NA

Null

Factor
Redlined
Social Disorganization
Govt.
Funding
Decisions

Public Housing Built
PH Built Previous
Highway Construction
Commute Time

Protective
Factors

Finally, Table 53 shows the fixed effects from mixed-effects negative binomial
regressions predicting homicide rate using the factors analyzed in this section and
controlling for the random effects of decade. The first model only contains redlining,
population density, and homicide lag from neighboring tracts. The second contains the
same as the first with the addition of the government funding decision and protective
factors variables. And the third adds social disorganization score to the second.
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Table 53 - Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models Controlling for
Random Effects of Decade Predicting Decade Homicide Count using Redline Status,
Government Funding Decisions, and Protective Factors with and without Social
Disorganization Variable 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Total Homicides per Decade
(1)
(2)
(3)
Redlined

0.166***
(0.031)

0.072
(0.038)

Social Disorg. Score

-0.046
(0.034)
0.743***
(0.029)

Public Housing

0.375***
(0.061)

-0.138*
(0.056)

Highway

0.180***
(0.047)

0.123**
(0.041)

Landmark Site

-0.171***
(0.049)

-0.086*
(0.043)

Waterfront

-0.164*
(0.072)

-0.119
(0.062)

Commute Time (minutes)

0.004*

-0.006***

(0.002)

(0.002)

TIF Spending

0.037*
(0.017)

0.030*
(0.015)

Homeownership Rate

-0.236***
(0.021)

-0.088***
(0.020)

-0.038
(0.021)

-0.039*
(0.019)

Population Density

0.035*
(0.015)
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Homicide Lag

1.320***
(0.026)

1.163***
(0.029)

0.486***
(0.034)

(Intercept)

-6.447***
(0.162)

-6.489***
(0.190)

-6.109***
(0.180)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Bayesian Inf. Crit.
Note:

4053
2682
2682
-11760.590 -7763.500 -7464.149
23533.170 15553.000 14956.300
23571.020 15629.630 15038.820
*

p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The addition of the government funding decision and protective factors variables
to the model reduced the effect of redlining on homicide rate to insignificance. This,
along with the vast improvements in model fit, indicate that the combined factors
together explain much of the relationship between redlining and homicide rate. In this
model, several of the factors analyzed had significant relationships with homicide rate,
but the two strongest remain the existence of public housing (positive relationship) and
homeownership rate (negative relationship). However, the addition of social
disorganization score in the third model changed the direction of the relationship
between redlining and homicide rate and reduced the strength of the relationship
between many of the variables in the analysis. Again, this indicates that social
disorganization is an extraordinarily strong predictor of homicide rate, so much so that
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its addition into a model affects the association with homicide rate and almost every
other predictor in the model.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Overview of Key Findings
This study sought to determine whether redlining – a discriminatory practice in
which inner-city neighborhoods were starved of investment, often because of the racial
makeup of their residents – affected violent crime rates over time through its effect on
social disorganization. In addition, it sought to determine whether this effect was
mediated by redlining’s effect on other discriminatory government policies and
whether it was moderated by protective factors that were hypothesized to lessen the
effect of redlining on social disorganization, and therefore violent crime, over time. This
section will review the key findings for each of this study’s four research questions.
Question 1: What effect has the discriminatory practice of redlining had on area
measures of social disorganization?
This study found that social disorganization scores were higher in areas that were
redlined before redlining occurred. However, scores in redlined areas increased more
relative to non-redlined areas following the 1930s, when the HOLC created their
residential security maps. After this jump, the gap between redlined and non-redlined
areas began to even out starting in the 1970s, but social disorganization scores remained
much higher in formerly redlined areas as compared to other areas. And, while social
disorganizations scores tended to increase as HOLC grades moved sequentially from A
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to D, D rated (redlined) areas had by far the highest level of social disorganization
across all social disorganization indicators in every decade studied.
It was no surprise that redlined areas saw higher rates of social disorganization
throughout the study period. Studies show that areas subjected to redlining nearly a
century ago still see higher rates of poverty, vacancy, and racial segregation (Rutan &
Glass, 2018); lower housing prices and homeownership rates (Appel & Nickerson,
2016); less development of new housing and higher levels of population decline
(Krimmel, 2018); more mortgage loan application denials and subprime loans (Faber,
2017); and worse indicators of quality of life including health, income, educational
attainment, and employment status of residents (White et al., 2018). Another study
found that, while there were differences in neighborhoods before the HOLC maps were
created, those differences could only explain a small portion of the current day
differences between redlined and non-redlined neighborhoods in terms of
neighborhood homeownership rates and housing values (Aaronson, Hartley, &
Mazmuder, 2017).
As noted, the relationship between redline status and social disorganization was
strongest in the years immediately following the creation of the HOLC maps. As figure
5 indicates, redlined areas of Chicago tended to be concentrated towards the center of
the city in older, denser neighborhoods. This made sense, as the HOLC risk rating
system favored suburban areas with newer homes and larger lot sizes over older, more
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densely populated urban areas (Jackson, 1980). And, in the years directly following the
creation of the HOLC maps, social disorganization tended to concentrate in those same
areas as indicated by Figure 14. Interestingly, Shaw and McKay’s original theory of
social disorganization was founded on the observation that high rates of delinquency
were found predominantly in areas just outside Chicago’s city center where there were
high concentrations of poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility (Shaw &
McKay, 1942). However, Figures 14 and 15 clearly shows that social disorganization,
albeit a revised form of it used in this study, was far more dispersed in Chicago in the
1920s when Shaw and McKay performed their analyses than it was in the 1940s
following redlining. This pattern of social disorganization concentrating in redlined
areas close to the city center was also expected given that private banks used these
designations when determining where they were willing to provide home and business
loans (Jackson, 1980), and because the FHA relied on these designations to decide which
neighborhoods to insure mortgages in (Woods, 2012). As a result, redlined
neighborhoods were left underdeveloped and in disrepair, leading to an exodus of
residents with the financial means to leave. Interestingly, redlined neighborhoods
tended to concentrate in the areas surrounding downtown, which were also the areas
that Shaw and McKay identified as being in the “zone of transition” where social
disorganization and crime were particularly highly concentrated (Shaw & McKay,
1942). Future studies could examine whether redlining played any part in their
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findings. For instance, such a study could map Shaw and McKay’s concentric zones
onto Chicago’s HOLC map to verify whether the areas they identified as highly socially
disorganized overlap with areas that were redlined, and then test whether the timing of
the study and the creation of the maps indicate a potentially causal relationship.
What was surprising was that the gap in social disorganization rates between
redlined and non-redlined areas shrank significantly as the decades moved further
away from redlining. For instance, in 1940, tracts with D ratings had an average social
disorganization score of 0.64, while those with a C rating had an average score of -0.36.
Since these scores act as Z scores, the difference in ratings equaled one full standard
deviation. In 2010, D rated tracts had an average social disorganization score of 0.23
while C rated tracts had an average score of -0.11, a difference of only .34 standard
deviations. A review of Figures 14 and 15 sheds some light on why this may be the case.
The panel showing social disorganization scores in 1940 indicates that areas of high
social disorganization were highly clustered near the center of the city in those same
super tracts assigned a D rating. However, the maps from 1970 and 2010 indicate that
over time, clusters of high social disorganization super tracts began to migrate away
from the city center towards those super tracts further to the south and east.
Interestingly, from 1940 on, high and low social disorganization super tracts clustered
strongly together. This is to be expected given the abundance of literature showing that
disadvantage often spills over into neighboring communities (Mears & Bhati, 2006;
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Morenoff et al., 2001; R. Peterson & Krivo, 2009). However, the locations of those
clusters seem to have migrated over time. As a result, many of the super tracts with
high social disorganization began to fall outside of those areas that were redlined in the
1930s.
While the geographic shift in the location of high social disorganization tracts may
explain why the effect of redlining on social disorganization diminished over time, it
still leaves an important unanswered question, that is, what caused this shift? Given
that the shift started becoming evident in the 1970 census data, one explanation could
be that the passing of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, which prohibited discrimination in the
sale, rental, and financing of housing, played some part in reducing social
disorganization levels in redlined neighborhoods. Kimmel (2018) in his study of
redlining found a convergence of homeownership and segregation rates between
redlined and non-redlined neighborhoods following the passing of this act. However,
as previously noted, the bill’s ability to meet these goals was weakened as politicians
removed many of the means of enforcement that would be required to promote housing
desegregation. In addition, if this bill were to be successful, one would expect indicators
of disadvantage to become less concentrated throughout the entire city. Instead, the
areas of concentration simply shifted, as indicated by the consistently high indicator of
global spatial autocorrelation in tract-level social disorganization scores seen in Figure
15.
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Another explanation for this shift could be that, as posited by ecological theories of
neighborhood change, it was a result of a natural process involving shifts in housing
preferences and decisions made by landlords and developers (Sweeney, 1974), or that
these neighborhoods are simply going through natural stages of a lifecycle common to
all neighborhoods (Hoover & Vernon, 1962). This could be, at least partially true,
especially given the locations of redlined neighborhoods and their proximity to the
center of the city. However, as this study has shown, in the post-WWII era, most major
changes in the landscapes of major US cities have, instead, been the result of deliberate
government actions designed to advantage wealthy whites at the expense of Black
households and neighborhoods (Gordon, 2008; J. R. Logan, 2016; Rothstein, 2017). This
seems especially likely given that studies show that: neighborhood disadvantage tends
to persist across generations (R. J. Sampson & Sharkey, 2008; Sharkey, 2008); that
housing is a durable good, so decisions that affect neighborhood development have
long-lasting effects (An et al., 2019; Puga & Duranton, 2014), and because current-day
lending practices can be affected by a neighborhood’s historic lending practices (Lang &
Nakamura, 1992).
One potential explanation is gentrification of the inner-city and the suburbanization
of poverty. At the national level, gentrification has led to a marked “resurgence” in
formerly low-income, inner-city neighborhoods that started in the 1990s at the expense
of less dense suburban areas (Covington, 2015). However, this shift was likely more the
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result of policy changes than natural preferences. For instance, one study hypothesized
this “suburbanization of poverty” may have been caused by welfare reform that
affected those living in the highest poverty neighborhoods, increases in mortgage
lending in formerly underserved neighborhoods, changes in federal housing policy that
shifted the focus of government subsidized housing away from large inner-city public
housing developments, and a decrease in overall inner-city crime (Ellen & O’Regan,
2008). In addition, many majority Black inner-city neighborhoods were subjected to
urban renewal under the guise of “ghettoization” leading to the forced relocation of
poor, often Black, former residents (J. Logan, 2007). And, many of these poor
communities were replaced by office centers, luxury housing, and other cultural
amenities (Lipsitz, 2018). Therefore, part of this divergence could be that the city
government decided that the land that many redlined neighborhoods were sitting on
had become too valuable to serve as poor residential communities, and used urban
renewal to repurpose them, replacing them with more upscale development, and
thereby decreasing social disorganization.
Unfortunately, these analyses do not allow one to determine whether this shift in
social disorganization away from redlined areas advantaged the communities that were
initially harmed by the practice. Instead, it could be that individuals in those
communities were simply displaced through gentrification and urban renewal to
neighborhoods further from the city center that eventually became areas of
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concentrated social disorganization. Further analysis is needed to determine whether
this shift involved improving neighborhoods for existing residents, or whether these
residents were simply displaced before these neighborhood improvements took place.
Question 2: Has the effect of redlining on social disorganization been partially
mediated by government funding decisions in certain areas that fuel disinvestment?
This study did find evidence that government funding decisions, specifically the
construction of public housing, affected social disorganization and, at least partially,
mediated the effects of redlining on social disorganization. The first piece of evidence
supporting this finding was that redlining did appear to affect where public housing
was built. Specifically, tracts were far more likely to have public housing developments
built in them than non-redlined tracts. Indeed, while only 36% of super tracts in the city
were designated as redlined, over 90% of public housing was built within redlined
tracts. In addition, the tracts that contained public housing had significantly higher
social disorganization scores than tracts that did not. And, tracts with public housing
built within them in a given decade saw greater increases in social disorganization the
following decade than tracts that did not. However, tracts with public housing built in
them also had higher levels of social disorganization than other tracts before the
construction of public housing began in Chicago. This was confirmed using a
difference-in-difference analysis. Finally, a mediation analysis provided evidence that
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redlining’s effect on social disorganization was at least partially mediated by the
presence of public housing.
Given the criticism of public housing that it was often built to ensure racial
segregation (Julian & Daniel, 1989) by demolishing once diverse neighborhoods and
replacing them with segregated public housing developments (Heathcott, 2011); it is not
very surprising that it was associated with increased levels of social disorganization.
This is especially true given that the revised definition of social disorganization used in
this study relied heavily on the deleterious effects of racial social isolation (R. J.
Sampson et al., 2018). Indeed, public housing was famously associated with racial
isolation in Chicago, as a 1976 Supreme Court ruling found that the Chicago Housing
Authority had unconstitutionally selected sites for the development of public housing
to maintain the city’s segregated landscape (Rothstein, 2017). In addition, the
construction of public housing caused residential neighborhood turnover, leading to
instability in neighborhoods where it was located (Bursik, 1989). And finally, housing
authorities often set strict income limits on public housing developments, further
concentrating poverty in already poor neighborhoods, and cut maintenance budgets
which allowed the properties to deteriorate to the point of blight (Rothstein, 2017; Schill
& Wachter, 1995). In addition, public housing mediating the relationship between
redlining and social disorganization is also supported by a study by An et al. (2019)
which found that the mechanism through which redlining affected current day housing
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market outcomes was by removing access to mortgages in redlined neighborhoods,
thereby leading to the development of multifamily rental housing, which they found to
be negatively correlated with rent and housing values. Therefore, public housing may
have also increased levels of social disorganization in redlined neighborhoods by
changing their durable urban landscape.
It could also be that public housing in an area simply acted as a proxy for other
harmful government programs in certain areas. For instance, since governments built
public housing as a way of promoting segregation in certain areas of the city, it is likely
that those same areas were also targeted for other discriminatory government policies
not measured in this analysis. Such policies may have included: discriminatory
mortgage insurance practices, enforcing racial zoning and covenants, starving these
communities of important resources, or targeting said communities as the sites of
undesirable industrial or waste disposal locations. Future studies should take a deep
dive into this issue, looking specifically at the mechanisms through which public
housing affects social disorganization and crime and testing whether public housing
has a direct effect on these measures after controlling for the effects of other potentially
harmful government policies mentioned in this study. These studies may include a
qualitative component designed to support and add context to these findings.
Redlined tracts were also somewhat more likely to have highways built through
them than non-redlined tracts, but the correlation between redlining and highway
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construction was not nearly as strong as the correlation between redlining and public
housing. However, perhaps because highways were built to move people from outside
of the City into its center and back, and since redlined neighborhoods tended to be
concentrated in the inner-city, it only makes sense that highways were built in both
redlined and non-redlined tracts. In addition, while highways tended to be built in
tracts with higher levels of social disorganization, their construction does not seem to
have increased social disorganization levels in tracts where they were built. In fact,
analyses of social disorganization over time in tracts that did and did not have
highways built within their boundaries showed that mean social disorganization rates
were much higher in neighborhoods that at some point had highways built through
them even before construction of highways began in Chicago, and in more recent years
those tracts with highways saw lower social disorganization scores than tracts without.
This seems to go against the body of literature describing the deleterious effects of
highway construction on urban Black communities. These studies show that highway
construction led to population loss in inner-city neighborhoods (Baum-Snow, 2007),
destroyed Black neighborhoods (Rothstein, 2017), and cut off Black communities from
white communities to promote segregation (Bayor, 1988; Connerly, 2002), and that these
effects were disproportionately seen in neighborhoods that were redlined (Nall &
O’Keeffe, 2018). One explanation for this apparent contradiction is that much of the
damage highways did to inner-city communities was less the result of the destruction of
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those communities because of highway construction, and instead had more to do with
the construction of a highway system promoting the suburbanization of the city. As
mentioned, highways were constructed through inner-city redlined communities and
less dense suburban neighborhoods by necessity. This is because, for a highway to
allow people to travel from the city center to its suburbs, said highway must go from
the center of the city outwards to its far reaches.
One theory posited in this study was that highway construction and social
disorganization may have a stronger relationship in denser urban neighborhoods with
less land available for highway construction, however, the analysis did not find such a
relationship. Instead, it could be that highways simply led to increased levels of social
disorganization in redlined communities by making it easier for people to live in
outlying areas and commute to high paying jobs in the city, and by allowing them to
drive outside of the city without having to drive through urban neighborhoods. If this is
the main mechanism through which highways lead to social disorganization, one
wouldn’t expect highway construction’s effects to be concentrated in neighborhoods
where highways were actually built, but instead spread throughout inner-city
neighborhoods as seen in this study.
Question 3: Are there protective factors that moderate the effect of redlining on social
disorganization by protecting areas against its harmful effects?
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Each protective factor had either a direct relationship with social disorganization
or affected the relationship between redlining and social disorganization through
mediation or moderation. Commute time to the center city, for instance, was negatively
correlated with social disorganization. This relationship goes against the hypothesis
that easier access to downtown would protect against social disorganization, Chetty et
al. (2014), for instance, found that people living in neighborhoods with shorter
commuting times benefited from increased upward mobility. However, this seemingly
paradoxical finding could have occurred because neighborhoods closer to the City’s
center are characteristically different from those further away. When controlling for
population density and the interaction between population density and decade,
commute time had a positive, but insignificant relationship with social disorganization.
Interestingly, the interaction between population density and decade was positive and
highly significant. In addition, when looking at the direct correlation between commute
time and social disorganization score by decade, as seen in Figure 27, there is a clear
trend in which the negative correlation begins to lessen each decade until there is nearly
no correlation in 2010. This follows the pattern by which concentrations of high social
disorganization tracts shifted from formerly redlined areas near the city center towards
areas in the City’s southern and western outskirts.
In addition, commute time appears to have moderated the effect of redlining on
social disorganization. Specifically, redlining’s effect on social disorganization increased
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as commute time increased. This could also be the result of the shift in social
disorganization from the city center to outlying areas as well. For instance, it could be
that redlined neighborhoods closer to the city center and those further out both
experienced increases in social disorganization because of redlining’s negative effects.
However, since concentrations of social disorganization shifted outwards, it is likely
that those redlined areas closer to the city center benefited from this shift, while those in
outlying areas either simply did not benefit, or even suffered because of said shift.
Future research could examine the differential effect of redlining on neighborhoods that
are and are not near city centers to determine whether this effect was universal or if it is
novel to Chicago. This research may also include in-depth case studies of specific
neighborhoods designed to gather detailed contextual information on the interaction
between redlining status and accessibility to center cities.
Redlined super tracts had significantly lower levels of homeownership than nonredlined tracts, even after controlling for important covariates such as population
density, a factor that is particularly important in this analysis since denser tracts may
have more multifamily housing which is generally renter occupied. This finding is
expected given the immediate effect of redlining was that it highly discouraged home
loans in redlined neighborhoods (Crossney & Bartelt, 2005; Jackson, 1980; Woods, 2012),
and recent studies have confirmed that this has had lasting effects on current-day
homeownership rates (Appel & Nickerson, 2016; Krimmel, 2018) since banks often use
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information about current neighborhood conditions when making lending decisions
(Lang & Nakamura, 1992; Puga & Duranton, 2014) and because lenders often practiced
racially discriminatory lending practices (Bates, 1997; Immergluck, 2002; Massey et al.,
2016; Yinger, 1997).
Homeownership rates also had a highly significant negative effect on social
disorganization scores. Indeed, a moderation analysis showed redlining’s positive effect
on redlining was actually mediated through its negative effect on homeownership rates,
which were found to protect against levels of social disorganization. This is also backed
by previous research that homeownership rates increase neighborhood collective
efficacy and reduce levels of crime and disorder (Lindblad et al., 2013). These, in
combination, indicate that homeownership was likely a key aspect in redlining’s effect
on social disorganization rates, and one that should be focused on when determining
how to address said effects through policy.
Tax Increment Finance (TIF) spending had little effect on social disorganization in
the expected direction. Indeed, some analyses showed that it may have had a slight
positive effect on social disorganization, thereby going against the hypothesis of it being
a protective factor. However, super tracts that received TIF generally had higher social
disorganization scores than other super tracts before receiving said funding.
Unfortunately, this analysis did not assess the implementation of TIF projects
throughout the City, which may have shed some light on these findings as poor
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implementation may have caused projects to fail in reducing levels of social
disorganization. Such a study may shed some light on these findings given that the
program has received criticism in the city of Chicago for drawing money away from
economically deprived neighborhoods for the benefit of developers and wealthier
neighborhoods (Dardick, 2020). In addition, an analysis of TIF’s outcomes found that,
after controlling for selection bias in TIF assignment, the program ultimately showed no
evidence of increasing tangible economic development benefits for local residents
(Lester, 2013). Future research on the effect of TIF spending on indicators of social
disorganization should include a critical analysis of the implementation of the program.
Specifically, such studies should include a process evaluation that first examines
whether TIF projects were implemented with fidelity to the program’s design, and then
whether quality of implementation has any effect on program outcomes. Such an
analysis may find that that well implemented TIF projects in high-need communities
do, indeed, produce positive neighborhood outcomes. In addition, future analyses may
evaluate the effect of TIF spending on social disorganization at a more micro level. As
discussed earlier, TIF zones were generally small areas within a super tract. Therefore,
analyzing the effect of TIF funding at a micro level may produce results that differ from
those found in this study.
Overall, tracts that eventually contained landmark districts within their boundaries
saw lower levels of social disorganization than other tracts, even after controlling for
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their redline status. Note, the purpose of this analysis was not to test the effect of a tract
receiving a landmark designation on said tract's social disorganization score. Instead,
the landmark designation was used to measure whether a super tract contained
neighborhoods that were historically significant. Tracts containing landmark districts
saw increased levels of social disorganization through the 1960s as compared to tracts
without landmark districts. However, beginning in the 1970s, this trend flipped as
social disorganization scores for tracts with landmark districts dropped steeply
compared to tracts without them. However, when controlling for other important
covariates including spatial lag and population density, the negative effect of landmark
status on social disorganization diminished decade-by-decade as seen in Figure 34.
Again, this seems counterintuitive given the decrease in social disorganization score for
landmark districts relative to all other districts over time as seen in Figure 33. One
possible explanation for these seemingly paradoxical findings is that the landmark
designations given to tracts have more to do with complicated, unmeasurable aspects of
those neighborhoods that are difficult to quantify. For instance, they likely have
historically significant buildings that make them highly valued locations, which may
also increase the likelihood that the areas surrounding said districts may be more likely
to see development and attract a more affluent population. Because of this, it may be
that tracts surrounding landmark districts may also see these benefits, and therefore,
some of the benefits may be obscured when controlling for the social disorganization
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lag term. Research on the effect of landmark status on property values backs up this
hypothesis of a lag effect (Ford, 1989), with one study even showing that areas adjacent
to landmark districts benefit more than the landmark districts themselves (Been et al.,
2014). In addition, this analysis was unable to examine how specific landmark districts
were designated, and whether tracts that contained landmark districts differed
significantly from tracts that did not. Future research may examine the differences
between areas with landmark designations and those without to see which qualitative
aspects of a neighborhood do and do not protect against social disorganization.
Finally, waterfront adjacent tracts had significantly lower levels of social
disorganization on average as compared to tracts that were not waterfront adjacent.
This finding is supported by previous studies showing that natural amenities, including
rivers and coastlines in urban neighborhoods protected against the negative effects of
suburbanization seen in many cities (S. Lee & Lin, 2013).
Overall, each of the protective factors had an influence on social disorganization,
either directly or by moderating redlining’s effects on social disorganization. In
addition, homeownership rate mediated the effect of redlining on social
disorganization. When controlling for certain individual factors such as
homeownership and waterfront adjacency, redlining’s effect on social disorganization
was rendered insignificant. However, when controlling for all the protective factors
together in one model, it regained its significant effect as seen in Table 40. This indicates
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that the protective factors in this study have a complex combined effect on redlining’s
relationship with social disorganization. For instance, when controlling only for
homeownership rates, it could be that important negative confounders, i.e., variables
whose omission would cause the observed association to be biased towards null, were
missing from the analysis. So, it could be that including a variable into the model that
acts as a negative confounder, let’s say commute time as a potential example, would
remove the negative confounding effect that artificially made the relationship between
redlining and social disorganization appear to be null. The reason such a relationship
might be confounding is that redlined areas tended to be closer to the center of the city,
in areas with more multifamily dwellings and lower homeownership rates regardless of
resident income and including commute time into the model allowed this difference to
be controlled for. Further research may include an in-depth qualitative analysis to
identify the mechanisms through which each of these protective factors affect social
disorganization, and the complex ways in which they work together. For example, such
an analysis may include an examination of why certain protective factors negate the
effect of redlining on social disorganization when analyze on their own but not when
entered into a model together.
Question 4: What effect has redlining had on area homicide rates, and is this
relationship mediated by redlining’s effect on area social disorganization? How is this
effect mediated or moderated by government funding decisions and protective factors?
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The final research question sought to link each of these analyses of the causes of
social disorganization to spatio-temporal homicide patterns in Chicago. The hypothesis
being that redlining increased homicide rates through its effect on measures of social
disorganization. Overall, the analyses showed that both redlining and social
disorganization were positively associated with homicide rates over time, and that the
effect of redlining on homicide rates was indeed fully mediated by its effect on social
disorganization.
More specifically, redlined tracts had significantly higher homicide rates than
non-redlined tracts. This difference was persistent across all decades studied. This
finding was consistent with a previous study which found that modern day firearm
assaults were significantly higher in formerly redlined neighborhoods (Jacoby et al.,
2018). However, mixed-effects regression analyses showed that while the effect was
positive and significant across all decades studied, it varied in strength. As shown in
Figure 41, the effect increased from 1960 through 1980 before beginning to decrease.
Again, this seems to follow the pattern found earlier where concentrations of social
disorganization began to shift away from formerly redlined neighborhoods towards
neighborhoods further from the city center.
In addition, tracts with high homicide rates tended to cluster together, as
suggested by the literature on the spillover effect of violent crime into neighboring
communities (A. W. Chamberlain & Hipp, 2015; Griffiths & Chavez, 2004; Morenoff et
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al., 2001). And, throughout the decades studied, social disorganization score and
homicide rate were highly correlated. Indeed, as the patterns of social disorganization
concentration shifted decade-by-decade, concentrations of high homicide rates mirrored
these shifts. This can be seen clearly in Figure 42 which plots decade-level social
disorganization concentrations next to homicide concentrations. In each decade, the
patterns are nearly identical. That is, the same tracts with high rates of social
disorganization also saw high rates of homicides. Indeed, this study provided strong
evidence that the effect of redlining on homicide rates was fully mediated by redlining’s
effect on social disorganization, meaning redlining affected homicide rates through its
effect on social disorganization.
Therefore, it was not surprising that several of the government funding and
protective factors that were shown to affect social disorganization also affected
homicide rates. For instance, tracts subjected to the government funding decisions
examined in this study saw higher homicide rates than other tracts. However, when
controlling for social disorganization levels, these effects were nullified. But this doesn’t
necessarily mean that they don’t have positive relationships with homicide rate since
some important predictors, including protective factors, were missing from the analysis.
Three protective factors were associated with lower homicide rates: homeownership
rates, tract landmark status, and waterfront adjacency. These associations remained
significant when controlling for social disorganization. In addition, these factors
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reduced the effect of redlining on homicide rate but not to insignificance, indicating the
combined factors partially mediated that relationship. And finally, commute time
moderated the effect of social disorganization on homicide rate. Specifically, as
commute time increased so did the strength of the relationship between redlining and
homicide rate. This may be a result of the shift in concentration of areas with high social
disorganization away from the city center, which alleviated social disorganization levels
in tracts closer to the city center while increasing it in tracts further out to the south and
west of the city.
Importantly, these findings confirm that this study’s more modern
reconceptualization of social disorganization as more of a measure of concentrated
disadvantage, as opposed to the theory’s original conceptualization of something
affecting neighborhoods that are in a state of constant transition, had a strong
association with violent crime rates. This new conceptualization used the following
factors to create a social disorganization score: racial isolation, percentage of households
that were female headed, percentage of households living below the poverty level, and
the unemployment rate for individuals sixteen and older.
Extant literature exists tying each of these factors directly to violent crime. For
instance, studies have found that racial isolation increases levels of crime in Black
communities by concentrating poverty and joblessness into small pockets of
disadvantage (Massey, 1996; R. Peterson & Krivo, 2009; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996;
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Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996). Other studies found that disruptions to the family structure
and family instability, often caused by a disconnection of males in certain communities
from the job market, also led to increases in violent crime rates (S. F. Messner &
Sampson, 1991; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994; Solomon, 2018; Wilson, 1987) by
decreasing formal and informal social controls. Unemployment has also been shown to
influence crime (Arvanites & Defina, 2006; Devine et al., 1988; Phillips & Land, 2012;
Shihadeh & Ousey, 1996), however, these studies found that unemployment had a
stronger effect on property crime than on violent crime. Importantly, each of these
factors also lead to increases in poverty and economic inequality, which studies have
found increase rates of violent crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Rosenfeld, 1986), especially in
Black communities (Balkwell, 1990; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994).
There are many theories as to why this study’s conceptualization of social
disorganization as a measure of concentrated disadvantage may lead to increased
violent crime. For instance, Elijah Anderson’s (1999) Code of the Street theory posits
that individuals living in extreme concentrated poverty feel alienated from mainstream
society and lose faith in the criminal justice system to protect them, and therefore take
matters of protection into their own hands by acting violently. Other theories suggest
that violence becomes a way for young men in such communities to prove their
manhood or express their anger, something they are unable to do through traditional
means due to alienation from mainstream society (Majors & Billson, 1993; McCall, 1995;
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Messerschmidt, 1993). Often, involvement in crime comes as a natural response to
living in concentrated poverty (Bruce et al., 1998) as Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) found in
their study of retaliatory killings in St. Louis where they noted that the combined effects
of structural disadvantage, neighborhood culture, and problematic policing meant that
such killings were seen as a way to exert control. In any case, this study provides
support to the body of evidence linking violent crime structural disadvantages suffered
in certain, often Black communities, many of which were knowingly inflicted on said
communities by federal, state, and local governments to advantage whites at the
expense of Blacks.

Policy Implications and Recommendations
A major takeaway from this study is that violent crime is heavily associated with
neighborhood concentrated disadvantage. This finding suggests that addressing crime
using the traditional punitive criminal justice measures discussed earlier in this study
that rely on surveillance through over policing and punishment through incarceration
may be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. This is because, as previously
discussed, those policies often worsen the social problems that this study found to be
associated with increased levels of crime (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008; Kamalu &
Onyeozili, 2018; Owusu-Bempah, 2017; Western et al., 2015). Instead, the findings from
this study suggest that, to reduce violent crime in American cities, policies should focus
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on reversing the damage caused by the discriminatory policies described in this study
which have perpetuated extreme levels of concentrated disadvantage in certain, very
often Black, communities.
Unfortunately, reversing the negative effects of over a century of discrimination
is a much more complicated proposition than simply using the weight of the criminal
justice system to address the downstream results of said discrimination through
enforcement and punishment. Throughout the decades, many ideas have been put
forward on how to address these complicated issues, however, none constitute a magic
bullet. Instead, reversing the damages of redlining and the subsequent harms it caused
will likely require sweeping reforms across many areas of government from the
national to the local level. More importantly, it will also require changing American’s
perceptions of the causes of disadvantage and its resulting violence. This is because if
people believe disadvantage to be a result of moral failings, and not decades of
discrimination, these sweeping reforms are unlikely to stand a political chance of
passing.
Back in 1967, following a summer where racial tension hit a breaking point,
leading to violent riots in several American cities; then President of the United States
Lyndon Johnson established The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
often called the Kerner Commission after its chair, Otto Kerner Jr. The purpose of this
commission was to determine why this violence occurred, and what could be done to
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prevent such violence in the future. Like this study, the Kerner Commission found that
the major cause of this unrest was that many Black Americans were living in segregated
neighborhoods characterized by social isolation, poverty, unemployment, family
disruption, and a general lack of opportunity and hope. The report concluded that the
prospect for these neighborhoods would be grim unless sweeping changes to public
policy were made. They identified two broad competing categories of policy that could
be pursued: enrichment – or dramatically improving conditions in disadvantaged
neighborhoods and integration – or encouraging individuals in disadvantaged
neighborhoods to move to less disadvantaged areas (United States National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, 1988). Similarly, Bollens (1997) suggests that tackling
concentrated disadvantage would likely require a concerted government effort
involving policies that included both in place/community development strategies
designed to improve economic conditions for poor people in the neighborhoods where
they currently live and mobility/de-concentration strategies designed to allow poor
people living in disadvantaged neighborhoods to move to locations with better
economic conditions and social structures. Importantly, Bollens also suggested that
such a strategy would require the coordination of those in charge of “multiple and
qualitatively different public functions” (Bollens, 1997) to make tradeoffs in order to
coordinate efforts with the goal of deconcentrating regional poverty, and that such
coordination would best occur through a multifunctional regional agency tasked with
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creating a comprehensive regional equity program. The following policy suggestions
will be categorized using this framework of place-based community development and
mobility policies.
The first set of policy recommendations are those seeking to improve resident
mobility. A major problem with concentrated disadvantage is that individuals in highly
disadvantaged communities become stuck in those communities. And, when
individuals do leave these communities, they usually end up in new neighborhoods
that are just as disadvantaged as the ones they left. As noted throughout this study, one
of the main reasons why more affluent neighborhoods tend not to integrate is because
of racial and economic discrimination. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 was supposed to
solve the problem of housing discrimination by prohibiting discrimination in the sale,
rental, or financing of a home on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex,
handicap, or family status (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), n.d.). Additional legislation added further provisions including the Equal
Credit Opportunity act of 1974 which banned discrimination in mortgage lending and
the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act which outlawed discrimination against Black
neighborhoods in terms of investments (Massey, 2015). However, as previously noted,
this legislation was stripped of nearly all its enforcement mechanisms (Massey, 2015)
even after a 1988 amendment to the act gave HUD additional power to investigate and
enforce complaints (Hackworth, 2005). Indeed, a 2018 fair housing trends report by the

254

National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) found that the biggest obstacle to fair housing
rights in America is the federal government’s failure to vigorously enforce fair housing
laws (Abedin et al., 2018). Therefore, it should come as no surprise that this study found
that segregation and concentrated disadvantage existed in Chicago through the entire
study period, long after the passing of the Fair Housing Act.
Accordingly, a major category of policy recommendation for alleviating
concentrated disadvantage is adding additional methods to allow for the enforcement
of the current Fair Housing Act. For instance, in American Apartheid, Massey and Denton
(1993) suggest that, to encourage fair housing, HUD should: increase financial
assistance to organizations that do fair housing work to improve their resources and
ability to investigate and prosecute housing discrimination complaints, establish a
testing program that enables them to identify realtors who engage in patterns of
discrimination, create a group to work under the Assistant Secretary of Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) to scrutinize lending data to identify lenders with
unusually high rates of rejection in for minority applicants and in minority
neighborhoods, and shift trials from federal courts to administrative law judges to
allow more timely relief through judicial action. In the decades since these suggestions
were made, much of this work has yet to be done. In addition, the NFHA recommends
Congress should establish an independent fair housing enforcement agency tasked with
administering and enforcing the Fair Housing Act, a responsibility that currently falls to
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HUD’s FHEO, which has consistently failed to enforce fair housing regulations. They
also suggest reinstating the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule which
required all HUD grantees to make a concrete data and community member driven
plan to identify and overcome fair housing barriers. This rule also helped equip these
grantees with the data and analytical tools necessary to design said plans.
Unfortunately, the finalized plan, which was passed by HUD in 2015, has since been
dismantled by HUD Secretary Ben Carson in 2018 (Abedin et al., 2018).
However, the idea of strengthening antidiscrimination laws is not without its critics.
For instance, Wilson (1987) notes that the problem is more complicated than the
“conscious refusal of whites to accept Blacks as equal human beings and their
systematic effort to deny Blacks equal opportunity”, as this fails to account for the
deepening economic divide within the Black community. Others have suggested that
simply tackling concentrated disadvantage through anti-racial discrimination policy
without addressing other underlying economic issues within the Black community has
worsened the conditions in these areas by allowing the Black residents with the means
to do so to vacate the communities, leaving behind those who are too poor to take
advantage of antidiscrimination laws (Hackworth, 2005).
Another recommendation for increasing mobility is creating policies that
encourage increased affordability in more affluent areas, thereby making them more
attainable for residents of poorer communities. This may involve, for instance, federal
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policies designed to ease local regulations that drive up housing costs such as: zoning
ordinances, impact fees, and growth controls (Schill & Wachter, 1995). Rothstein (2017),
for instance, suggests a ban on zoning ordinances that prohibit multifamily housing or
require specific lot sizes or square footage for newly constructed single-family housing;
noting that such rules prevent lower and middle-income families from settling in more
affluent neighborhoods. He also suggests that Congress could amend the tax code to
deny mortgage interest deductions for property owners in areas that are not taking
sufficient steps in attracting their fair share of lower income residents. An example of
such a policy is New Jersey’s Fair Share Act which requires jurisdictions to provide
through land use regulations a “realistic opportunity for a fair share of its region’s
present and prospective needs for housing for low- and moderate-income families.”
This legislation requires municipalities in the state that do not have their “fair share” of
low- and moderate-income housing to allow developers to build multi-unit
subsidized housing (New Jersey Fair Housing Act, 2008). Indeed, Boger (1993) went as
far as to suggest the adoption of a national fair share act that included dispersing funds
to municipalities that agreed to shoulder their fair share of housing obligations and
disincentivize municipalities who did not through tax code modifications that would
affect property owners in those areas.
Other jurisdictions perform inclusionary zoning at the local level. For instance, New
York City has an inclusionary housing program designed to promote economic
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integration by creating incentives for developers of new housing to include a
percentage of units that are affordable, and remain permanently affordable (New York
City Department of City Planning, n.d.).
Another major policy that allows individuals from impoverished communities to
move to more affluent ones is the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program, which
assists low-income families in renting decent, safe, and sanitary housing in mixedincome neighborhoods by providing rental subsidies directly to landlords (Housing
Choice Voucher Program (Section 8), n.d.). Currently, the program assists approximately
2.2 million low-income families. Unfortunately, this only represents about a quarter of
families who are eligible to receive a program voucher (Zaterman & Holder, 2020). In
addition, only a small minority of HCV holders use their vouchers to live in lowpoverty areas. This is likely a result of residents wanting to stay in existing
neighborhoods where support structures exist, while others simply lack the resources to
move to more affluent communities where many landlords do not accept vouchers and
where housing vacancies are low (Sard et al., 2018).
One simple policy that could help improve mobility is to simply increase the
amount of federal funds going towards the HCV program, which would allow more
families to obtain housing in higher income areas. HCVs are also currently
administered at the jurisdictional level which makes integration across jurisdictions
difficult. Instead, administering these programs at the metropolitan area would allow
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for better integration as it would allow individuals to move to more affluent
jurisdictions within their metropolitan area (Rothstein, 2017). Another suggestion
would involve providing public housing agencies who administer HCV programs with
additional funds to provide robust housing mobility services that may include outreach
to landlords and housing search assistance (Sard et al., 2018). An example of such a
policy is the Baltimore Housing Mobility Program which provides voucher holders
with intensive counselling to help them locate and save for a security deposit in high
opportunity neighborhoods. In addition, they provide two years of post-move
counselling to help them adjust to life in their new communities. To date, the program
has allowed families from poor, often redlined, communities to move to communities
with much lower poverty rates and much higher average incomes (Engdahl, 2009).
HUD’s Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) program, which started in
1994, was another federally funded program designed to allow low-income families
move to low poverty neighborhoods by providing tenant-based rental assistance in
combination with housing counseling. Evaluations of the program’s outcomes have
been mixed. An initial evaluation of the program found that it had real positive effects
on families randomly selected into the program as compared to the control group in the
areas of housing conditions and the quality of schools that their children attended, but
that there was no evidence that it had a positive effect on their educational
performance, or on employment, income, or self-sufficiency. Subsequent studies found
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that the program that looked at resident outcomes several years after receiving this
intervention saw significantly improved economic and quality of life outcomes as a
result (Kling et al., 2004, 2007). However, other studies indicate that the program had no
positive effect on such families, noting that previous findings were a result of selection
bias (Clampet‐Lundquist & Massey, 2008). More recent research of the outcomes of
MTO found that the children of families from the original study who were younger
than 13 at the time of their move saw improved college attendance rates and earnings.
They were also more likely than children from the control group to live in low-poverty
areas. However, children from the same families who were older than 13 at the time of
the move saw somewhat negative long-term outcomes, perhaps because of the
disruption the moves caused (Chetty et al., 2016).
As noted earlier, the second set of policy recommendations involve place-based
policies that encourage community development in neighborhoods plagued by the type
of social disorganization discussed in this study, thereby improving the quality of life of
community residents. One way of doing this is to improve the economic conditions of
individuals currently living in said neighborhoods. Years of structural racism and
discrimination have left many of the residents of these neighborhoods with little in the
way of assets, which are a prerequisite to obtaining stable, safe, and affordable housing.
In his book Being Black, Living in the Red (1999, p. 166), Conley suggests that the federal
government could help encourage savings and help poor families save for the future
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and accumulate wealth by designing savings plans. This plan would bypass the need
for families to make regular savings decisions by providing families who agree to set
aside some small portion of their paycheck into a savings plan with a lump sum that
would become immediately available to them. The government would then match fifty
percent of those families’ monthly savings for the next fifteen years. Such a plan would
help families save over time while at the same time giving them immediate access to
much needed capital. Conly also proposes a program called “Self-Help” that was
implemented in South Carolina by which funds from a large charitable grant were used
to insure the mortgages of underserved families who were otherwise unable to acquire
loans. This program allowed for approximately 27,000 families to become homeowners
over the course of five years.
Another area for policy improvement would involve addressing lending
discrimination in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), which was enacted in 1977, was supposed to solve the issue of lending
discrimination by ensuring that lending institutions meet the credit needs of low- and
moderate-income communities through regulation (Federal Reserve Board - Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), 2020). And, while some have lauded the successes of the CRA
(Barr, 2005), it is not without its critics, most of whom note lack of federal enforcement
as a major shortcoming (Fishbein, 1992; Marsico, 2005), and as a result, the law has had
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little effect on the market share of lenders in historically redlined neighborhoods (Park
& Quercia, 2020).
In his book Credit to the Community Dan Immergluck (2004) outlines some
suggestions on how to strengthen the CRA so that it can better address the issues of
lending discrimination and concentrated disadvantage. First, he notes that the CRA
only regulates banks and thrifts, while in recent years an increasingly large portion of
mortgages are provided by other institutions including mortgage and finance
companies, insurance companies, security firms and credit unions. He suggests that any
institution making housing or small business loans should be regulated under the act.
Next, he notes that current CRA assessment areas (the geographic boundaries where a
bank’s transactions are reviewed) currently only incorporate the communities
surrounding physical branch locations. To solve this, any metropolitan area where a
bank makes a substantial number of loans should be included in that bank’s assessment
area. Requiring assessment areas to include entire metropolitan areas would also limit
banks from creatively constructing assessment areas that don’t include low-income
neighborhoods. He also notes that little attention is paid to small business lending
patterns, and as a result, there is little regulation of discrimination in that area. Going
forward, regulators should review race and area socioeconomic data on a loan-by-loan
basis. And finally, he notes that the CRA should be used to protect poor communities
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against predatory lending, and that the act should explicitly address discrimination by
race, and not just income level.
A recent federal program, Qualified Opportunity Zones, was created in 2017.
Through this program, the United States Internal Revenue Service provides tax
incentives to individuals and businesses who invest in low-income census tracts
identified as opportunity zones. The purpose of the program is to spur investment and
encourage economic growth in underserved communities (What Are Opportunity Zones and
How Do They Work?, 2020). This program is too new to have affected the results of this

analysis. However, future research should look at the extent to which these zones
overlap with formerly redlined areas, and whether they have an effect in reducing
social disorganization in those areas.
Another way to improve economic conditions in disadvantaged neighborhoods is
by attracting higher income families, thereby deconcentrating poverty and attracting
additional investment to said neighborhoods. Hackworth (2005), for instance, proposes
a policy to encourage individual residential investment in distressed neighborhoods by
encouraging the in-migration middle-class families to said neighborhoods. Such a
policy may include providing targeted federal tax credits to individuals who move to
distressed neighborhoods based on some measure of neighborhood-level poverty
concentration. These tax credits would make housing in high poverty neighborhoods
more desirable. Another option may include creating favorable rehabilitation loan
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terms in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty that are in need of
rehabilitation. Hackworth notes that such policies could increase neighborhood
diversity, improve social capital, and increase neighborhood political power. Finally,
Hackworth notes that such a program would need to avoid leading to gentrification
such that the families originally living in these neighborhoods get priced out. He does,
however, point out that change resulting from individual investment would happen
more slowly than from large-scale government investments. He also suggests that
incentives should be removed from a neighborhood once its poverty level dips below a
predetermined threshold.
However, even in instances of “positive gentrification” where the original residents
of neighborhoods are not directly displaced, there often exist forms of indirect
displacement that slowly push residents out of their former neighborhoods. For
instance: price shadowing in gentrifying neighborhoods may result in price increases
that drive neighborhood costs beyond the financial means of original residents, new
residents may disrupt local governance and place identity in such a way that leads to a
loss of power and belonging of original residents, and shifts in neighborhood resources
caused by an inflow of higher-income residents may result in a shift in the local
economy by which original residents no longer have access to needed resources
including affordable goods and services (Davidson, 2008). Ensuring that existing
residents of gentrifying neighborhoods receive the benefits of positive economic shifts
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presents a difficult policy problem. However, Joe Kriesberg (2018) of the Massachusetts
Association of Community Development Corporations put forth some interesting ideas.
One idea would involve affordable housing actors buying buildings in gentrifying
neighborhoods where current residents live to make sure that those units remain
affordable despite shifts in the local market. He also suggested that affordable housing
systems should shift more resources towards promoting homeownership of existing
residents to help them remain stabilized in their changing neighborhoods. And finally,
to address cultural and economic displacement, he suggests working to help existing
local businesses stay open so that they can continue to serve existing residents and
supporting creating place making and place keeping to help retain these communities'
historic and cultural narratives.
The final set of place-based policies involve making improvements to transform
disadvantaged communities with high levels of concentrated poverty into vibrant,
mixed-income neighborhoods that benefit existing residents. The idea behind
transforming low-income neighborhoods into mixed-income neighborhoods was that it
would allow individuals who had lived in poverty with limited access to opportunities
to live in communities with better resources along with higher-income residents who
could create opportunity pathways while allowing said residents to remain in areas
where they have strong social ties and support systems (Pelletiere & Crowley, 2012). An
example of an initiative designed to deconcentrate poverty through the construction of
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mixed-income developments in formerly high-poverty areas is the HOPE VI program
which started in 1992 to lessen the concentration of poverty and reshape public housing
by replacing severely distressed public housing developments with sustainable mixed
income communities in conjunction with the provision of supportive services to
promote resident self-sufficiency (Popkin et al., 2004). And, while residents of the new
developments who came from formerly distressed public housing developments felt
more comfortable and secure in their new housing (Joseph & Chaskin, 2010), those same
residents saw little or no economic benefit (Goetz, 2010). As Rothstein (2017) suggested,
to ensure better economic outcomes for low-income families in redeveloped
communities, any such development should only occur as part of an integrated urban
development program that includes improvements to services such as transportation,
health services, job creation, supermarkets, and community safety.
An example of a program that follows Rothstein’s vision of an integrated urban
development is HUD’s replacement for the HOPE VI program – Choice
Neighborhoods. Like HOPE VI, Choice Neighborhoods involves replacing severely
distressed public housing with modern, mixed-income housing. However, it also
involves a plan for revitalizing the surrounding neighborhood. This plan generally
includes fostering partnerships with other public and private entities to improve the
services, schools and educational programs, public assets, public transportation, and
access to jobs in the area surrounding the development (The Urban Institute, 2013). To
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date, the effectiveness of the program in deconcentrating poverty and improving the
lives of residents who previously lived in distressed public housing has not been tested.
Future research should evaluate the effectiveness of the Choice Neighborhood program
on resident economic outcomes. Another program that seeks to improve neighborhood
services in areas of concentrated poverty is the U.S. Department of Education’s (DOE)
Promise Neighborhoods program which, modeled after the successful Harlem
Children’s Zone program, is a place-based initiative designed to improve the
educational opportunities of children growing up in distressed neighborhoods. It does
this by encouraging and supporting collaboration between institutions and agencies
within a neighborhood to create comprehensive plans to support neighborhood
children’s educational needs from cradle to career (U.S. Department of Education,
2018). For instance, one Promise Neighborhood grant in San Francisco’s Mission District
involved a collaboration between over twenty partners to provide wraparound services
to strengthen children’s families so they could do better in school. This included
providing services to ensure stable housing, providing access to immigration and
tenants’ rights assistance, and providing access to quality medical care among other
things. In this instance, the program saw improved outcomes including higher
graduation rates among minority students and improved school enrollment rates (Raya,
2019). And, while Promise Neighborhoods provides an example of a place-based
service designed to improve one aspect of the lives of individuals living in concentrated
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poverty, similar programs may be created to target other problem areas in those same
communities including employment, housing, and adult education just to name a few.
Finally, as Rothstein (2017) notes, if young people in America are not taught how
our country became segregated, there is little hope in us doing a better job in the future.
Therefore, middle and high school history curriculum should include a frank and
historically accurate discussion of the discriminatory practices discussed in this study,
and the effect they had on current day concentrated poverty and violence in Black
communities. Otherwise, we are doomed as a nation to repeat the same mistakes.

Study Strengths and Limitations
There is currently a dearth of empirical evidence linking the discriminatory
government policies of the 20th Century to concentrations of urban disadvantage and
violent crime. This study helps fill that gap by identifying a significant relationship
between the discriminatory practice of redlining and concentrations of violent crime
that is mediated by redlining’s effect on social disorganization, operationalized in this
study as concentrated disadvantage. This study also fills an important gap in the
literature around social disorganization which generally takes for granted the original
source of social disorganization in communities. In addition, this study identifies key
community characteristics, or “protective factors”, that help shield certain
neighborhoods against the harmful effects of redlining over time.
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A major strength of this study was the unique dataset used that was custom
made for this analysis. The dataset used a variety of data sources and merged them in
interesting and unique ways. This allowed for the analysis of data from decade’s worth
of decennial censuses, crime data, and other geographical data such as the locations of
government developments and neighborhood resources. This allowed for the analysis
of the intricate ways in which these different factors affected tract-level neighborhood
conditions over time and space. The descriptions of the creation of this dataset may help
future criminal justice researchers, and indeed other social scientists studying the
intricate effects of urban policies, create similar datasets designed to examine the
complex ways that these policies affect places over time and space.
That being said, another major strength of this study was also its ability to track
longitudinal changes across small geographic areas over long periods of time.
Specifically, it allowed for the analysis of super tract level changes over a span of eighty
years. This is powerful because it not only allowed for the analysis of the effects of
redlining and other government policies on current neighborhood conditions, but also
allowed for the analysis of how those conditions changed over time, thereby providing
a more complete picture of the long-term effects of said policies at a micro-geographic
level.
Limitations
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A major limitation of this study is that the geographic data being used are all at
different levels of aggregation. For instance, some homicide data are at the census tract
level while others are geocoded to their exact location, census data for calculating social
disorganization are at the census tract level, and data on public housing, highway
construction, and TIF districts are at their own levels of geography. In addition, census
tract boundaries changed over the decades studied. Because of this, effort was made to
standardize geographies across the data sources, but this standardization was not
always perfect. This may not affect outcomes much but may introduce bias into the
findings. In addition, when point-level variables such as crime and instances of social
disorganization are aggregated into larger areas, analyses face the modifiable areal unit
problem where summary values can be influenced by the size and shape of the
geometries used (J. K. Nelson & Brewer, 2017). Also, some of the factors being studied
have changed over time in terms of how they are collected. This is especially true for the
census data, which is collected every ten years. And each new census collects different
data in different ways. This limits the data points that can be used over time to those
that stayed consistent across censuses.
The major outcome variable of interest, homicide rates, was also not available for
years prior to 1965. Since redlining, the intervention being tested, occurred in the 1930s,
there is a three-decade gap between the independent and dependent variables in the
study. Fortunately, though, data on social disorganization are available for that 30-year
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time period, which is important since this study proposes that the effect of redlining on
violent crime is mediated by indicators of social disorganization.
Another limitation of the study is that data are quite limited on the major
independent variable of interest, discriminatory government practices. For instance,
little data exists on government policies such as biased mortgage insurance practices,
employment discrimination, and supporting racially biased zoning practices that may
have stemmed from redlining and contributed to social disorganization.
Finally, it is difficult to distinguish from the data available what portion of the
findings are a result of government practices, and what portion are simply a result of a
continuation of the conditions that were in place prior to redlining. This is exacerbated
by the fact that much of the data used for this analysis were not made available until
around the time of redlining, or shortly after it occurred.
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Conclusion
This study demonstrated that historic discriminatory government policies such
as redlining have increased rates of violent crimes in certain communities through their
effect on social disorganization and concentrated disadvantage. In addition, it has
shown that these negative effects have persisted across decades and can still be seen in
neighborhoods subjected to them today. The policy implications of this finding are that
to reduce violent crime in urban communities, we cannot simply rely on our current
punitive criminal justice system. Instead, policies should focus on reducing
concentrated disadvantage and racial isolation by helping economically strengthen
severely disadvantaged neighborhoods and by increasing residential mobility for
individuals currently living in those neighborhoods. Futures studies should look more
closely at the relationship between public housing and social disorganization, and the
mediating effect that relationship has on redlining’s relationship with social
disorganization. Studies should also examine how patterns of social disorganization
have changed over the decades; specifically, how and why pockets of disadvantage
have moved outward from those areas generally considered the inner city. Studies
should also examine the effect of TIF and other community development funding play
in reducing disadvantage, and whether that relationship is affected by the quality of
said programs. And finally, studies should look more deeply into the complex ways
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that the protective factors examined in this study work together to affect neighborhood
social disorganization.
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Appendix A: Available Data by Decade
Table 54 - Available Data by Decade
Measure
Total Population
Homicide Count
Population by Race
Racial Isolation
Unemployment Rate
Female Headed Rate
Poverty Rate
Housing Value
Owner Occupancy Rate
Waterfront Designation
Landmark District
Designation

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

🗴🗴
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
✓

🗴🗴
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
✓

✓
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓

✓
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓
🗴🗴
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓

✓
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓
🗴🗴
✓
✓
✓
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